North Korea tested what was initially announced by Pyongyang to be a hydrogen bomb on Wednesday, though the Obama Administration is skeptical. White House Spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters, “the initial analysis is not consistent with North Korean claims of a successful hydrogen bomb test.” Still, Pyongyang’s announcement has serious repercussions for regional and global stability. China, North Korea’s only semblance of a friend in the region, “firmly opposed” the nuclear test. How Beijing and the international community responds to the latest nuclear test, remains the key issue at hand. Thomas Cynkin, a former diplomat and former head of the Washington office of Fujitsu Ltd., discusses what the nuclear test means for East Asia.
North Korea gets exactly what it wants out of its nuclear tests, which it trumpets to the world: attention from the U.S. and other major players, and renewed discussion within the international community about how best to deal with, or even accommodate, North Korea. Arguably, North Korea may even see a positive side to resultant increased isolation, given its desire to maintain “Hermit Kingdom” status and keep North Koreans insulated from “corrupting” foreign influences. Under the circumstances, other than China, members of the international community have little leverage with North Korea in the short term.
As the DPRK leadership moves toward expanding its nuclear arsenal and increasing the range of its delivery systems—ultimately to bring the continental United States increasingly under threat—the longer-term means for the U.S. and other countries in the region to counter the threat is to construct a robust missile defense network. It simply makes no sense to rely on North Korea’s presumed rational calculation of its own national interest, as we would define it.
China’s interests with North Korea diverge from those of the U.S. While the U.S. prioritizes denuclearizing the DPRK threat to the U.S. and its allies, China is more concerned with maintaining the division of the Korean Peninsula and preserving North Korea as a buffer state. Reunification from the South could mean a revanchist, pro-U.S. Korea reaching out to the ethnic Korean population on the Chinese side of the border, as well as deployment of Korean or even U.S. military forces directly along the Chinese border. Therefore, we cannot expect China to respond to the DPRK’s nuclear test in the same manner as the U.S. or its allies would. That said, Beijing recognizes that North Korea’s actions are destabilizing, and understands that China needs to respond credibly. We can therefore anticipate China joining the international community in condemnations and, to some extent, even limited punitive measures, while also attempting behind the scenes to mitigate and constrain the international community’s reaction to the test.
The Japanese-South Korean relationship has its own sensitive historic and political dynamics. Both countries have long been acutely aware of the North Korean threat and the practical utility of intensified Japan-South Korea security cooperation. It is to be hoped that the recent historic agreement between the two countries on the issue of comfort women will help pave the way for such cooperation.
