As the deadline for the landmark international court ruling on the South China Sea territorial dispute draws near, a recent editorial in a Chinese state run newspaper proclaimed that China should prepare for “military confrontation” in the South China Sea. While the foreign ministry was quick to reiterate China’s commitment to peace in the region, it has been equally clear on its course of action. In addition to stating it will not abide by any ruling released by The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration on July 12th, China has announced it will engage in naval drills within the disputed area from July 5th through the 11th in the days leading up to the court’s decision. It appears China is willing to back up its words with actions. What remains to be seen is how far Beijing will go to defend a claim that the international court is unlikely to uphold.
China’s territorial claim over much of the South China Sea originates with the nine-dash line, a cartographic creation that predates the Chinese civil war (1927-1950) and has remained at the center of regional disagreements ever since. More recently, the nine-dash line has become the center of an important case in international law. In 2013, the Philippines filed charges against China in international court in response to China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal and the failure of bilateral negotiations.
In addition to assessing the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim and whether it violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the ruling will also determine the legal definition of several disputed geographic features. This is important because certain features, be it an island, rock, or low-tide feature, grant the possessor different economic and sovereign rights under UNCLOS. Given the expansive nature of Beijing’s claim, it is widely believed that many provisions of the ruling will not be in its favor and will instead side with Manila.
As a response to an unfavorable ruling, many experts speculate that Beijing may attempt one or both of the following courses. The first would be to set up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over portions of the South China Sea as it did over the East China Sea in 2013. Such a move in the South China Sea would be easy to implement and enforce given Beijing’s expansion of airfields on reclaimed islands. The second course of action would involve turning Scarborough Shoal into a new naval base and airstrip. Such a move is the most provocative to the U.S. and Philippines, because it would place Chinese planes less than 125 miles from the Philippines.
While China has been clear that it will not accept the terms of the ruling, this is likely to cause greater complications long term. Greg Poling, director of CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, believes that any defiance of the ruling on China’s part “…directly undercuts Beijing’s narrative that it is a peaceful rising power that deserves a larger hand in shepherding the international system.” While China may not go to great lengths to undercut the ruling to maintain its international standing, it may be more reluctant to abide by future rulings requiring international arbitration.
Mike Fuchs, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, offered an additional reason for China to keep its cool in response to an unfavorable ruling. China’s role as host to the G-20 in September is a “… built-in incentive for China to refrain from provocative actions that would cause things to get out of hand…” Therefore, Fuchs believes this time period could be the most crucial for the U.S. and other stake holders to formulate a response to any increased tensions.
As a regional stakeholder, it is important for the U.S. to uphold international rule of law and maintain the confidence of its allies while leaving open avenues for compromise. Given that China’s territorial claims are in direct conflict with that of several U.S. allies and could interfere with freedom of navigation and trade-$5 trillion in goods pass through these waters annually- this is easier said than done.
The U.S. presidential campaign has also had an effect on regional perceptions of U.S. resolve. Ernie Bower, President and CEO of Bower Group Asia, highlighted this fact at a June 20th CSIS event “The South China Sea Arbitration.” With Donald Trump disparaging all trade agreements and Hillary Clinton turning her back on the Trans Pacific Partnership, Asian countries are left wondering how strong the U.S. regional commitment will truly be under the next president. In summation, Bower said: “It scares the hell out of Asia, particularly the Japanese and others who are students of American politics.” It will remain difficult to allay the fears of U.S. allies if this anti-trade narrative continues.
Both Poling and Fuchs agree that the U.S. has an important role to play in whatever comes next. They say at a minimum, the U.S. should support the international ruling and, as an additional measure, should consider expanded freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the near future. Additionally, the U.S. should consider ratifying UNCLOS rather than just acting within its regulations.
Whatever the outcome, the UNCLOS ruling will have important ramifications for regional relationships, free trade, and the sanctity of international law. The world will have to wait and see what the ruling brings and subsequently evaluate China’s response. The U.S. has several avenues for signaling its commitment to prosperity and peace: ratifying UNCLOS, tightening regional alliances, and FONOPS. The right combination will uphold international law and norms without ostracizing China.
Will Edwards is an international producer at The Cipher Brief.
