If there was one way to emphasize the grave problem of nuclear security to the international community, South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s recent visit to Washington summed up the issue pretty well. On the fringes of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), Park met with President Barack Obama and the leaders of Japan and China to discuss the region’s response to the present and palpable threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Park’s participation in the NSS and conversations with her regional neighbors on dealing with Pyongyang’s ever-present nuclear threat symbolically underscored the exigency of finding a unified strategy to deal with nuclear threats.
The outcome of the meetings? At the theoretical, symbolic level, all parties endorsed South Korea’s position on the perennial problem of North Korea’s nuclear provocations, rebuked Pyongyang’s course of action in recent months – its January hydrogen bomb test, followed by several missile launches – and expressed support for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2270 imposing sanctions against the Kim regime. Both President Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for the global community to faithfully implement the resolution and reaffirmed bilateral and three-way cooperation on the common North Korean threat. Washington maintained its security commitment guarantee on the Peninsula and backed Seoul’s efforts to deter Pyongyang’s bad behavior. Tokyo, too, put aside longstanding territorial and historical disagreements with Seoul to promote concrete security and defense cooperation among the three nations.
China’s threshold for tolerance on North Korean provocations also appears to be decreasing, albeit gradually. Beijing has faced some pressure from the international community to take a tougher stand against the Kim regime following the conclusion of UNSCR 2270 – primarily because the impact of the sanctions hinged largely upon China’s follow-through on its verbal commitment to tightening the chokehold on North Korea’s nuclear and other illicit activities. President Obama reiterated the importance of Beijing’s position in this matter during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who cautiously expressed support for enhanced communication and coordination on the DPRK’s nuclear issue, emphasizing dialogue to find solutions for disputes and disagreements. Xi agreed to implement in full the UN sanctions against the Kim regime. Most recently, Beijing has announced a list of trade restrictions on North Korean rare earth minerals, coal, gold, and sales of jet fuel and oil products.
Park’s Washington visit served as a cogent reminder to the global community about the serious security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and renewed the momentum for countries to follow through on implementing UNSCR 2270 against Pyongyang. Washington’s reiteration of its security commitment on the peninsula and Tokyo’s full support for sanctions were politically and symbolically significant, boosting Seoul’s case to deter the Kim regime’s aggression and nuclear pursuits. But the impact of Park’s visit on discouraging Pyongyang from nuclear provocations depends largely upon the implementation of sanctions on the regime – which, by extension, is heavily contingent upon China’s actions. Beijing, by and large, has not completely disengaged itself from the DPRK, instead taking calculated, deliberate steps toward joining the U.S., South Korea, and the nonproliferation community in meting out punishment on North Korea. China’s recent steps toward executing sanctions against North Korea are encouraging; the steadfastness of its resolve to contribute to the region’s nonproliferation and security efforts, however, is yet to be determined.
If Beijing were to fully get on board with UN sanctions and abandon its strategy of using Pyongyang as a buffer strategy against Washington, it would send a clear signal to the global community on its evolved stance on the DPRK. Some countries may even interpret this as an about-face in Beijing’s policy towards its regional neighbors, and more importantly, on its views toward the U.S. – a hesitant leap for Beijing. But this could help enhance the PRC’s international image, shedding its past reputation as a generally intransigent country, whose interests stood in conflict with those of its regional neighbors, and taking on a new position as a cooperative partner in maintaining stability in one of the most unstable regions of the world.
