On Sunday, March 26, widespread protests broke out in more than 80 cities in the Russian Federation, apparently in response to the government's inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem of endemic corruption.
Estimates of the numbers of protesters vary, with the opposition claiming that more than 30,000 participated in Moscow alone. The government estimated fewer than 8,000 protesters. With the announced number of protesters arrested at over 1,500, it is likely the number of participants was larger than government figures suggest, though definitely smaller than the massive protests in 2011 and 2012.
Striking nonetheless was the breadth of the protests — in cities from St. Petersburg in the west to Vladivostok in the east — and the relative youth of the participants. These weren't disgruntled pensioners complaining about transfer payments. Many of the protesters appeared to be young enough to have known only post-Soviet leadership in Russia. They seemed worried about the direction their country is taking under Putin's leadership. Perhaps significantly, the protests took place on the 17th anniversary of Putin's first election to the presidency. Putin warned of hooliganism and point to the chaos that stemmed from "colored revolutions" and the Arab Spring.
Putin may have cause for concern. The recent protests, complaining about corruption, are materially different in substance than the 2011 and 2012 protests that focused on election fraud, although the issues are related. The latest round of protests has taken place in a worse economic and political environment.
Moreover, the luster of the nationalism aroused by Putin's geopolitical adventures in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere may have begun to fade as the conflicts in those regions continue and as their economic cost rises. Russia's increased negative image in the world, and in the West in particular, may be taking its toll on the Russian polity as the effects of the corruption exposed in the Panama Papers and by the impressive investigative activity of opposition leader Alexei Navalny starts to have an impact. This is in addition to the impact of the massive Russian sports cheating scandal exposed by the WADA investigations.
Western sanctions have been meaningful but not for the purpose for which they were implemented, i.e., to reverse the annexation of Crimea. The sanctions may have helped foster the economic conditions which might over time bring about political change in Russia. Real incomes in Russia have been steadily falling for several years despite relatively stable energy prices. The number of Russians living below the poverty line has increased by 15 percent in the past two years. The number of billionaires and millionaires has increased, and evidence of their extravagant lifestyles has become increasingly available on the internet.
The geopolitical environment may be turning against Putin as well. Despite the annexation of Crimea and the Russian-sponsored insurrections in the Don Basin and the establishment of two more "frozen conflict" states in the model of Transdniestria and Abkhazia, the bulk of the Ukraine has survived and has embarked on a path toward a closer economic, political, and ultimately military relationship with the West. This is precisely what Moscow was trying to avoid. Russia can’t preserve Putinism by creating a ring of "Lugansk People's Republics," meaning, small, weak, pro-Russian, self-proclaimed city-states on its borders.
Moscow has complained repeatedly and loudly about having been betrayed by the West over the eastward expansion of NATO, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea has resulted in meaningful NATO military deployments in the Baltic States, Poland, and elsewhere. The 2014 annexation has likely served as the impetus for increased military spending by NATO members and the expansion of the alliance to include Montenegro (where a failed coup attempt was likely engineered by Russian military intelligence). The U.S. has deployed ballistic missile defense systems to Poland and Romania. Although the rationale for those deployments is defense against Iran, the Russians understand those same systems could be used in defense against Russian missiles.
Even Russia's pervasive use of cyber tools to influence the recent U.S. presidential election has backfired. If you accept the premise that the Russians conspired to bring about a Trump victory, the victory is a pyrrhic one, because the U.S. political environment brought about by Russia's cyber meddling has likely made it very difficult if not impossible for President Trump to effect any meaningful improvement in U.S.-Russian relations and to give Putin the sanctions relief he so clearly desires. Compounding Putin's problems in the long run, Trump has proposed a significant increase in U.S. defense spending and is embarking on a program of modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Trump is encouraging/insisting that U.S. allies increase their defense spending and participation in mutual security. We may be witnessing the beginning of a new arms race that Russia has no more chance of winning than did the Soviet Union.
The Russian argument against the eastward expansion of NATO is based on the belief that NATO is a strategic military threat to Russia. But what Putin and Russia's leadership really fear is the expansion of Western values and economic prosperity to Russia's borders. The pluralistic and democratic values of the West and the efficiency and prosperity of Western economic systems represent direct and existential threats to Putinism.
Putin is desperately engaged in an all-out effort to stem the tide of history. This is a contest he cannot hope to win. Recent protests may be the beginning of a rejectionist movement by Russia's youth against the corruption and dishonesty of the system Putin and his Siloviki cronies have established and from which they have massively profited.
