Nuclear North Korea: A No-Win Scenario?

The latest North Korean nuclear test was the largest to date, yet the international consensus on a response is as fractured and indecisive as ever. In the days following the test, China announced that it opposed the unilateral sanctions pursued by Japan. The United States is in support of sanctions, but is not set to deviate from its policy of “strategic patience,” the policy of isolating North Korea via sanctions and waiting for it to return to negotiations. Everyone agrees that the threat is real and growing, but there is no agreement on how to confront the threat of a North Korea armed with nuclear tipped ballistic missiles.

In addition to upping the kiloton yield of its weapons, North Korea’s nuclear program is increasing the rate at which it can produce nuclear warheads. A new estimate in an article published at 38 North by Siegfried Hecker, the American expert who was invited by the North Korean regime to tour its nuclear facilities in 2010, points to an increased production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Conservatively, Hecker suggests that North Korea can now produce enough material for seven nuclear weapons per year. HEU production is also troublesome because it is much harder to reliably estimate as development continues. Variables such as the number of centrifuges and their individual output can change, whereas plutonium can only originate from a single reactor – and that reactor’s output is known from previous IAEA surveys. The growth of the nuclear arsenal is a worrisome unknown.