There could not be a riper time than the present for North Korean provocations. Over the past six months, leadership changes took place in both the U.S. and South Korea, the DPRK’s two greatest adversaries. In Washington, the advent of the Trump Administration in January signaled to the Kim Jong-un regime the arrival of an “inexperienced” wildcard team, easily provoked and perhaps naive about playing by Pyongyang’s terms.
In Seoul, the ouster of conservative president Park Geun-hye and the recent election of liberal Moon Jae-in to the Blue House indicated an end of nearly 10 years of Seoul’s hardline approach toward its northern neighbor – and judging by Moon’s previous positions, the possibility of a more conciliatory North Korea policy.
Two new presidential administrations, coupled with domestic political confusion in both countries, have, in North Korea’s eyes, made Washington and Seoul more vulnerable and sensitive to Pyongyang’s every moves.
Pyongyang certainly seems to be milking this fortuitous window of opportunity for its strategic benefit. On May 14, the North Korea fired a missile that traveled nearly 800 kilometers with an approximate altitude of 2,000 kilometers – stats which, if confirmed, would set the record for the seven missile tests Pyongyang conducted this year, and indicate substantial progress toward an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile). This, of course, is vexing to not only Trump and Moon, but the international community.
As would be expected of new administrations confronting the North Korea challenge, leadership and policy circles in the region have focused much attention on solutions to mitigate Pyongyang’s destabilizing threats. In recent months, the U.S. Vice President, Secretary of State, and CIA Director have all flown to Seoul to give public affirmation of Washington’s commitment to Korean Peninsula stability. These visits symbolically alleviate concerns about regional security and aim to present a unified response to the DPRK’s instigations.
Our president has also said that “all options are on the table” when it comes to dealing with North Korea – which could mean either sit-down talks with the North or kinetic action to deter Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats. The head of South Korea’s intelligence service indicated his willingness to travel to Pyongyang for talks. Moon, during his campaign, alluded to the possibility of going to North Korea for dialogue and is considering reopening South Korean business ventures in Pyongyang.
Repetitive as North Korea’s threats may be, leadership in the U.S. and South Korea are placed in a sticky position, in which they are pressed to come up with a prompt, neat solution to a complex, longstanding security dilemma, either for the sake of allaying public concerns, or motivated by longstanding security policy legacies. In light of the Kim regime’s recent display of technological progress in its missile capabilities, the perception of imminence of North Korea’s missile threats pressures the leadership in Washington and Seoul to race against the clock to find a definitive solution.
Concerns are justified, but we need to step back just a bit and untangle this mess and clearly assess the situation. If the North Korea dilemma is as urgent and serious as we believe, then it merits a more thorough, objective treatment than the seemingly knee-jerk responses we’ve been seeing of late. As much as there is pressure on the leadership to present a North Korea strategy or respond defiantly to Pyongyang’s provocations, we would only be playing into the Kim regime’s hands by reacting in haste.
The most effective way for the Kim regime to elicit a reaction from its adversaries is through its missile and nuclear threats. We perceive their potential to wreak severe damage and threaten national populations to be credible and too great of a risk, so we focus the North Korea policy lens on dismantling its nuclear program or coaxing the regime to the negotiating table. To be clear, there hasn’t been a shortage of policy choices on North Korea, with recommendations ranging from becoming more open to the idea of talks with the regime, to a kinetic strike against Pyongyang, to imposing sanctions to clamp down on the financial spigots funding the Kim regime’s lavish lifestyle and nuclear and missile programs. As significant and imminent as the threat seems, we would be oversimplifying the North Korea puzzle by neatly laying out a three-step solution focused entirely on its nuclear and missile programs. By now, we know – and perhaps stubbornly refuse to accept – that if the DPRK problem were just that, it would have been solved through one of our neat formulas long ago.
Dealing with the North Korea problem involves a complex weave of geopolitical, economic, humanitarian, and generational factors. This is a country whose practices and people have been stunted in growth and suppressed in development by the regime’s emphasis on large-scale military spending. The North’s per capita GDP is one of the lowest in the world. The Kim dynasty’s iron-fisted rule has denied its people the most basic rights as humans – murder, corruption, enslavement, torture, and imprisonment are indispensable tools in the leadership’s maintenance of power. Pyongyang has routinely been under scrutiny by the UN Security Council and Human Rights Council, becoming a regular subject of human rights violations resolutions and economic sanctions. It goes without saying that the economic, political, and generational divide between Pyongyang and Seoul widens day by day, making reunification a desired outcome but a mess that South Korea’s well-to-do younger generations, China, and other countries are cautious about. By comparison to the regime’s nuclear and missile threats, these issues clearly are less imminent, but a definitive, conclusive solution to the North Korea problem requires a more holistic approach.
In addition, the North’s strategy is as old as the Kim regime. Pyongyang is staying its course in bargaining, hedging, and threatening its adversaries – Kim knows full well that his country is a nuisance for the U.S., South Korea, and the international community to deal with, and that some of the key players, in the interest of their own national economic and political agenda, will defer taking any constructive measures within a consistent, well-orchestrated strategic framework against his country. New leadership in Washington and a president in Seoul with a pro-engagement track record, not to mention China’s half-hearted commitment to support U.S. and South Korean efforts, and the absence of a coherent, consistent message to Pyongyang, embolden Kim to keep poking its adversaries until one of the powers caves and concedes to the North’s demands.
The North Korea problem is gaining greater attention as a top-priority item in the Trump Administration and elsewhere. Without a doubt, the DPRK issue merits attention and a solution. The seriousness of the problem and the persistent, perennial occurrence of North Korea’s threats justify all the more a thorough, firm, and comprehensive strategy now that will set us on the sure path of ending the game being played on Pyongyang’s terms.
