Following the conclusion of North Korea’s 7th Workers’ Party Congress, many questions remain regarding the future direction of economic and foreign policies. The Cipher Brief spoke to Gordon Chang, author of Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World to learn more.
The Cipher Brief: So far, reports of the congress are light on policy details, what can we glean about future policy from the information we have?
Gordon Chang: On policy, Kim Jong-un’s announcement of a five-year economic plan, the first multi-year development program since the Third Seven-Year Plan ended in 1995, looks significant. North Korea now has a money culture, and Kim has to satisfy the economic aspirations of both the rich and poor. North Koreans, across society, seem to care much more about prosperity than ideology these days.
With the adoption of the five-year plan, Kim has made himself accountable, so he will have to work especially hard to show economic progress in the coming years. Progress will be hard, however, because Kim is devoting substantial resources to the military and especially his nuclear weapons program.
TCB: With the congress completed, will we see a decrease in the provocative behavior exhibited by North Korea in the first part of this year?
GC: I don’t think we can tell at this moment whether there will be a decrease in Kim’s provocative behavior. That behavior is the result of political turmoil at the most senior levels of the regime.
Even though Kim was elected chairman of the Party, the most important political struggles may not be over. The most important of such struggles is the fight between the military and the Party. Kim’s new title is a recognition that he is in control of the Party. Yet the chairmanship does little to help him with the military.
During his tenure, Kim has favored the Party over the military, a stance which of course has been unpopular with the generals and the admirals. The real test of the coming year is whether the military now accepts his rule. If we see more disappearances and executions of flag officers, we will know that the struggle between the military and Kim is not over.
TCB: What is the significance of Kim Jong-un’s new title as Party Chairman?
GC: We have confirmation that he is in control of the Party. Yet that has been clear for some time.
What is significant is that Kim did not try to get rid of older regime figures, as many had predicted. North Korea’s new faces, therefore, are the old faces. There has been turmoil in governing circles since the Kimster took over in December 2011, and I suspect that a wholesale generational change in leadership at this time was considered too destabilizing.
TCB: China did not send a delegate to the congress, what does this tell us about Sino-NK relations?
GC: The fact that China did not send a representative to the Congress is not as significant as the fact that Xi Jinping, in his congratulatory message to Kim on his election as Party chairman, did not call him comrade. Xi used that special term last October on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Workers Party. The failure to use comrade now is a good indication that ties between the two regimes have deteriorated significantly since October.
