My first meeting with the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks in 2003 was instructive. Their lead negotiator, First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan, said the U.S. should accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and like Pakistan, North Korea would be a good friend of the U.S. I said this would never happen; denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was U.S. policy.
In late September 2016, in a Track 1.5 meeting in Kuala Lumpur with North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Han Song-Ryol and his delegation, Han said the U.S. should accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, saying that they would be a responsible nuclear state, friendly with the U.S. I repeated what I said in 2003, but this time as a civilian, expressing my view that the U.S. would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
What was unsaid in the 2016 exchange, and very apparent to each side, was that North Korea had made significant nuclear and missile progress since 2003. They now possessed nuclear weapons and an impressive array of ballistic missiles, acquired during the past 13 years of failed negotiations. This year alone, North Korea had launched 12 ballistic missiles, to include the Hwasong 14 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the Hwasong 10 Intermediate Range Ballistic (IRBM), and a Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM). And of North Korea’s five nuclear tests, two were in 2016, with Kim Jung-un claiming that the North was capable of miniaturizing its nuclear weapons. Additionally, North Korea has been working on their offensive cyber capabilities and their chemical and biological programs.
Given these developments, it appears no longer realistic to think that North Korea would ever give up its nuclear and missile programs. They’ve dedicated too many resources to these programs, and they’ve progressed too far. What may be realistic, however, is to get North Korea to halt its nuclear tests and missile launches, in return for deliverables – peace treaty, fewer joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, sanctions relief – important to the North.
Thus our short term goal should be to get North Korea to halt its nuclear tests and missile launches and enter into exploratory formal talks, where their demands will be discussed. These exploratory talks should have an established time line, during which time decisions must be made. If these exploratory talks are constructive, a more formal process, which includes South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, could be established to determine if North Korea could be convinced to dismantle its nuclear programs, in return for economic development assistance and a more formal relationship with the U.S., to immediately include the establishment of diplomatic Interest Sections in the respective capitals.
When we proposed a halt to all nuclear tests and missile launches during our Track 1.5 discussions, Vice Minister Han suggested that the North could consider this if the U.S. and South Korea were prepared to halt their military exercises, which the North views as a threat. Han was told this would be a non-starter for the U.S., since these joint military exercises are defensive in nature, between two allies. Rather, it was suggested that the North could agree to halting their nuclear tests and missile launches while exploratory talks were underway. Once at the table, the North could then pursue any of its demands, such as a scaling back of joint U.S.- South Korea military exercises, sanctions relief, and a peace treaty – issues important to North Korea. We also suggested that the North should release the Americans they were detaining; a gesture that would go a long way in building much needed trust between our countries.
Getting North Korea to temporarily halt its nuclear and missile programs may be possible, but only if the North thinks it can succeed with some of their security demands. Also important will be our determination to be strong and united with the international community in response to North Korea’s continued violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. This would include enhancing regional missile defense, persisting with joint U.S. - South Korea defensive military exercises, establishing greater trilateral – U.S., South Korea, and Japan –intelligence and military cooperation, and imposing additional sanctions, to include secondary sanctions on those entities doing illicit business with North Korea. In this regard, China, which has relatively more leverage over the North than any other country, could signal its displeasure with Pyongyang’s recent behavior by modulating the amount of crude oil shipped to North Korea, critical for its survival.
In the final analysis, a halt to nuclear tests and missile launches will be a pause necessary to determine if a peace treaty, economic development assistance, and interaction with international financial institutions are of interest to North Korea. If these and the eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. and others are important to Kim Jung-un, then it’s possible North Korea eventually would be willing to discuss the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs, something Kim Jung-un’s father, Kim Jung-Il, supported. But to do this, we must get North Korea to take the first step – temporarily halting its nuclear and missile programs.
Accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, even with a limited nuclear arsenal, would be a mistake. A nuclear North Korea would result in significant nuclear proliferation in East Asia, with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and others likely seeking their own nuclear weapons, regardless of extended nuclear deterrence commitments from the U.S. A nuclear North Korea could also result in the accidental use of nuclear weapons because of miscalculation or error, with the potential that some of these weapons or nuclear fissile material could find its way to rogue states or non-state terrorist actors.
Time is not on our side. A pro-active strategy to resume exploratory formal negotiations, with the goal of the eventual dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs, should be our objective.