For American policymakers, Taiwan has been an oasis of calm in a turbulent region during the past eight years. But that may be about to change.
When President Ma Ying-jeou of the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) party was elected in 2008, he made rapprochement with mainland China the centerpiece of his administration. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait dropped to their lowest level in decades, while economic ties flourished, with China becoming Taiwan’s leading trading partner.
The thaw was dramatized by Ma’s historic meeting last November with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore. It was the first time the leaders of the two parties had met since Mao Zedong’s communists seized power from Chaing Kai-shek’s KMT in 1949, during the Chinese civil war.
But Taiwan’s election on January 16 is likely to dramatically change the picture. Opinion polls show that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will win a decisive victory. Its leader, 59-year-old, London-educated Tsai Ing-wen, is almost certain to defeat KMT candidate Eric Chu and become the island’s first woman president. Her party may well gain control of Taiwan’s legislature for the first time.
The DPP has long supported independence for Taiwan, which Beijing insists is a Chinese province that must eventually be reunited with the mainland – by force if necessary. And China, whose policy of rapprochement and growing economic integration was designed to achieve the long-term goal of political reunification, has reacted to Tsai’s likely election with alarm.
Barely two weeks before the vote, China’s top official in charge of relations with Taipei, Zhang Zhijun, warned against "any pro-independence separatist attempts to split Taiwan from China and to sabotage peace and stability."
Beijing has demanded that Tsai endorse the concept of “One China” and the so-called “1992 Consensus,” an ambiguous formula under which China and the KMT agreed that there was only one China but acknowledged that each side had its own interpretation of what that meant.
Ma’s administration has described the consensus as a key foundation of the current improvement in relations, while Chinese leader Xi Jinping warned last year that “to deny the 1992 Consensus, challenge the legal basis of both sides of the Taiwan Strait belonging to one China…will shake the cornerstone of the development in cross-Strait relations, and there will be no possibility of peace or development.”
In her unsuccessful presidential bid in 2012, Tsai declared that the 1992 Consensus “did not exist.” Indeed, her position at the time prompted the Obama administration to publicly signal its unease at the prospect she might become Taiwan’s leader.
Since then, however, she has moderated her stance, calling for “constructive exchanges and dialogue with China,” and seeking to reassure both Washington and Beijing that she supports maintenance of the status quo. Unlike former DPP leader Chen Shui-bian, who held the presidency from 2000 to 2008 and was known for his provocative pro-independence rhetoric, Tsai has projected a calm, steady style and avoided inflammatory statements. Her campaign, while tapping into a deep public sense of Taiwan identity, has focused on Taiwan’s economic difficulties and stressed the need for an open and consultative approach to dealing with Beijing.
"I will make the greatest efforts to seek mutually acceptable interaction between Taiwan and mainland China," she said in one televised debate. "I will not be provocative, there will not be surprises."
Assuming she does win, however, managing her party’s own internal politics may prove to be difficult for Tsai. If the DPP gains control of the legislature, as many observers also expect, Tsai could face pressure from more extreme pro-independence voices in her own camp advocating a more confrontational approach to Beijing.
The key question under these circumstances is whether anything Tsai says – short of bowing to China’s demands—will ease Beijing’s distrust. And if not, could China—which under Xi Jinping has taken a more assertive posture on many international issues—seek to ratchet up the pressure?
“Tsai Ing-wen isn’t going to do anything stupid,” said one former U.S. government Asia specialist. “But what about the scenario where she does nothing to offend Beijing but China decides to teach her a lesson anyway? If the Chinese are as thick-headed about Taiwan as they have been lately in so many other areas, it suggests their response may not be as deft as it otherwise might.”
An increase in cross-Strait tensions would pose a tough challenge for the United States, which is pledged to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.
To underscore this commitment, in December, the Obama administration authorized a $1.83 billion weapons sale to Taiwan, including ground missiles, frigates, amphibious vehicles, and communications. Beijing reacted angrily, threatening to sanction U.S. companies involved in the sale, although many analysts believe the Chinese response will turn out to be more rhetoric than action.
But if China does turn up the heat on a newly elected Tsai Ing-weng, managing the triangular relationship between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—long one of the trickiest problems for any American administration—is likely to become even more challenging.
