EXPERT INTERVIEW – In the early weeks of the second Trump administration, questions were raised about Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, as the White House appeared increasingly opposed to aid for Ukraine and took a more sympathetic approach to Moscow. Those concerns remain, but they’ve been joined by a much broader question about European security: Can Europe defend itself, in the event of a full-throated American retreat from NATO?
General Philip Breedlove, who served for three years (2013-2016) as the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, recently completed a multi-country tour of the continent, as it grapples with those questions about the U.S. commitment. Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke with General Breedlove during his trip, while he was on a stop in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.
Their conversation ranged from broad European military needs to specific weapons systems to new measures the so-called frontline European nations – Poland and the Baltic states – are taking to counter the Russian threat.
“Deterrence is in the mind of the deterred, and clearly most people like me think about deterrence,” Gen. Breedlove said. “They think of capability and credibility. I think the West and NATO have plenty of capability to deter Mr. Putin. I do not think the West has the credibilityto deter Mr. Putin right now, and that's worrisome...I think Mr. Putin senses weakness and he knows what to do in the presence of weakness.”
The interview has been edited for length and clarity. You can watch the full interview with Gen. Breedlove on our YouTube channel.
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The Cipher Brief: How much does Europe actually depend on the United States for its defense, and what's lost – in terms of countering Russia in particular – if and when this American retreat materializes?
Gen. Breedlove: This is a timely subject. And there are a few realities right now that will change across the next several years. The first reality that few think about is that Russia's army is really badly mauled and beaten up right now. If you listen to the Institute for the Study of War and others, Russia in the last year has gained about 1% of Ukraine and they've lost about 400,000 soldiers. Imagine that. And you had the destruction of the army of Russia when they first invaded about three years ago, in this portion of this 11-year-long war – their armies took a bad mauling in their armor and their rolling stock and their transportation capability was beaten up horribly in those first attacks that were repelled largely by Ukraine.
I'm painting a picture right now – the Russian army is not at its peak. It certainly is not 10 feet tall like we used to think. I jokingly say it's about five-foot-five these days.
So over the next several years in a land warfare context, Europe I believe could do just fine.
But now it's all the other things where Europe really depends on America. The maritime, the naval capabilities, the air capabilities — those Europe has quite a bit. But where America is absolutely the key to Russia is with all of the enablers, all of the things that make an army potent — long-range precise fires, deep technical intelligence, developing kill chains and target folders in order to strike.
There are a few things that really only America can do. Aerial transport is one. We're really tied to railroads and roads in Europe. The ability to rapidly move forces by aerial transportation is something really only America can do. Some nations have some small capabilities, but they really don't have the kind of strategic lift that America brings. Then there are the very capable intelligence and intelligence-gathering platforms that give us the multiple intelligence feeds – only America can truly do that. And then command and control, and all of the headquarters that NATO fights from. A strong backbone in those headquarters are American capabilities. And so these are things they absolutely depend on.
In a kinetic way, there is the penetrating precise-strike capability. Truly only the United States right now is flying the kind of stealth and fifth-generation capabilities in a sense of mass that are needed for that. We have nations now that are coming on board with stealth and penetrating capabilities and that will build over time, but the United States brings the depth of that capability.
The Cipher Brief: There was a report in the last week from the International Institute for Strategic Studies that said that it would cost Europe upwards of a trillion dollars and take about 25 years to match and replace what America brings.
Gen. Breedlove: We took almost a three-decade procurement holiday. We were enjoying our peace dividends for almost three decades. I was asked not long ago, How long does it take to recover from that three decades? I said three decades; you're bringing up 25 years; I think there's a lot of sense there. Very few countries could throw huge amounts of cash at this – maybe Germany and others can – but most nations, it's going to take time. We have been trying to make [Russian President Vladimir] Putin a partner for a long time and he has never intended to be a partner in Europe.
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The Cipher Brief: You see almost on a daily basis a new announcement from either an individual European nation, a NATO nation, or from Brussels on behalf of the whole continent saying, we're pledging this much new spending, we're going to hit this new percentage target, whether it's 5% or lower. How optimistic are you that the Europeans are doing the right things now beyond what they're saying?
Gen. Breedlove: I actually see a lot of very good progress. I'm in the middle of a four-capital swing in Europe right now; and another four-country swing in about 10 days. And what I'm seeing is that people are trying to think through the problem of the trade-off between current readiness, fixing the kit that they have to be able to fight tonight, versus investment in that long-term readiness, buying the next level, and they're looking at some pretty ruthless prioritization to figure out how to do this. So there are still a couple of nations, two or three nations that are – in my opinion – not yet showing the appropriate movement. But most capitals have determined that Mr. Putin is not a partner, he's an enemy. He has now three times amassed his army and marched across internationally recognized borders and invaded his neighbors and we're going to have to deal with him.
The Cipher Brief: I want to ask a couple of questions about specific things that European nations are doing, or talking about doing, to – as you say – “deal with Putin.” One has to do with landmines. Poland, Finland and the three Baltic states have said they're withdrawing from the international treaty that bans landmines and they cite the Russian threat. What’s your view of that change?
Gen. Breedlove: Well, if you’ve studied the eastern edge of the Baltic nations, it is not an easy throughway for anybody. In peacetime, there are complications – swamps, forests, narrow spots. And so if there is any territory out there where landmines could definitely cause massive problems for an invading army, I would say that it is the eastern flank of the Baltic nations. And remember, these nations now are really trying to decide: Is America a reliable ally or not? And if they're going to have to go it alone, they're going to have to take some pretty tough measures to make sure that they can hold, should Russia do what they seem to be continuing to do.
The Cipher Brief: And here's another unusual measure, that comes from Poland – a request that they've publicly made that nuclear weapons be positioned on their soil.
Gen. Breedlove: Doesn't surprise me at all. In South Korea and Japan, there are now intimations out of both of those countries that they think it's time to start a nuclear program. I don't doubt that Poland would love to have U.S. weapons there. Poland is going to buy the kind of aircraft that could deliver a nuclear weapon in a stealthy manner. Again, the world is sort of sitting back and watching what's going on in Ukraine, and they're trying to determine, is America a reliable ally or not? And they're going to start taking these more drastic measures, because you just can't bet your national sovereignty and existence on a hope.
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The Cipher Brief: One more question about Poland. How much of a linchpin or a leading edge are they, for this discussion about Europe defending itself?
Gen. Breedlove: They're kind of the anchor in the north. Europe has a new, amazing anchor in the high north – Finland, an incredibly capable and determined nation and military. They fought Russia to a standstill in the Winter War [in 1939] and others. Now you've got Poland, that has been steadily investing in capability, and taking their defense in an important way. And I think if you look at the Black Sea in the south, you've got a nation there that's not moving as fast as others, but Romania is fast becoming an anchor in the south. But definitely in the center, Poland is the army that has the capability to inflict damage on Russia.
The Cipher Brief: You noted at the outset that Russia is battered right now, losing all those soldiers, and the economy not doing well. Some might look at all that and think – well, it seems a little farfetched to imagine a Russian incursion or invasion against any of these countries we've been discussing, given where they stand. On the other hand, or the other end of the scale, there is what we know about Putin's ambitions. How should we weigh all that?
Gen. Breedlove: Deterrence is in the mind of the deterred, and clearly most people like me think about deterrence. They think of capability and credibility. I think the West and NATO have plenty of capability to deter Mr. Putin. I do not think the West has the credibilityto deter Mr. Putin right now, and that's worrisome. I talk often about how our strategic deterrence is still firm. Our tactical nuclear deterrence is slipping every day and we need to take steps to regain and make that solid. Our conventional deterrence is still pretty solid inside of NATO, but we have no conventional deterrence outside of NATO. Mr. Putin is running amok in non-NATO nations, and then finally in the hybrid, the gray zone, whatever you want to call that war – we never have had deterrence, and we've got to establish deterrence there. And all of this really turns on our credibility. I think Mr. Putin senses weakness and he knows what to do in the presence of weakness.
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