As 2016 comes to a close, Russia and Turkey have cobbled together a ceasefire in Syria, paving the way for peace talks to end the more than five-year long war that has destroyed the country and torn asunder its social fabric. Though past initiatives failed to silence the guns, the current plan holds more hope, even if its prospects for success are still low.
In September, the United States and Russia announced a similar ceasefire, which quickly crumbled. A number of factors have created a more propitious atmosphere. The rebel defeat in eastern Aleppo was a major blow to their fortunes, and they are scrambling to remain relevant as government forces increasingly shrink their territory. The election of Donald Trump as president augurs a complete abandonment of their cause. But ultimately, it is the Russians who have changed the calculus of the war.
After leading the campaign to retake eastern Aleppo, Russia has supplanted Iran as the major power broker in Syria. The rebels never trusted the Iranians, whose militias have run amok in the country and looted recaptured territory. They have more faith in Moscow to keep these militias in check. More importantly, rebels are eager to remain out of Russia’s crosshairs. Moscow has long argued that it entered the Syrian conflict to stem the terrorist threat menacing the country. In doing so, it did not differentiate between jihadists such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Western backed rebels from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a loose coalition of largely nationalist groups.
Since the ceasefire, Russian rhetoric has changed. Official media has begun referring to the latter as rebels rather than terrorists, which confers on them a measure of recognition. This is of crucial importance, since a clear differentiation will likely lead to less airstrikes against them.
Most of the rebel groups that agreed to the cease fire are based in the northern provinces of Aleppo and Idlib, and depend on Turkish largesse for their continued prosperity. Though groups such as the Free Idlib Army, Levantine Legion, and Levantine Front all receive American aid, they are ultimately beholden to Turkey for passage through its borders. To this end, they must do Ankara’s bidding. They are part of a Turkish backed coalition known as Euphrates Shield whose mission is not to fight the Syrian government but rather ISIS and the Syrian Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (PYD). Ankara views the PYD as its chief adversary in Syria, since it is the local affiliate of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey has been fighting since 1984.
For these reasons, the ceasefire is less about halting the fight against the government than placating patrons who control all the cards.
The Russian-Turkish agreement envisages eventual peace talks in Kazakhstan. But to get there, they have to neutralize the joker in the deck – Jabhat al-Nusra. The American-Russian initiative stipulated that rebel groups would separate themselves from the al Qaeda affiliate. In Aleppo, Jabhat al-Nusra was one of the smaller factions. In its waning days under rebel control, the group only had several hundred fighters in the city. But in Idlib, the last rebel stronghold, it is among the most powerful groups, with at least 2,800 troops. The FSA groups rely on Jabhat al-Nusra’s goodwill to thrive. They must pass its checkpoints and temper its ire. In 2015, the jihadist group drove out two Western-backed groups, which it believed threatened its prosperity.
The Russians equally need to keep government forces in check. They have continued operations throughout the country, but attention has focused on the Barada Valley outside Damascus. On January 2, twelve rebel groups released a statement declaring the cease fire would be over unless the government, “immediately returned matters to their position prior to signing the agreement.” Given the government’s proclivity to violate previous cease fires, its current breaches may ultimately push the demoralized rebels to end a ceasefire, which they desperately need to regroup.
Though the ceasefire may hold, it is much less certain that peace talks could succeed. Bolstered by battlefield success, the Syrian government is in no mood to make concessions. But even at its nadir in 2015, the regime was unwilling to do so. The Ba’ath regime has historically preferred to wear down its adversaries – ranging from Israel to the United States – through a process of attrition and at the negotiating table.
President Bashar al-Assad is unlikely to step down. More concerning is that serious political reform is beyond the regime’s capabilities. Loosening the strictures built over 53 years could lead to its complete unraveling. The regime may offer cosmetic changes by allowing a token opposition, but sharing power is likely a tonic it will not stomach.
Senior government officials, ranging from the president to the foreign minister, have argued the opposite, saying that they are intent on fulfilling the will of the Syrian people. In October, President Assad told me, “What is the best political system? Is it parliamentarian? Is it presidential? Is it semi-presidential?...that is another debate that needs to be comprehensive.”
Peace talks in Kazakhstan will allow him and his negotiating team to broach the topic with the opposition. It remains to be seen whether the Russians, who rescued the government, can now convince it to make the concessions necessary to end a conflict, which has devastated the country.
