Russia is playing a game of Bismarckian realpolitik in the Middle East – political maneuvering based on current conditions, rather than on ideological premises, that uses the exertion of power to gain benefits for one’s country. Russian President Vladimir Putin is forming as many alliances as he can, in order to protect Russian economic and political interests. “Moscow tries to support a dialogue with all countries in the region without expressing obvious support for any particular state or coalition, and, so far, it has been partly successful in doing so,” says Cipher Brief expert and Carnegie Moscow Center scholar Nikolay Kozhanov.
The heavy hand of Russian involvement can be seen most clearly in Syria, where Russia is exerting power and Washington has made relatively few commitments during the civil war. Syria is an important ally for Russia because it is Russia’s only real ally in the Middle East. According to Cipher Brief expert and former U.S. Senior Defense Official and Attaché to the Russian Federation Brigadier General (ret.) Peter Zwack, “Russia and the USSR have been in Syria since 1970, which became especially important for them after the Egyptians kicked them out of Egypt in 1972. Syria is the only remaining Russian base/platform outside the Former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War.”
To be sure, Moscow does have other “allies” in the Middle East, but those relationships are fragile. Take Egypt, for instance. President Putin’s engagement with Cairo increased following the 2013 coup that ousted Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and replaced him with the military chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Washington held back arms shipments to Egypt following the overthrow because of disapproval of the coup and Sisi’s slow transition to democratic governance. This allowed Moscow to swoop in and reclaim its role as Egypt’s military supplier. In September 2014, the head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Alexander Fomin announced Russia and Egypt had sealed a preliminary arms deal amounting to $3.5 billion. The alliance is bolstered by Sisi’s support of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Yet Egypt does not seem likely to cut all ties with the U.S. in favor of Russia anytime soon. In fact, in April 2015, the Obama Administration committed $1.3 billion of foreign military financing to Egypt.
Then there’s Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Russia and Israel are historic friends. The Soviet Union was one of the first nations to recognize Israel in 1948. Dr. Mark Katz, a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, lists many reasons for the Russian-Israeli friendship: Israel is a source of Western military technology for Russia, Moscow has convinced Jerusalem it needs Russian support in defense against Iran and the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah, and a sizeable percentage of Israel’s population comes from the Russian Jewish community. In addition, Putin’s deep commitment to defeating the Chechen rebellion parallels the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
But the Russia-Israel alliance has not always been friendly. The relationship has fluctuated between Russian support of Israel and Russian alignment with the Arab regimes, along with support for the Palestinian government.
Russia’s current engagement with the GCC can be most clearly seen in the case of Saudi Arabia. Last year, the Saudis and Russians ramped up high-level meetings, culminating in an August meeting in Moscow between Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. This relationship can be viewed in mostly economic terms. Russia has a strong interest in selling arms to Saudi Arabia and competes with the Arab nation in oil markets.
However, friendship between the two countries is superficial. As long as the Russians keep close ties to the Middle East’s largest Shiite power, Iran, the nation’s most influential Sunni power, Saudi Arabia, will not be happy. Riyadh sees Tehran as an existential threat and is, therefore, extremely annoyed that the Russians are siding with Iran and the Assad regime in the Syrian conflict, according to Katz.
But though they are on the same page regarding Syria, the Russia-Iran relationship is also insecure. “The Iranians just plain don’t trust the Russians,” states Katz. He continues: The Iranians think the Russians are always trying to press the Americans into a closer partnership, and as soon as they get a good deal, the Russians will drop Iran. This has historic precedence. In 1995, the U.S. and Russia signed the secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement that strengthened cooperation between the two nations and called for an end to Russian conventional weapons sales to Iran within four years. Today what is really bugging the Iranians, according to Katz, is Moscow’s close relationship with Jerusalem and disagreements on how to divide the Caspian Sea for access to oil and gas beneath.
Finally, there’s the Turks. The Russians have put a lot of effort into cultivating relations with Turkey over the past few years. In spite of that, Moscow flew an SU-24 too close to the Turkish border in November, and the Turks downed the aircraft. The Russians lost out big time, says Katz. Turkey’s gradual pivot toward Russia has reversed in a shift back toward the West, most notably with the recent Turkey-European Union agreement on illegal immigrants.
Putin’s tricky game of realpolitik in the Middle East means Russian allies can quickly become foes. This limits true Russian influence. Yet any U.S. disengagement in the region makes room for the Russians to get involved and alter alliance structures.
Kaitlin Lavinder is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
