Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte rattled decades of foreign policy on October 20 with his announcement of a military and economic “separation” from the United States. The declaration came in Beijing amid a Philippine pivot away from the long-standing relationship with the United States and toward China, with whom Duterte said he “aligned” himself ideologically. Asia foreign policy observers are watching closely to see if Duterte’s bold statements translate into an official split, or if the move is part of a grand plan to play the two powers against each other in pursuit of an independent Philippine foreign policy.
If Duterte is only trying to play China against the United States to secure greater concessions from each, he is doing so in an extraordinarily ham-fisted manner. Courting Beijing would not necessitate a full split with the United States, nor would it require the crass language that has captured headlines. U.S. officials repeatedly have said that the United States welcomes warmer ties between the Philippines and China, because international relations is not a zero sum game. Additionally, after many of Duterte’s boldest statements, his cabinet secretaries scramble to either walk back or contradict his words. Duterte himself already walked back his “separation” pledge, saying he would not sever ties with the United States. This is not the execution of some well-orchestrated stratagem to balance great powers.
It seems more clear after his recent statements that the sudden lurch toward China comes in part from Duterte’s ends-justify-the-means approach to governance. One of the most controversial aspects of Duterte’s presidency so far is the war on drugs, which has seen more than 4,300 extrajudicial killings since July 1. Duterte calls the plague of methamphetamines an existential threat to the Philippines and says human rights are of secondary importance to the security and well-being of the nation.
Accordingly, Duterte sees U.S. criticism over the extrajudicial killings as an obstacle to his country’s security. Domestic opponents who speak out against the drug war face retaliation, and Duterte has threatened to declare martial law if other branches of government “interfere” in his fight. Without threats as an option, Duterte instead blasts President Barack Obama and curses at the European Union. China, on the other hand, makes a perfect partner for Duterte. Besides being an enormous market for Philippine goods and a source of desperately needed foreign investment, China will not criticize human rights abuses under the Duterte administration and will serve as the Philippines’ benefactor—for the right price.
The other, more problematic impetus behind Duterte’s shift is his profoundly anti-imperialist (and, by extension, anti-Western) perspective on world affairs. Duterte hails from Mindanao, the restive southern region of the Philippines that has seen decades of struggle against Islamic terrorists and separatist groups. When the Philippines was a U.S. colony in the first half of the 20th century, U.S. military forces put down rebellions by the Moro population in Mindanao, and the memories of those bloody pacification campaigns are still raw to many. This was apparent at September’s East Asia Summit in Laos, when Duterte veered from a planned address and waved photos of an infamous massacre while decrying American hypocrisy on human rights.
Moreover, many in the Philippines highlight Duterte’s connection to communist organizations active in the Philippines during his youth. His former professor and mentor Jose Maria Sison founded the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1968, the same year Duterte graduated from college. Though Duterte has not joined the party and has quarreled publicly with Sison since his inauguration, coming of age in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War under the tutelage of anti-imperialists has had a lifelong effect on him, and Duterte bears no love toward the United States.
The Obama administration has done its best to keep the relationship steady, responding to Duterte’s outbursts by re-affirming the strength of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. So far, this tack—taking the long view of the relationship and trusting in institutionalized cooperation at the working level to counter Duterte’s bombast—has been a safe bet. Assistant Secretary of State Danny Russel’s visit to Manila October 22 through 25 (planned well before the current blow-up) focused largely on maintaining those working-level links and unraveling any specific policy behind Duterte’s proclamation.
Obama officials may hope to ride out the Duterte problem until January, when it becomes the next administration’s problem. But a “hunkering down” approach could serve as a good model for a U.S. approach to Duterte for the rest of his six-year term.
The United States faced another Southeast Asian anti-imperialist firebrand not long ago—Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, prime minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003. Though Mahathir was highly critical of U.S. foreign policy, the two countries enjoyed healthy trade and defense relationships through his premiership, and public relations began to mend under his successors. The U.S.-Philippine alliance will survive Duterte’s presidency, and Filipino affinity toward the United States will keep Duterte from straying too far off course.
To preserve the relationship while staying engaged, the next administration would do well to ask Japan to act as an interlocutor. Despite his grievances against former colonizers, Duterte views Japan warmly, in part because of considerable development assistance the Japanese government poured into Davao City while Duterte was mayor. Japanese-donated coast guard cutters arrived in Manila earlier this month, prompting an effusive Duterte to praise Japanese friendship and cooperation. Japanese cooperation could take the form of trilateral exercises with the Philippines and the United States, if Duterte pushes through on threats to cancel U.S. joint exercises.
Additionally, hunkering down doesn’t mean Washington can just ride out the Duterte storm and sweep back in after Duterte leaves office in 2022. Keeping the relationship warm means addressing some of the real concerns Filipinos have with the alliance. Chief among these is the U.S. willingness to defend the Philippines under the defense treaty. Compared to explicit promises to defend Japan’s Senkaku islands under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, Philippine officials see the more ambiguous assurances of an “ironclad” defense of the Philippines as a reluctance on the United States’ part to get involved in the South China Sea. Eliminating that ambiguity would go a long way in under-cutting support for Duterte’s anti-U.S. rhetoric.
