Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, after last year’s U.S. election, was quick to meet with President Donald Trump to seek reassurance on the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and find areas of economic cooperation after Trump’s rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership – seen as necessary for Japan’s economic revitalization. Tokyo has since sought clues on the direction of U.S. policy in East Asia. However, differing statements among Trump and his Cabinet officials have complicated this process. The Cipher Brief spoke to Kuni Miyake, President of the Tokyo-based think tank the Foreign Policy Institute.
The Cipher Brief: Shinzo Abe was the first world leader to meet with Donald Trump as President, and at the time, the visit was seen as a productive meeting between the two leaders. Have perceptions in Tokyo changed since then?
Kuni Miyake: No, such perceptions are still dominant here in Tokyo, although some in Japan wonder which Donald Trump is the real Mr. Trump, while others also wonder whether the Trump Administration has truly sensible, consistent and reliable foreign policy vis-a-vis East Asia in general and China/North Korea, in particular. At best, the views of pundits in Japan seem to be divided and ambivalent about the Trump Administration’s handling of East Asian affairs.
TCB: Defense Secretary James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence have all visited Japan to reassure Tokyo of U.S. commitment to the alliance. How have these visits been viewed in Japan? From Japan’s perspective, are there any concerns that the President’s statements don’t always align with those of his Cabinet members?
KM: People like Vice President Pence, General Mattis, and Mr. Tillerson were highly regarded and quite welcome in Japan and are considered very serious and trustworthy officials in the Trump Administration. Having said that, those officials seem to be those of “Donald Trump 2.0,” a group of officials who are deeply committed to “governing” instead of “campaigning” in the Administration. The latter including Mr. Stephen Bannon, who are of “Donald Trump 1.0,” seem to be still influential inside the White House, and the transition from DT 1.0 mode to 2.0 mode might not have taken place yet, and probably will never take place.
TCB: How does Japan view Trump’s change of heart on China, pursuing new trade opportunities, building a friendship with Xi Jinping?
KM: Optimistic voices in Tokyo say, no, it’s not a change of heart on Beijing on the part of Mr. Trump but is just a reflection of the unpleasant reality that China is dominant as an economic power in this part of the world and has the key to convincing North Korea to change its nuclear policy. They are confident that Japan can continue to deal with the Trump Administration in East Asia.
Others are more pessimistic. They consider that Mr. Trump may not be able to understand the subtlety of regional international relations among the East Asian nations and he will eventually inadvertently make political or economic concessions with China which may be unpleasant and unacceptable to Tokyo. They are cautiously watching and listening to Mr. Trump.
TCB: How does Japan view the current U.S. approach to North Korea?
KM: While the Shinzo Abe Administration welcomes and supports Mr. Trump’s tough position against Pyongyang, ordinary Japanese may not fully comprehend the ultimate implication of such a position, which might eventually lead to a serious military showdown with North Korea.
Although the silent majority of Japanese are getting more and more informed of the dangers that North Korean missiles and nuclear warheads may pose to Japan, the real question here in Tokyo is that we don’t know what kind of Korean Peninsula Mr. Trump wishes to end up with.
Finally, and worst of all, he is neither in DT 1.0 campaigning mode nor in 2.0 governing mode. He seems to be in DT 1.5 mode, somewhere in between, and he could also be flip-flopping every few days. This is what I am most concerned about.
