The reduction of sea ice in the Arctic has increased prospects for shipping to and from the Northwest Passage, development of offshore oil in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, and migration of fish stocks from the Bering Sea to the Arctic Ocean. The legal and political regime of the Arctic laid out by the Law of the Sea Convention and the work of the Arctic Council has clarified the obligations of Arctic states to monitor, regulate, and secure activities in their Arctic waters. The speed with which both the physical and legal regimes have changed has overwhelmed the United States’ capacity to monitor and manage activities in the region.
The Coast Guard’s Arctic icebreaker fleet consists of a single heavy icebreaker that is 10 years past its design life and one medium icebreaker commissioned in 1999, both of which may serve in Antarctica as well as the Arctic. Lack of harbors north of the Bering Strait, limited support on-shore for air operations along the Arctic Coast, and only limited deep draft port facilities and air bases in southern Alaska further complicate deployment of the ships and aircraft in the Alaskan Arctic. And satellite observation at high latitudes has not expanded to match increasing activity in the Arctic.
Future Arctic operations will require effective implementation of three functions: physical presence, maritime awareness, and land support. A new heavy icebreaker, budgeted at $1 billion, will provide continued presence but could take days to reach ships or platforms in distress. Additional ships will be needed, probably a mix of ice-hardened cutters, ice breaking patrol ships, and salvage tugs, along with helicopters capable of sustained operations at temperatures of 40 degrees below zero. This, in turn, will require new ports and bases in and near the Arctic for resupply and maintenance.
Located in the high north, the Alaskan exclusive economic zone (EEZ) poses problems for remote observation. A new mix of satellites placed in highly elliptical orbits will be needed to track vessels at sea, monitor ice movement and changing weather conditions, and expand telecommunications and geolocation services.
The United States is not alone in addressing new Arctic challenges. Russia is expanding development of ports, waterways, and offshore oil and gas resources. In Canada, the Northwest Passage is open, not just for hardy explorers but for commercial shippers and tourists sailing this year on the Crystal Serenity as it takes one thousand well-heeled passengers through the once impassable passages. Norway has overseen development of hydrocarbons in the Barents Sea and, along with Denmark, monitored fishing in the Greenland, Norwegian, and Barents seas.
The U.S. does need large icebreakers, particularly the planned replacement for the aging Polar Star. Beyond that, the United States needs to invest in ice-hardened patrol vessels for inspection and boarding duties, icebreaking patrol vessels, tugs, and emergency response ships to respond to casualties in Arctic waters, helicopters that operate and navigate in harsh Arctic storms, and satellites that track vessel movements, monitor changes in weather and ice cover, and provide GPS and communications support for all maritime activities.
Cooperation on Arctic policies among the Arctic coastal states has become the norm, but there is much to be gained from increased cooperation in maritime infrastructure. Some of the possibilities open to the United States have been pioneered in Norway, Denmark, Canada, and Russia. Denmark maintains ice-capable frigates and patrol ships that operate in the Greenland Sea and on the fringe of the Arctic ice sheets. The icebreaking patrol ship Svalbard can operate in ice up to one meter thick and provide emergency assistance and towing services to vessels in distress. Russia is launching a new class of ice-hardened patrol vessels that can operate in 80 centimeters of ice and is constructing a new class of patrol icebreaker similar to Norway’s Svalbard. It is also deploying ice-breaking salvage tugs in the heavily traveled Barents and Kara Seas.
Russia’s planned investment in space-based observation of the Arctic provides insight into the requirements for maintaining maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. The planned Russian system comprises two weather satellites with the capability to route emergency telecommunications, two types of communications satellites deployed in groups of three – one servicing civilians needs and the other handling government communications and relaying data for both GPS and GLONASS positioning systems – and, finally, two Arctic resource observation satellites.
The cost to the United States of maintaining a full spectrum maritime presence in the Arctic is daunting, and it is difficult to secure funds when Congress gives the Arctic a low priority. But the high degree of cooperation among Arctic states evidenced already in the Arctic Council and the new Arctic Coast Guard Forum and by U.S.-Russian cooperation in space activities suggests that the U.S. need not “go it alone” in building its Arctic maritime capacity. Shared vessel design based on collective experience and procurement of ship systems from manufacturers among the Arctic states can reduce costs of the relatively small number of Arctic vessels needed by the U.S. Cooperation in maritime domain awareness based on U.S. and foreign satellite, air, vessel, and shore resources with shared access to data can make the most out of limited resources.
The Arctic is unique because it has developed a pattern of cooperation and collaboration among cold-war opponents. Yes, the United States can and should build a new heavy icebreaker – perhaps more. But it should also collaborate with Canada, Europe, and Russia in design and construction of patrol vessels, emergency response ships, and aircraft for the Arctic. Similarly, it should build on decades of U.S.-Russia cooperation in outer space to contribute new satellites and share the information they gather in a joint effort to strengthen maritime domain awareness for navigation, ice monitoring, vessel identification and tracking, weather prediction, and communications in the Arctic. Joint operations, including “ship rider” programs that place law enforcement officers of one state on the ships of another, and access to foreign ports for service and supply can further extend the capabilities of each nation’s resources in the Arctic.
The heavy polar icebreaker has become an icon for America’s commitment to the Arctic, but large icebreakers, while necessary, are not sufficient. Smaller vessels and aircraft, and investment in real-time observation of the Arctic and in regional bases that can provision and maintain ships and aircraft to maximize their time on station will be needed to get full value out of the new icebreakers. Adm. Paul Zukunft, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, recently stated that the purpose of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum is to “leverage the collective resources of all of the Arctic coast guards.” It falls to the service chiefs represented in the Forum to make the case for collaboration in building the maritime and space infrastructure needed to serve the interests of all Arctic states.
