After months of uncertainty following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, South Korea has a new president. Moon Jae-in, a human rights lawyer and former chief of staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, has promised to pursue economic and political reform and restore prosperity and trust in government. Moon faces an uphill battle on several fronts. His liberal stance on North Korea may put him at odds with the United States, and his party lacks a majority in the National Assembly, making substantial reforms a difficult task. The Cipher Brief spoke to Soo Kim, a former CIA analyst and interpreter, about the stakes of the election and the prospects for significant policy change.
The Cipher Brief: What was the most important issue or issues in this election and how did they affect the outcome?
Soo Kim: Clean politics, transparency, and a more integrated, inclusive leadership that governs for the people.
Following the South Korean public’s anger and disenchantment with the Park administration, the next candidate had to present an image and [make] campaign promises entirely antithetical to what the Park government represented. Conservative candidates – regardless of their position on Park’s involvement in a deeply entrenched, expansive corruption scandal – have essentially lost the public’s confidence, and to a certain extent, they did not enter into the elections planning a presidential win. With some exceptions, the vast majority of South Koreans were reluctant to place their confidence in another conservative administration.
Important as they were, the issue of inter-Korean dynamics, foreign relations, and other externally-focused issues took the backseat, while policies and issues with immediate, palpable effects on the average South Korean’s daily life came to the fore. And on these latter issues, especially against the backdrop of an already weakened conservative base, the tides were clearly turning in favor of the liberal parties.
As some election observers have pointed out, however, this election cycle was contracted. Candidate selection and the campaign process took place within a much shorter time frame. No doubt the issues that led to Moon’s victory reflect some of the discontent in the South Korean population; it remains to be seen whether a Moon presidency will be enough to quell some of these grievances.
TCB: How do you foresee the election of Moon Jae-in, a member of South Korea’s largest liberal party, affecting U.S.-South Korean relations?
SK: As you mentioned, Moon is a member of South Korea’s largest liberal party. He’s also identified as one of the closest affiliates of the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration.
Former President Park’s impeachment dealt a severe blow to the conservatives – who had already been on tenuous ground – and shifted the tide back in favor of the liberal camp. After two conservative presidential administrations, no doubt the South Korean liberal parties are antsy to tackle and recalibrate some of the high-priority policy topics, including relations with Washington. Moon, in an effort to appeal to a wider base of voters and start things on proper footing with the U.S., has expressed agreement with some of President Trump’s statements about handling relations with North Korea and even said he believed the President was much more rational and pragmatic than how the media portrayed him. These good-faith comments notwithstanding, keep in mind that Moon will face some pressure and expectations from his party members, loyalists, and the South Korean public to make policies in pursuit of South Korea’s interests. Whether those are domestic or foreign policies, this will inevitably mean some friction between the Trump and Moon administrations, particularly when it comes to defense, security, and economic issues – all of which figure as prominent, sensitive topics on either side.
TCB: Moon is the former chief of staff for the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which worked towards reconciliation with North Korea and was a proponent of the Sunshine Policy. Given relations today, what is the likelihood of a return to the Sunshine Policy?
SK: Many observers assume that Moon, for his close affiliation with the pro-North Roh administration, will likely take a posture towards Pyongyang more conciliatory than South Korea’s two previous administrations. And rightfully so, as Moon in recent interviews has said that if elected, he would go to Pyongyang before [he went to] Washington, and he advocated a more measured engagement policy toward the Kim regime. He later qualified such statements to give the perception of a more reasoned, moderate approach. For instance, he has expressed agreement with President Trump’s criticism of the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” being a failure. But South Korea’s former foreign minister in his memoir claimed that the Roh administration dealt with the 2007 UN vote on North Korea’s human rights record in consultation with Pyongyang – a move that Moon, as Roh’s chief of staff, supported. Despite Moon’s attempts to present a more moderate image in recent days, the broad contours of his policy views throughout his political career suggest he’ll stay closely aligned with long-held South Korean liberal views in dealing with the Kim regime.
TCB: What is Moon’s stance on the influence of chaebol (large family-owned conglomerates) on the economy and politics, and do you foresee his presidency having an impact on the chaebol system? More broadly, what is his vision for South Korea’s economy?
SK: Moon is likely going to take the assumed liberal stance of tightening the government’s regulation of the chaebol. This position aligns with the rest of his economic campaign pledges to improve the lives of the average South Korean citizen – raising the country’s disposable income, addressing income inequality, youth unemployment, and the South’s anemic growth. The question, however, is how deep and consistently will the Moon administration drive these reforms, particularly against the chaebol. Further, the chaebol still hold an important, rooted place in the South Korean economic framework and governing bodies, so it remains to be seen just how quickly these reforms will be implemented in such a way as to [effect] palpable change on the lives of the South Korean population.
The views expressed in this article are solely the opinions of the author.
