Despite years of international sanctions and recent pressure from the Trump Administration, North Korea’s missile program has continued to rack up successes and acquire new capabilities. It would seem these new capabilities have made North Korean leader Kim Jong-un more confident, evidenced by his threat to conduct a missile test aimed toward the U.S. territory of Guam. After Trump doubled down on his commitment to use force against North Korea, Kim withdrew his threat to carry out the test while stating it could happen at any time of his choosing. For the moment, North Korea and the U.S. are at an impasse. The Cipher Brief spoke to James Kim, director of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC., to learn more about North Korea’s new capabilities, its motivations, and how it has managed to achieve technical success in spite of international sanctions.
The Cipher Brief: The Pentagon recently completed a report saying North Korea could successfully miniaturize a nuclear warhead and place it on a missile. North Korea has claimed this capability for some time, and previous reports suggested they had achieved this capability. What is new about this report?
James Kim: We know of at least one other assessment by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2013 which stated that North Korea may be able to arm a ballistic missile with nuclear weapons. The Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea also stated in October 2013 that he believed North Korea has the “capability to miniaturize a device… and… the technology to potentially deliver what they say they have.” The difference this time around is that the DIA has made this assessment with “moderate confidence.”
The report also comes at a moment that the rhetoric between North Korea and the United States is heating up. Some media coverage suggests that there is genuine concern that the recent intelligence assessments can be used as a basis for pursuing a military option to address the North Korean nuclear problem.
TCB: A recent report by Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggests North Korea may have acquired rocket engines and technical know-how from Ukraine. How is North Korea able to evade sanctions on these technologies, and how has evasion benefitted the progress of its missile program?
Kim: It would not come as a surprise if this most recent assessment is true given that there is ample evidence to suggest that North Korea frequently evades sanctions and engages in illicit trade. For instance, there are reports that North Korea conducts many questionable business transactions with countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, China, and Russia. This is just another reminder about the resourcefulness of this regime.
It is conceivable that Pyongyang can work out an arrangement with Ukraine via Russia or even work directly with entities in Ukraine to acquire military hardware and technical know-hows. We know, for instance, that a North Korean vessel was seized in 2013 for carrying Soviet-era weapons and MiG-21 fighter jets during its return trip from Cuba.
In theory, sanctions should address these types of problems, but there are certain realities about North Korean sanctions that we must acknowledge. First of all, past sanctions on North Korea have been shown to be considerably weaker than that of other countries. For instance, the number of North Korean entities that have been targeted by the U.S. government has been traditionally smaller than that of countries like Belarus, Burma, Iran, Syria, and Zimbabwe. The North Korean sanctions regime has grown tighter in recent months especially with the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act.
There are additional measures being considered by the U.S. government to tighten the noose around North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, but the fact remains that sanctions require time and effort to have a measurable impact.
Finally, sanctions are effective only to the extent that they are enforced. Although the U.S. government can utilize diplomacy, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the degree of compliance by other governments and businesses.
It is doubtful whether countries like China or Russia will dutifully enforce sanctions on North Korea given that they have been reluctant to do so in the past. This is largely due to the fact that their interests do not align with a weakened North Korean regime.
TCB: North Korea appears to have backed down from its threat to launch missiles towards Guam. What other measures can they take to demonstrate the progress of their program?
Kim: North Korea need not launch missiles toward Guam to demonstrate the progress that they have made. They can conduct test launches into international waters anywhere in the Pacific, which would demonstrate their ability to manage re-entry and guide intermediate or long-range missiles to intended targets with precision.
TCB: What is your take on why North Korea decided not to fire at Guam?
Kim: It is important to keep in mind that North Korea has shown time and time again that it exerts a significant amount of time and effort in dealing with other states or conducting so-called “provocations.” The fact that this regime has been able to sustain itself through two leadership transitions and the end of Cold War suggests that it is led by an able-bodied cadre of elites. From this, we can reason that North Korea’s desire to develop its own nuclear capability is driven by its ultimate objective to minimally survive and maximally dominate.
From this perspective, it is difficult to imagine North Korea taking steps that would jeopardize its own chances of survival. Granted, evidence shows that the regime does not shy away from taking calculated risks to get what it wants. But these moves are carefully planned and executed. For instance, the statement leading up to the recent announcement to delay the decision on whether to test launch four mid-range ballistic missiles 30-40 km from Guam is very revealing.
First of all, the original statement suggests that the regime may have been testing to see how the Trump administration would react to the planned launches. Second, 30-40 km from Guam indicates North Korea’s ability to acknowledge international laws and norms, which would make this launch (if successful) technically outside of Guam’s territorial waters; hence, Pyongyang could argue that the test was not aimed at Guam if Washington decided to escalate. However, the North Korean leadership has never dealt with a U.S. president like Donald Trump. There is an element of uncertainty surrounding Washington’s actions and rhetoric.
While it remains to be seen whether North Korea has completely backed away from the possibility of any future tests near or at Guam, they seem to have earned themselves some time to better read and assess the United States’ intentions. There may even be some concern in Pyongyang about the dangers of escalating tension with the U.S. too quickly.
