The Putin government of Russia is conducting cyberspace-enabled Information Operations, including political “destabilizing operations” (a form of warfare), against the United States. Moscow is competing worldwide with the United States and rejects the Western, liberal world order as the model for all states.
Russia is likely stealing internal documents related to U.S. political parties and institutions, altering some of them, then strategically releasing them in order to influence our political process and confidence in our government. Russian trolls attack certain individuals and candidates. The Russian government finances Russian RT and Sputnik Television abroad, as well as foundations, journalists, and crony spokesmen to smear certain individuals (not necessarily from one party) and spew Russian state propaganda and disinformation.
The U.S. President could, if he so chooses, declare these Information Operations acts of war. Regardless of whether he does, the President would be wise to respond to these brazen and illegal acts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions are typical of any authoritarian who wishes to consolidate power by fabricating threats abroad to justify greater internal control at home under the guise of national defense. Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao and Castro all played this game and all led their states into internal decay, moral bankruptcy, totalitarianism, and ultimately became pariah states. We would be wise to facilitate Russia’s return to a global pariah state.
Today, Russia fights in peacetime via the manipulation of information – who controls it and who can create it. Russia’s chief weapon is its formidable cyberspace capability, which it uses to manipulate and to control the narratives that sway public opinion.
Russia even has a name for this warfare, “Information Confrontation,” consisting of disinformation and planted information delivered via social media and select third party leaks, tailored for a specific influence operation. Where possible, Russia targets an adversary’s political stability by manipulating its public media and tainting specific institutions. The next step is to posture conventional forces alongside the target’s border for intimidation and supply weapons to “separatists” fighting Western oppression.
The December 2015 cyber-attack against Ukraine’s electrical power grid is a perfect example of this strategy. Russia’s goal is to keep the pro-West Ukrainian government off balance and to undermine its credibility. By making it appear that the government cannot provide basic services, the attacks made the Ukrainian government look incompetent, unstable, and less attractive to Western investment and support. Russia’s goal is to exhaust Ukrainian patience with the pro-West Kiev government in order to force a new one aligned with Moscow – all without a declared war. Similarly, Russia’s goal is to create ambiguity and confusion within American society via the Democratic National Committee and other hacks, ultimately undermining American faith in our political institutions and leaders (thereby weakening them).
By confusing an adversary’s politics, denying involvements (“who me?”) and keeping tensions focused on words and ambiguity (and not military forces), Russia achieves its political goals – all without having to fight kinetically. Russia fuses psychological warfare with kinetic intimidation to shape or confuse an adversary. This strategy complicates the ability of its adversaries to mobilize for an appropriate and timely response.
Cyberspace operations are integrated into all aspects of Russian military operations and involve psychological effects (the targeting of people, by employing diplomats, ‘experts,’ and academic elites to influence opinions and shape perceptions); Information Operations (controlling the message); and technical operations (offensive cyber-attacks against computer and communications systems). Information is used to confuse, paralyze, and subvert.
How do we fight Russian information warfare in peacetime?
The best means to defeat Russian information warfare is first to expose it: ask academics to discuss it; brief countries on Russian Information Operations; identify and expose Russian propagandists; create counter troll factories; and require Russian media to register as foreign agents. States along Russia’s periphery already live with Information Confrontation. NATO states and other allies need to acknowledge it, talk about it publicly, identify it when used against them, and confront it.
A second means is to multiply sources inside Russian-targeted countries to defeat Russian control of information: set up Internet Free America; generate Internet sources free of Russian control inside Russian-targeted countries; create mobile hotspots; and advance forensics.
Third is to call on the U.S. private sector to adhere to the Terms of Use guidelines it allegedly maintains to purge Russian hate speech, libel, and state propaganda from its social media. Since most of the Internet is owned by the private sector, we need to hold it accountable for its enabling of Russian Information Operations.
Fourth is to better defend targeted states’ cyber infrastructure from Russian control and infiltration with U.S. Department of Defense and other cyber teams that are experts in shoring up a state’s defenses and collecting on Russian cyber activities.
Since Russia rejects the liberal world order, the fifth means is to eject Russia from the very liberal institutions they smear, in particular from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking program.
The sixth means is to keep Russia economically vulnerable and its foreign adventures costly: build the trans-Caucus pipeline in Europe; approve the Keystone pipeline; develop the Alaskan Anwar reserve and the newly found Alaskan reserves.
Russia recognizes the importance of cyber operations in all conflict today and invests in its use. It does not hesitate to use cyberspace. Neither should we.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
