There has been no shortage of speculation about the motives behind Russia’s recent military deployment to Syria following the September 28 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York.
Most of the commentary, however, has failed to identify the underlying objectives behind Russia’s Syrian gambit: Russia’s re-emergence as a superpower, Russia’s intent to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East, and Putin’s desire to demonstrate to the Russian people that Moscow can project military power abroad in the War on Terror (as the other superpower, the United States had done 15 years earlier in Afghanistan).
Speculation that Russia’s Syria gambit is designed to set the stage for a bargain between Russia and the West on sanctions relief and Ukraine seems to miss Putin’s fundamental motivations. Putin has as little ability and interest in compromise on Syria as he has shown interest and ability to compromise on Ukraine.
For Putin, one of the important lessons to be learned from the events of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 and its aftermath is that superpowers don’t allow their long-time allies and new friends in the region to rot in prison (former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak) or in a ditch (former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi) if they hope to preserve influence in a region like the Middle East.
Putin’s decision to insert Russian military power in Syria came at a point when Assad’s military was on the verge of collapse. The dire military circumstances for Syria’s military were even acknowledged by Assad in a national speech in July 2015. The prospect of the collapse of Assad’s army and his government, potentially leading to an Islamic State march into Damascus, and the threat that would potentially cause for the Russian naval facility in Tartus, Syria, certainly galvanized Putin’s thinking on the need for Russian military intervention to support Assad.
Putin’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent support for secessionists in the Ukraine’s Don basin can also be viewed in the context of Russia’s re-emergence as a superpower, willing to use military power to assert what it believes to be its national interests. Russia’s resumption of strategic bomber and nuclear submarine patrolling near the United States, and its military exercises along Russia’s borders and in areas where it perceives current strategic interest—the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic and Pacific theaters—are similar manifestations of a re-emerging superpower.
As can be understood from Putin’s UN speech, as well as many other public comments in recent years, Putin laments the collapse of the bipolar world order and efforts by the West to establish a unipolar world order. He laments the failure of the unipolar world order to preserve stability and mitigate the growth of non-state actors such as the Islamic State. For Putin and the generation of former KGB officers that he represents, “stability” is a critical concept, whether referring to Putin’s governance in Russia or the formation of a stable network of client states or alliances in areas of perceived regional or strategic interest such as the Middle East.
Taking advantage of the U.S.’ unwillingness to again assert its military power in the region and the disillusionment of the U.S.’ long-time partners in the region—such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia—Putin has engaged in a concerted effort to build partnerships in the region, particularly with Egypt. Russia signed a $3.5 billion arms deal with Egypt in April 2015, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made frequent visit to Moscow—four in the last two years. Putin also visited Egypt in February.
Most significantly, Russia has strengthened its relationship with Iran, including participation in the P5+1 talks. Moreover, Putin has decided to move forward with the sale of the S-300 air defense system to Iran. In November 2014, he agreed to build two new nuclear power reactors in Iran. More significantly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Russia in July with the purpose of discussing the situation in Syria and the Middle East. Ominously, there are reports of a visit to Moscow by Iranian Quds force commander Qassem Soleimani to meet with Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu immediately before the first reports of the Russian military build-up in Syria.
From Putin’s perspective, re-building relations with a long-time client state like Egypt and strengthening practical on-the-ground cooperation with a rising regional power like Iran makes perfect sense as actions a superpower would take to secure its interests. There is the added benefit, from Putin’s perspective, of sending a message to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other states in the region that are partners at some level with the United States, that there is a new player in the power paradigm in the region.
Putin is also aware certainly of the economic hardships Russia is facing as a result of Western sanctions over Ukraine, as well as the economic impact of the decline in the price of oil and the weakening of the Ruble. Putin’s circle of advisors on geo-political strategy, led by Russian National Security Council Chair Nikolay Patrushev, Russian Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov, and chief of the Presidential Administration Sergey Ivanov, are strong proponents of Russia’s re-emergence as a superpower counterweight to the West. They strongly support the intervention in Ukraine and Syria.
Russian state media has continually articulated the view that the crisis in Ukraine was brought about by U.S. support for the coup d’état that resulted in the abdication of then Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich, and that sanctions are designed to “punish” Russia and keep it weak. Russian media in recent weeks has emphasized a similar theme with regard to the intervention in Syria—that Assad is the elected President of Syria and his army is the only “legitimate” force fighting the terrorists of the Islamic State. Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis in the region is directly the result of policy mistakes made by the U.S. in supporting the overthrow of elected governments in the region, beginning with the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Russia’s military support for the Assad regime, or so it is reported in the Russia media, is a responsible act designed to bolster the effort against the Islamic State and return stability to the region. By all indications, the Russian population is buying the argument for intervention in Syria as it has the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Consequently, even if Putin were inclined to compromise on a post-Assad Syria—and there are no indications of any such intention to cooperate—he would likely have a difficult time articulating the rationale for compromise to his hardline supporters or the Russian people. The more likely prospect in the near future is a continued Russian military build-up in Syria, the conversion of the Tartus naval facility into a fully capable base for the Russian navy in the Mediterranean, and the transformation of the airport at Latakia into a fully capable support facility for Russian air operations against opponents of the Assad regime. Iran will live up to its side of the agreement with more Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military activity in support of Assad. That means more effective tactical coordination with Russian airpower in strikes against opponents of the Assad government. And if as a consequence some bombs fall on Islamic State targets, so much the better.
