Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing presents economic and security challenges to all maritime nations. Bad actors, ranging from local artisanal fleets fishing without a license inside their countries exclusive economic zones, to foreign distant water fleets who can take advantage of a lack of governance and management in developing countries to fish at will or run drift nets for miles in international waters, strip mining the ocean and killing everything that is unfortunate enough to be caught in their wake, are driving an industry that is estimated to cost between $15.5 and $36.4 billion per year. IUU fishing destroys global fishing stocks, removes revenue from the legitimate economy, and threatens food security. Additionally, as the global population increases and demands for fish grow with it, IUU fishing is emerging as a national security threat.
As with other forms of high seas crime, such as narcotics smuggling and human trafficking, unpredictable human behavior makes detecting and catching nefarious actors a difficult proposition. Promises of high payoffs to fishermen from unregulated catches, partnered with the low probability of being caught due to the remote nature of territorial seas and limited capability of militaries and maritime law enforcement units to patrol the vast expanses under their control, contribute to the growth of IUU fishing.
Furthermore, IUU fishing is often integrated into the networks of these other high seas crimes. Like narcotics smuggling and human trafficking, IUU fishing can take advantage of the seemingly legitimate business of fishing to move and transport illicit products and people. When engaged in IUU activities, some fishers can appear to be completely legitimate and even be engaged in legal activities right up to the point that they transition to illegal activities. As a result, developing and implementing a comprehensive and effective strategy to combat IUU fishing is extraordinarily difficult, but completely necessary in today’s world of global competition for limited resources.
Military-style wargames can provide insight into how to better address the challenges of IUU activities. The Stimson Center recently conducted two wargames as part of a National Interagency Advisory Group, hosted by the National Maritime Intelligence Integration Office, to develop solutions to improve the surveillance, monitoring, and enforcement capabilities as methods to combat IUU fishing in Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Costa Rica and Chile.
Attendees broke into teams to look at how to best improve IUU fishing enforcement in the Cocos Island MPA in Costa Rica and the Juan Fernandez MPA in Chile. Cocos Island’s main threat is from local fisherman running illegal longlines inside the MPA boundaries. By contrast, Juan Fernandez faces threats from foreign distant water fleets turning off or “spoofing” their Automatic Identification System (AIS) while fishing illegally inside Chile’s exclusive economic zone. If left unchecked, there may be potential for conflict in both countries.
The governments of Costa Rica and Chile are committed to working toward reliable and effective strategies for combatting the IUU fishing threats to their countries. In fact, both countries sent their ambassadors and other senior officials and stakeholders to the event to speak about the threat of IUU fishing to their respective national interests.
The wargames were run in an action-reaction-counteraction format, with players divided into three teams for each of the two MPAs. The blue teams were assigned to IUU fishing enforcement through an external supporting lens to determine what resources from private industry, international assistance, or global NGOs could be applied to help the government better monitor and respond to IUU threats.
The green teams were assigned to enforcement from a domestic, internal perspective and to assess the following three areas: ensure law enforcement units are properly resourced to interdict illegal activities; determine whether the government was dedicating the correct legal oversight to catch and prosecute IUU fishers; and decide whether the available surveillance, monitoring, and enforcement resources were correctly aligned with the tasking.
The red teams were assigned to look at critical vulnerabilities in the current strategy and determine how to best exploit them. The white team served as game facilitators to provide the scenario background information and briefing all scenario injects. Some key elements emerged as soon as the games started.
Experts from across the intelligence, military, private sector, and NGO communities immediately drew upon their expertise and background to bring experiences from similar problems faced in different areas around the globe. Using their collective expertise, the players filled in knowledge gaps to develop policy recommendations, formulated resource allocation plans, and discussed available and emerging technologies with relevant applications.
After the first round of collaboration, each team briefed their initial analysis and recommendations to the larger group. During this first phase, the blue and green teams focused on maritime domain awareness and layering of available intelligence products by establishing government fusion cells to digest the massive amount of surveillance data and move toward targeting these nefarious actors. They also looked at enacting more severe penalties for IUU fishing as a deterrent to repeat offenses. Finally, the teams recommended information sharing agreements with regional partners to deny IUU fishers the use of potential seams between exclusive economic zones.
The red teams looked at better methods of hiding their criminal enterprise, such as purchasing more fishing vessels to better disguise their illicit activities and force the limited law enforcement units to work harder to interdict them. Not surprisingly, the red teams were able to move more quickly with less central coordination, making the environment even more complex and adding to the already challenging problems facing the blue and green teams.
In the second phase of the game, the facilitators allowed blue and green to “team up” to simulate external agency cooperation with the host government just as would happen in the real world. As expected, this yielded more coherent strategies that were explored deeper amongst the larger and more diverse team, including how to incorporate international law enforcement assistance and leverage the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations to greater effect. Additionally, it forced the red teams to determine how the new tactics would affect their enterprise now that the blue and green teams were fighting as a united front.
The team construct, although artificial, enabled experts who normally do not work together to collaborate and brainstorm options for IUU enforcement, alongside the officials responsible for their implementation. Additionally, working together, they facilitated communication among government, agency, industry, and NGO leaders to formulate and recommend implementable solutions to improve IUU fishing enforcement.
Participants lauded the wargames as a success but noted the fact that these exercises only explored a fraction of the available decision space in the time that was available to them. Despite these constraints, players and facilitators recognized the value in wargaming new enforcement strategies against IUU fishing. The U.S. Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for Operations, Vice Admiral Charles Ray, lauded the conference’s success in creating “not just a community of interest, but a community of action.”
The Cipher Brief, in conjunction with the Stimson Center, is publishing a Natural Security Series featuring articles on the convergence between environmental and national security issues. Be sure to check in next month for the next part of the Natural Security Series.
