Closely supported by Russian air power and artillery, Syrian army attacks against rebel forces near Aleppo, Syria coincide with a significant intensification of fighting in eastern Ukraine, with the largest number of daily attacks by the Russian-separatist forces since August 2015. There have been heavy attacks all across the front line observed in detail by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), yet almost completely unmentioned in the international media. Moreover, recent statements by senior Russian officials show an increase in rhetoric about Ukraine.
Chairman of the Russian National Security Council Nikolay Patrushev—arguably the most important advisor to President Vladimir Putin on geopolitical strategy—recently repeated the comment the Ukraine is “not a real country,” and the U.S., with the help of the European Union (EU), organized an illegal state coup in Ukraine with anti-Russian aims. Patrushev went on to assert the current Ukrainian leadership works for the U.S. and implements the will of the U.S., with the goal of pulling Ukraine as far as possible away from Russia. Patrushev goes on to threaten, “Such a political course has no future: if Ukraine’s leadership does not in time reject this course, then it will lead to a complete collapse of the Ukrainian economy and to the break-up of Ukraine.”
Clearly, no softening of the Russian position on Ukraine is apparent despite the economic pain of sanctions. For its part, the West, led by the U.S., continues to insist on the full implementation of the Minsk agreement before any normalization of economic relations with Russia.
The original deadline for implementation of Minsk was December 31, 2015. This deadline has come and gone without any significant achievement of any of the terms of the agreement. Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France agreed to an extension of the deadline to December 31, 2016. However, in the context of the renewed violence, there appears to be little chance of implementation, even with an additional year. The European Union is scheduled to review renewal of sanctions against Russia in June, which will be a key indicator of European resolve to stay the course.
From the Kiev perspective, the constitutional changes and decentralization outlined in Minsk cannot occur until the following conditions have been met: a real and long-lasting ceasefire; Moscow returns control of the Russian-Ukrainian border to the prewar status quo; withdrawal of Russian arms and forces; full access for OSCE to all Russian-separatist areas; cancellation of the Russian-separatist elections (postponed since November 2014); and a prisoner exchange.
There is no working ceasefire nor has there been one since either of the Minsk agreements. There has been no withdrawal of Russian arms or forces. To the contrary, both OSCE and U.S. military sources report continued Russian military presence in eastern Ukraine and the provision of military support and supplies to separatist forces. But Kremlin officials continue to deny any military presence or support to eastern Ukraine at all. The Russian-Ukrainian border remains solidly in the control of Russian/separatist forces.
There has been provisional agreement in Kiev to a law for local self government and special status in eastern Ukraine, but Moscow and the separatist leaders do not believe the law goes far enough. In recent discussions with Kiev, separatists have increased their demands for autonomy to include the right to elect their own government, parliament, and president. They also want their own police force; “security service;” legal system and courts; and border police independent of control from Kiev. Clearly, these demands are unacceptable to the Ukrainian government.
The prospect that Minsk will not be implemented before even the end of 2016 seems inescapable. From Putin’s perspective, there is little need to compromise. He feels he has largely achieved the objectives he set out to achieve with the Ukrainian gambit. The Crimea has been annexed (and the Black Sea fleet secured), Russian-backed forces control a significant portion of the industrial and resource basin of Ukraine, and the rebels can ratchet up or down the level of violence as Moscow sees fit to put pressure on Ukraine and complicate Poroshenko’s ability to govern. Moscow can continue to apply the same sort of pressure on the energy front. Moscow’s use of cyber tools to disrupt the Ukrainian military effort and increasingly the economy remains well-documented.
The strong belief in the Kremlin is that Poroshenko’s government will collapse in the next few months, if not year, and Moscow will be in a position to install a more pro-Russian President. Certainly sanctions have exacerbated problems with the Russian economy but not to the point where there has been a significant drop in Putin’s public approval. With the focus in the West having turned to ISIS, the refugee crisis, and Assad’s resurgence, there seems little chance the West will summon the political will to support Kiev militarily or economically and give hope to the dream begun with the Orange Revolution in 2004.
