The 7th North Korean Workers’ Party (WPK) Congress —the first event of its kind in 36 years— began and ended with the flair for the dramatic we have come to expect from the reclusive communist state. Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un dialed up the party rhetoric and called on all workers to undertake 70 days of preparation to ensure that production numbers exceeded targets and every factory and public space was rigorously cleaned. Likewise, the congress ended with Pyongyang-style pomp and ceremony. A mass parade showcased precision military formation marching and the people’s choreographed exuberance for their dear leader. However, the substance of what occurred amidst the fanfare left many experts wondering what all the fuss was about.
There was the expected reaffirmation of the byongjin policy; a promotion of both economic and nuclear weapons development. The long standing policy, which Kim first reintroduced and updated in 2013 and has been the hallmark of his tenure as leader, received scant elaboration by Kim during the congress as to how the policy would fulfill its goal of turning North Korea into a strong and prosperous nation. Economic development will be pursued under a vaguely outlined five-year plan that will begin this year. This was a disappointment for global experts hoping to see more concrete policy direction emerge from such an important party event.
One clear policy announcement did emerge regarding nuclear weapons. While North Korea has described itself as a nuclear state for several years, it was unclear what this meant for its policy of using nuclear weapons. At the 7th Party Congress, Kim announced that North Korea would not use nuclear weapons “unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes." Kim also said that North Korea would be a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons, promote non-proliferation, and would be open to negotiations with “hostile nations.” For the U.S. this is a non-starter, given that its own policy is firm on the point that denuclearization is a prerequisite for normalization of relations.
Although there were few policy announcements, more evident changes occurred on the political front within the party apparatus. Here, it appears that Kim is trying to balance the older and younger generations by increasing cabinet sizes to accommodate new posts from his own cohort without replacing members of the old guard. The promotion of members with economic experience appears to coincide with advancing the new five-year plan.
The most important appointment was for Kim himself. By unanimous vote, he was elected to be chairman of the Workers’ Party, a promotion from his earlier title of first secretary. While Kim was already the party leader, the new title elevates his status as leader of the regime and signifies the growing importance of the WPK over the military, a departure from his father’s military-first policies and more in line with his grandfather’s focus on the the Party.
Though the regime invited the national media to cover the congress, the journalists were given scant opportunity to cover the proceedings, and, instead, were distracted by tours to a wire factory or other show pieces. Many experts are left scratching their heads wondering why this congress, the first in 36 years, appears to have accomplished so little. Dennis Wilder, a former special assistant to President George W. Bush, sees the event as a missed opportunity, and the lack of policy direction fails to capitalize on the country’s human resources.
Another vexing development is the absence of any international delegates to this congress. Previous congresses hosted as many as 177 delegates from 118 countries, but it appears none were invited to the 7th congress. This could be a sign of the frayed relations North Korea has with the international community.
Following Kim’s new promotion to party chairman, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent only a cursory congratulatory note to the North Korean leader. Experts noted that the letter did not address Kim as “comrade,” a title extended in previous correspondence. While this may be connected to Beijing’s disapproval of Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and a ballistic missile launch, some experts believe it is unlikely to be a sign of lasting damage to the alliance. Dr. Yun Sun of the Stimson Center told the Cipher Brief that North Korea is a “piece in the great game” between China and the U.S. and, in that context, its value as an ally is too important.
Now that the event has closed and the international reporters are gone, the view into the reclusive state will once again diminish, making it more difficult to discern how the events of the congress will shape the country’s future. The congress did make clear which half of the byongjin policy Kim Jong-un intends to use to cement his legacy with his new role as party chairman. North Korea’s commitment to advancing its nuclear weapons program will continue. Whether the same can be said for the economy and the welfare of the people remains unknown.
Will Edwards is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
