The rocky relationship between the U.S. and China was in full view last year, highlighted by President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Navy challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea. Known for his frank comments on current U.S. policy towards China, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) enumerated steps the United States should take to protect its interests in the region and how it can best deter an increasingly bold China.
The Cipher Brief: How would you assess the current state of the U.S.-China relationship?
Senator John McCain: I believe China can and should play a constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, China could play a unique role in contributing to the international order that enabled its rise and lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. Unfortunately, in recent years, China has behaved less like a “responsible stakeholder,” and more like a bully. And this has obviously exacerbated tensions in the U.S.-China relationship.
Going forward, the United States should reject China’s calls for a “new type of great-power relations.” A number of concerns have been raised about this seemingly innocuous diplomatic term of art. I am particularly concerned it sends the wrong message to our allies about U.S. commitments and the role we intend to play in the region. It also elevates China’s international role without tying such status to its behavior and willingness to abide by and support the rules-based international order. The United States should be proactive in shaping the future course of U.S.-China relations, identifying wherever possible opportunities for cooperation. At the same time, we must emphasize that a cooperative U.S.-China relationship will increasingly depend on China’s behavior and its willingness to abide by international norms, standards, rules, and laws.
TCB: What is your opinion on the U.S.’s current policy towards China? What should our strategy towards China be?
JM: Obviously, the U.S.-China relationship is complex and multifaceted with elements of cooperation and competition. It is natural that U.S. policy toward China would seek to enhance cooperation while keeping the competitive elements of our relationship in check. However, I am concerned that the Obama Administration has taken this too far.
Too often in recent years, we have been told by this Administration that the United States cannot take action to defend our interests on a whole host of issues – even when such action would be pursuant to longstanding U.S. policy – because such action would anger China and endanger other supposedly cooperative initiatives such as climate change negotiations or nuclear negotiations with Iran. As a result, we’ve seen a disturbing gap emerge between our words and our actions. And it is that gap that China has exploited to assert vast territorial claims, bully its neighbors, destabilize the region, and challenge the freedom of the seas.
That’s why we need to think anew about deterrence. When it comes to China’s destabilizing activities, it is not that the United States is doing nothing. It is that nothing we are doing has been sufficient to deter China from continuing activities that the United States and our allies and partners say are unacceptable—the cyberattacks, the economic espionage and theft, the land reclamation, the coercion of its neighbors, and the assertion and attempted enforcement of vast, unlawful territorial claims. We need to develop options, and act on them, to deter these admittedly unconventional threats, or else they will continue and grow. And they will do so at the expense of the national security interests of the United States, the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and a rules-based international order.
TCB: How do you see the Chinese military buildup impacting U.S. interests in the future? What should the U.S. be doing to counter this threat? What are some concrete measures that the U.S. could take in support of our interests in the region?
JM: Our national interests in the Asia-Pacific are deep and enduring. We seek to extend free trade, free markets, free navigation, and free commons – air, sea, space, and now cyber. We seek to maintain a balance of power that fosters the peaceful expansion of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and the many other values that we share with increasing numbers of Asian citizens. And we seek to defend ourselves and our allies by maintaining the capability to prevent, deter, and if necessary, prevail in a conflict.
Achieving these objectives is not the job of our military alone. We must use all elements of our national power. That’s why, for example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is so vital in sending a powerful strategic signal about America’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
Yet, we must remember that our soft power is the shadow cast by our hard power. And we must remain clear-eyed about the implications of China’s rise and its evolving foreign and defense policy. China is engaged in a rapid military modernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart American military strengths.
That is why the United States must continue to sustain a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. We must take advantage of new and emerging technologies to preserve our ability to project power over long distances and operate in contested environments. We must invest in enhancing the resilience of our forward-deployed forces. And we must continue to help our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to build their maritime capacity as we are doing with the Maritime Security Initiative included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. None of this will be possible, however, if we continue to live with mindless sequestration and a broken acquisition system. We have to do away with arbitrary defense budget caps in the Budget Control Act once and for all and return to a strategy-driven defense budget.
TCB: If armed conflict were to break out, it would likely be related to the South China Sea. Should this happen, what should be the U.S.’s reaction?
JM: The United States does not take a position on competing claims in the South China Sea, nor do we seek a confrontation with China. That is why, for example, we have praised the Philippines for its commitment to pursuing a legal course of action concerning its competing claims with China. While China is constructing and militarizing new land features in the South China Sea and increasingly turning to coercion to achieve its goals, it has been encouraging to see that Manila continues to make every effort to resolve these claims peacefully, consistent with international law, and through international arbitration mechanisms.
At the same time, it should be made absolutely clear to China that the United States will uphold its commitments to our treaty allies, including Japan and the Philippines. Moreover, the United States should be unwavering in its commitment to uphold peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Given the pace and scope of China's military trajectory, this will require sustained investment in our military presence in the region.
TCB: What were your takeaways from Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the United States? If you were given the opportunity to sit down with President Xi, what would you say?
JM: Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States last year was a squandered opportunity for a frank dialogue on the major issues in the U.S.-China relationship. Unfortunately, the Administration chose pomp and circumstance over candor and substance. Creating the perception of a successful state visit by President Xi came at the cost of months of silence and tacit acceptance of Chinese behavior by the Obama Administration.
To smooth the way for President Xi’s visit (complete with 21-gun salute), the Obama Administration avoided raising sensitive issues like human rights abuses in China. It delayed an arms sale to the democratic government in Taiwan despite the massive imbalance of military power across the strait. The Administration continued its restriction on the passage of U.S. naval vessels inside 12 nautical miles of China’s man-made islands in the South China Sea, granting de facto recognition of China’s sovereignty claims. And it backed away from an important opportunity to take concrete action on China’s cyber economic espionage. Instead, the Administration concluded a vague cyber deal with China. It took just a week for Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to voice his strong skepticism that China would abide by the deal.
As a result, the Administration’s conduct before and during Xi Jinping’s visit was the latest example of what some dub “the China calendar” – the pernicious tendency to grant China veto power over actions they deem provocative in the months before important meetings between our two governments. This is a destructive element of our complex relationship that needs to stop.
It is fitting and proper for the United States to conduct relations with China with respect. That is what responsible great powers do. But we cannot allow China to manipulate and control the diplomatic calendar through our response to their constant threats of hurt feelings and outrage. Doing so has the corrosive effect of giving China a seat at the table in our foreign policy decision making.
I did not have the chance to meet with President Xi during his most recent visit. However, I did have a chance to attend a meeting with him and other senators when he visited the United States as Vice President in 2012. I asked him about China’s continued support for North Korea and its abysmal human rights record. The only response he gave was, “Senator McCain’s candor is well known in China.” Not surprisingly, Xi seemed unaccustomed to and uncomfortable with dissent.
