The Pentagon today is paying greater attention to Russia as a security threat. That reflects several factors: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, its bellicose rhetoric, and the modernization of its military. As the United States prepares to modernize its own nuclear forces, arms control could play an important role in stabilizing the relationship between Washington and Moscow. But expectations should be kept modest, given the troubled political atmospherics and the two countries’ differing approaches on arms control.
The West-Russia relationship has declined to its lowest point in many years. Moscow used military force to illegally seize Crimea in 2014 and then supported armed separatism in eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin has taken a more threatening stance in general toward the West, for example, frequently flying nuclear-capable Bear bombers near the air space of NATO members. This takes place against the backdrop of a major Russian investment to modernize its nuclear forces.
How much should we worry?
Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear forces across the board. Much of that effort, however, aims to replace old missiles and submarines that should have been retired years ago but were not, because Russia could not afford it earlier. Russia’s strategic modernization programs should not cause undue concern as long as two conditions apply: First, the United States and Russia continue to observe the limits of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and second, the United States takes appropriate steps to maintain its strategic nuclear triad.
More alarming is Russia’s modernization of its non-strategic, or tactical nuclear arms, combined with loose comments from the Kremlin about nuclear weapons and a “de-escalation” doctrine that suggests Moscow might more readily contemplate using nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict, with a view toward affecting the course of the battle. This raises questions as to whether Russia’s leadership fully understands the risks of nuclear brinksmanship.
For its part, the United States is beginning to modernize its strategic forces. Plans call for new ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers (the B-21), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles, and a modernized nuclear bomb.
These programs, which will ratchet up in the 2020s, should easily balance Russia’s modernization drive. In fact, some aspects seem excessive and may prove unaffordable. For example, given that the B-21 will have stealth features and carry a modernized nuclear bomb, the need for an expensive new cruise missile is unclear. That is particularly so in light of the conclusion by the president and Pentagon in 2013 that the United States could safely reduce its strategic forces by up to one-third below the New START limits and still deter potential adversaries, including Russia—even if Moscow maintained its force levels at the maximum permitted by New START.
While Russia maintains an array of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Pentagon has reduced the U.S. non-strategic arsenal to a single type: the B61 bomb. Engaging Moscow in a non-strategic nuclear arms race would be costly and unnecessary, as U.S. doctrine focuses on deterrence and does not envisage fighting a tactical nuclear war. U.S. use of such weapons would instead aim, as a last resort, to send a political signal, a warning that the conflict verged on escalation to use of strategic nuclear arms.
The United States does not need additional nuclear weapons beyond what is planned (and, as noted above, might even pare back its programs). But Washington and NATO should make clear to Moscow that the use of any nuclear weapon, no matter how small or discriminate, would open a Pandora’s Box of dire, unpredictable, and potentially catastrophic consequences.
Over the past 45 years, arms control has played an important role in stabilizing the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. It has also helped the two countries save many billions of dollars on unneeded weapons. Under New START, they will reduce their strategic arsenals to levels not seen since the 1950s.
Arms control will hopefully continue to play a part in the U.S.-Russia relationship and perhaps spur reductions beyond those mandated by the New START treaty. Two things are required before those additional cuts can take place.
First, there needs to be an improvement in the overall political relationship between Washington and Moscow. That poor relationship makes dialogue difficult. One key to improving the political atmosphere would be a more constructive Kremlin position regarding Ukraine. It is also important that Russia come back into compliance with the 1987 treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces.
Second, the sides will have to reconcile their differing approaches to nuclear reductions, which limited the prospects for arms control well before the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Washington has sought further nuclear cuts, including in non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moscow, on the other hand, focuses on questions such as missile defense and advanced long-range conventional strike weapons. If the sides wish to make progress on arms control, they will have to find a way to bridge these differences.
The good news is that Washington and Moscow seem to understand that, in times of significant tension, it is in the interest of both parties to abide by the numerical limits and transparency measures provided by the New START treaty. That suggests that New START will continue. What remains to be seen is whether the two can move beyond that treaty and agree to further reduce their still overlarge nuclear arsenals.
