In the wake of a 4th nuclear test, a satellite launch, and, most recently, a KCNA film portraying a North Korean ICBM striking Washington, DC, the question has been raised yet again about whether the U.S. is doing enough to curb North Korean provocations. While the notion that North Korean missiles can reach Washington is dubious, what is clear is the threat to U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and Japan by the entire panoply of the North Korean ballistic missile arsenal. In light of this reality, U.S. military planners, who have pushed for THAAD’s deployment on U.S. bases in South Korea for several years, may finally get their wish.
For the proponents of THAAD, deployment would signal to the world that President Park Geun Hye is doubling down on South Korea’s commitment as a U.S. ally and would signal to North Korea that its ballistic black mail garners no real strategic advantage. However, many are not so sure. According to Stephen Costello of Asia East, such a move would back South Korea into a corner, because it “… indicates closer alignment with the strategies of the U.S. and Japan… and limits Seoul’s diplomatic power and influence.”
Following the March 22 announcement by Defense Secretary Ash Carter that the U.S. and South Korea have an ‘agreement in principle’ to deploy THAAD, it appears that Seoul’s ambivalence towards the weapon system is coming to an end. The next job for the two countries is to assure China that THAAD is not a threat to China’s strategic nuclear deterrent, and its radar systems are not a means of gathering intelligence on China.
THAAD is not designed to target ICBMs, and its advanced X-band radar scanners would be just one of several types of monitoring equipment that could be pointed at China. Dr. Bruce Bennett of RAND told The Cipher Brief that “… China’s objections [to THAAD] appear to be motivated more by politics than meaningful military security concerns.” Prior to last week’s Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the U.S. State Department offered to brief Beijing on the THAAD system. China declined the proposal then, and later at the NSS, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed China’s firm opposition to THAAD during a meeting with President Obama.
Raising the stakes is North Korea’s recent, and by all accounts successful, test of a solid fuel rocket. Analysis from 38 North suggests that this technology is most likely to be paired with North Korea’s Nodong missile, an intermediate range weapon that could reach all of South Korea, Japan, and portions of its tenuous ally China. The Nodong missile, which could be the first to carry a North Korean nuclear warhead, is just the sort of threat THAAD is designed to eliminate. The substitution of a solid fuel rocket makes it easier to pair with a mobile launcher and decreases the time necessary to fire such a weapon. Both of these advantages decrease the time an adversary has to react. Additionally, solid fuel diminishes the chances of mistakes on the launch site. What a solid fuel rocket lacks in accuracy and control, it makes up for in speed of deployment and dependability. THAAD would increase positional advantage over a solid fueled Nodong. In light of this North Korean technological advance, the argument painting THAAD as a superfluous and expensive addition to the current Patriot missile defenses in place begins to unravel.
In response to President Barack Obama’s meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, South Korean President Park and Chinese President Xi over how to cooperate on security in North East Asia and denuclearize North Korea, Pyongyang has added a new target to its normal bluster. Like Washington and Seoul, Beijing has been added to the list of cities that North Korea claims it will destroy in a ‘nuclear storm’ with its new arsenal. It seems that even China may be running out of reasons to resist the deployment of THAAD.
Will Edwards is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
