Drone strikes have proven effective at eliminating terrorist leaders, yet terrorists continue to threaten American security. In this article written for the 15th anniversary of 9/11, Cipher Brief expert Kevin Hulbert describes how U.S. policymakers appear to be confusing a tactic such as drone strikes with an overall counterterrorism strategy.
The fifteen years since 9/11 have been busy for the CIA and the Special Operations community who collectively are the pointy end of the spear in what we used to call the Global War on Terrorism, or the GWOT. And while the Obama administration quickly soured on the GWOT name, more importantly, they did not back away from the important mission. They kept their foot on the gas in the fight against al Qaeda. Most (but, not all) programs and policies put in place during the Bush administration were maintained and even expanded under the Obama administration.
Two notable differences were the Obama administration’s immediate curtailment of the CIA detention centers and the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (i.e., water boarding, et al) and simultaneously, the Obama Administration’s great increase in the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Predator drones) to kill terrorist targets in al Qaeda’s headquarters. While somewhat controversial, the increase in Predator shots is a tactic that definitely kept us safer, as an enemy always playing defense cannot effectively recruit, train, plan, rehearse, and launch attacks against the West.
In the 15 years post 9/11, there have been almost no terrorist attacks launched at us from al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Countless nascent al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the West were suddenly curtailed by aggressive counterterrorist actions that decimated their senior leadership. This was a huge success.
CIA Case Officers and Special Operators from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) have been working tirelessly to protect us from the scourge of terrorism since 9/11. We have consistently succeeded in operations against our al Qaeda nemesis and things didn’t end with Osama Bin Laden’s death in May 2011, either. There wasn’t even a pause as we continued to aggressively take the fight to the enemy. Working unilaterally and with our allies, we have succeeded several times over the last 15 years in eliminating most of the senior leadership of al Qaeda. The number three man in al Qaeda has been captured, or killed, more times than I can count. Now, only the very few who are deeply knowledgeable about al Qaeda would even know who are among the top ten commanders in the organization. Tactical successes against al Qaeda stem from our aggressiveness, our taking the fight to them on their turf, rather than waiting for them to attack us again at home.
Bin Laden’s successor, Aymen al-Zawahiri is so concerned with his own personal safety that he is completely isolated and cut off from the organization he leads, probably only venturing outside on rainy days, not using the phone, not using a computer, a de facto prisoner in his own home, passing written messages via courier and taking weeks or months between any communication. It is ironic that a man heading a ruthless organization that has sent many men to their deaths as suicide bombers is himself so afraid of dying that he has hunkered down in his home while his organization has steadily deteriorated because of attrition and ineffective leadership.
The bad news is that while we have been successful against al Qaeda core, suddenly we have a problem that has morphed and shifted in unexpected ways, and the threat of radical Muslim extremism and terrorism has probably grown, not diminished. Now we have the dreaded Islamic State with whom to contend. From neighborhoods in Brussels, to London, to great swaths of territory in northern Africa, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, the terrorist ideology of radical Muslim extremism is thriving. This is troubling news for the west.
In the environment of weak governance, failed and failing states, weak economies, bad leadership, and a host of other nurturing issues, the terrorist ideology is spreading. The Islamic State is now the source of many more attacks than is al Qaeda. Any tactical victory against the al Qaeda core is a bit hollow when viewed in the context of the backdrop of a larger strategic failure against the spread of radical Muslim extremism. And this is not a failure that the good operators at CIA or JSOC can fix—they don’t make policy. The strategic failure falls squarely in the lap of politicians around the world who have failed to put forward a strategy that might stem the tide of radical Muslim extremism, and in the absence of any real plan, mayhem ensues.
In the end, the scorecard for how we have done in the fight in the Global War on Terrorism over the last 15 years is mixed: Great tactical successes coupled with tragic strategic losses. We have won a lot of battles, but unless we shift course soon, we may lose the war.
