The complex proxy war in Syria has demonstrated both the reach and limitations of Iran’s strategic influence. By mobilizing a wide range of strategic, tactical, and operational resources, Iran has prevented the collapse of the Syrian state.
However, the depth of its commitment notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic lacks both the military muscle and diplomatic resources to conclusively defeat the wide array of forces ranged against the Syrian state.
This lack of superior strategic and diplomatic prowess came into sharp relief following the forceful Russian entry into the war last September. In the space of a few months, the Russian air force in Syria managed to transform the battle space in a conclusive manner, a feat Iran would struggle to achieve over several years.
Russian involvement notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic continues to be the most active foreign power in the Syrian conflict. Apart from mobilizing and directing its Lebanese ally Hezbollah and myriad Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shiite militias in the conflict zone, Iran has also deployed several thousand Revolutionary Guards, as well as a few dozen regular army special forces.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has deployed personnel from every branch (including from its air force and navy), with its expeditionary wing, the 2nd Qods Force, directing and coordinating operations at the highest levels.
One poorly understood aspect of Iran’s involvement in the conflict is the Islamic Republic’s concerted – and largely covert – effort to utilize the Kurds for its strategic ends.
In respect to the Syrian Kurds, the challenge for Iranian policy makers is not simply limited to reconciling the country’s short, medium, and long term objectives, but extends to preventing Kurdish-specific policies from clashing with wider regional considerations, notably future relations with Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
In the short and medium term, Iran has adopted a liberal attitude to the existence of Rojava, or “Western Kurdistan,” according to Kurdish nationalist narrative, viewing Syrian Kurdish autonomy as a useful buffer against Syrian rebels.
This outlook is reinforced by Rojava’s pragmatic attitude to the Syrian war, which in practice translates to tacit alliance with Damascus and by extension to Iran and Hezbollah.
In managing this relationship, Iran faces two key challenges. First, IRGC military planners in Syria are keen to push the Kurds to actively confront Syrian rebels, particularly in the Aleppo region. This machination has yielded mixed results; while People’s Protection Units (YPG) have periodically clashed with rebels and jihadists, on the whole, they try to avoid kinetic contact with groups not affiliated with the so-called Islamic State.
Second, the IRGC aspires to contain Syrian Kurdish cooperation with Western nations, notably the United States, to an acceptable level. Specifically, while the Iranians are not overly concerned about the intense American and YPG cooperation in the fight against the so-called Islamic State group, they do not want to see this cooperation extended to other areas.
In the long-term, pursuant to the conclusion of hostilities in Syria, the continuing political autonomy of Rojava is potentially inimical to Iran’s strategic interests in so far as it threatens Damascus’ hegemony, particularly if the quest for autonomy intensifies to demands for independence.
Additionally, there are legitimate fears centered on Kurdish irredentism, not only in terms of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) connection, but more importantly from Iran’s point of the view, the intensifying relationship between Rojava and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.
While the Islamic Republic has long accepted Kurdish autonomy in Iraq, it cannot abide the significant expansion of this autonomy across international borders, particularly as it directly threatens not only its most important ally in Damascus, but also further weakens the Shiite-led government in Baghdad.
At a higher strategic level, Iran is concerned about potential Turkish reactions to the consolidation and further empowerment of Rojava. Until now, the Turks have refrained from direct military intervention in Syria for fear of getting embroiled in a quagmire. This attitude may change once major hostilities have concluded.
Even a limited Turkish invasion of northern Syrian would place intolerable pressures on the government in Damascus, thereby necessitating a strong Iranian response.
Besides deploying military means to contain Kurdish ambitions in Syria and to disrupt the PKK-YPG alliance, Turkey will also likely apply diplomatic and political pressure on Iraqi Kurds to adopt a less cooperative attitude to Rojava.
Increased Turkish influence on the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is inimical to Iranian interests, as it complicates the Islamic Republic’s intricate balancing act in Iraq.
In conclusion, Iranian military planners and political strategists have to be mindful of these potential long-term scenarios even as they are fully engaged in fighting Syrian rebels and jihadists.
