Last month, The Cipher Brief published a feature commentary on the prospects for peace in Colombia. This month, we continue that conversation with Frank Mora, the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Mora offered his thoughts on the status of the negotiations between Bogotá and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The Cipher Brief: Recently the Colombian President and the leader of the FARC announced a six-month deadline for reaching a peace agreement. How would you assess the likelihood of them meeting this goal?
Frank O. Mora: President Juan Manuel Santos said six months. The FARC Commander, Timoshenko, said that it is not reasonable to expect a final deal in six months. Timoshenko did not say, however, that a deal was unlikely. So these are two separate issues: the likelihood of a deal, and the likelihood of meeting the six-month deadline.
The likelihood of reaching a deal in six months is not clear because the specifics of the deal haven’t been revealed. For example, what will happen to members of the FARC both in terms of their reintegration and transitional justice? The details of their detention or arrest are unclear, and this has legal consequences in Colombia. The Rome Convention—of which Colombia is a signatory—is clear that when people commit the kinds of crimes some in the FARC have been involved in, they will face jail time or legal consequences. I don’t know that the transitional justice part of the peace agreement will meet that standard. It’s very complicated, and that raises concerns about whether the six-months will be met.
However, I am confident that this conflict will end—and that it will end relatively soon, although probably beyond six months. The FARC made a very public commitment to end the conflict; they are now just negotiating some of the details. It would be very hard politically for either party to leave the negotiation and for the whole thing to fall apart. They have gone too far, and it’s very difficult for them to pull back now.
TCB: President Santos has been saying that Colombia has already started to enter the ‘post-conflict’ period. If the deal is passed, what changes can we expect in the short and long-terms?
FM: Expectations that somehow violence and insecurity are going to dramatically change once a deal is signed are a bit naïve. I think there will be a process of demobilization, but in my view, elements of the FARC will evolve or devolve into criminal organizations. In many ways they are a criminal organization, and some of them have done well from that business. Simply striking a political deal to end a war does not mean that the participants in that conflict will be reintegrated into normal life and become businessmen. That certainly may be true with some, but I don’t see that being a blanket reality for all of them. There will be a transition of FARC members into criminal activity, in which many of them are already involved.
What the deal will do is end a political conflict. But it doesn’t end the sources of conflict and violence in Colombia – inequality challenges, issues of social exclusion, and long-standing governance problems. These do not end with the signing of a document.
The Colombian government has made enormous progress in the security realm, but there are still some socio-economic and governance challenges that need to be addressed. One would hope and expect that in a much less violent environment, the government can actually move into certain less-developed areas of the country and establish a state presence, provide public goods, etc. We will see.
I think one has to moderate their expectations about the day after the agreement is signed. At the end of the day, President Santos wants to sign a document and to be responsible for ending a decades-old war. That is a major political accomplishment that has security implications, but it does not get to the root of the problem in Colombia.
TCB: We have been talking about what Colombia looks like if the deal is passed. What would be the greater security and geopolitical consequences if a deal is not reached?
FM: Because of the public role Cuba and President Raul Castro played bringing both sides together, Havana has a vested interest in ensuring the deal happens. There is too much at stake for the different actors to walk away from the table.
In terms of Colombia’s neighbors, Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Ecuador, would be concerned about a breakdown in negotiations, but it would be a serious problem for Colombia more than anyone else. We would likely see higher levels of violence if the FARC perceives that the government has not been honest or fully committed to what they promised. They might try to heighten the pressure on the government by increasing the level of violence within Colombia. Conversely, if the FARC or elements of the organization seek to sabotage the negotiations by heightening levels of violence, the process may fall apart.
TCB: Looking forward, if the deal is passed, will the U.S. defense community continue to focus as much on Colombia?
FM: The relationship between the U.S. and the Colombian government will continue, but it will take a different form than what we’ve seen since the institution of Plan Colombia. Colombia will expect U.S. assistance with post-conflict demobilization, reintegration, and modernization of the Colombian military—all very different from the support we’ve previously provided to the Colombians.
What is unclear is if we will maintain the same level of support – though it has already declined over the last few years. The tendency will be to declare victory and to say, “We’ve won. This is an example of how our support made a difference.”
Then, there would be a natural inclination—certainly from Capitol Hill—to move elsewhere. But the Colombians have a pretty strong campaign in Washington; the new Colombian Ambassador in Washington, Juan Carlos Pinzón, was the former Minister of Defense and has made an important effort on the Hill to ensure continued U.S. support in the post-conflict period. I certainly hope we continue to support Colombia – a strong strategic partner in the region – as it embarks on what promises to be a very complex post-conflict phase.
TCB: Where do you think the Hill would shift those resources?
FM: There is certainly a need in Central America, but that does not mean the resources will be shifted there. Previously, there was a request for $1 billion for Central America, which had become one of the top priorities for the Administration in Latin America. There is a security assistance plan before Congress; I am not sure that it will pass. If anything, it will get about $200-250 million.
However, I do not believe that Washington will say “We’re going to take Colombian money, and we’re going to put it somewhere else.” I don’t think appropriation works in such zero-sum terms. We should be able to support these two key priorities in the hemisphere.
