Gone are the times when the Italian Communist Party preserved its political and strategic autonomy when competing in domestic politics, while supporting the Soviet Union in international politics.
Firmly in the Western camp, all Italian governments over the past few decades were happy enough to be members of the two most important organizations: NATO and the European Union. Traditionally, however, no Italian government and no Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs played an especially active role. Membership in any international organization means, for most Italians, to be part of that organization, not necessarily to constantly take part in any of the activities of those organizations. Loyalty was the name of the game played by the Italians, not voice – that is, advocacy or dissent. Without questioning any choice, all subsequent (and there were many) Italian governments accepted and shared the decisions made within NATO and the European Union. More autonomy appeared only when dealing with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.
With Russia, Italy has quickly accepted the fact that it is not a democracy and that it is going to be ruled in an authoritarian manner by President Vladimir Putin for some time to come. Realism is the name of the game. But there is more to it. Poor in terms of energy resources, Italy significantly relies on gas produced and exported by Russia, and it has been unable to reduce its dependence on this source of energy.
While, of course, Italy understands that the conflict going on in the Ukraine cannot be easily solved, if forced to choose, it will side with those Ukrainians who stress their national independence and want to keep Russia away from their domestic politics. Nevertheless, popular sympathies are one thing, but formulating a specific policy is another thing. Fortunately for the Italian government, this task may be left to NATO and the EU. Italy may not have shared the idea of enlarging NATO to the East, thus challenging the geo-political security of Russia, but its opposition was neither loud nor unremitting. A slightly different story may be told with reference to European sanctions against Russia.
Generally speaking, Italian governments have never considered sanctions as an instrument capable of producing major changes in the politics of the “sanctioned” country. Sanctions may become inevitable, but their rate of success is highly debatable and, in any case, substantially limited. In the case of sanctions against Russia, there is no doubt that among EU member states, Italy was (and remains) the country that has more to lose. It is not just a matter of gas, though very important. It is a matter of the trade of many goods, often high quality and highly priced goods and materials that, for a country whose economy is largely export-oriented, significantly contribute to Italy’s Gross National Product. This may explain why, though never renouncing her role to express the official politics of the EU, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has always tried to formulate a less rigid position vis-à-vis Russia.
Still, it would be wrong to believe that Italy is soft on Russia and condones the behavior of its autocrat Vladimir Putin. At the same time, Putin is aware that Italy needs to have thriving commercial relations with Russia. He also knows that there are supporters of Russia in Italy. Recently, out of his newly acquired “sovereignist” perspective and his adamant opposition to the EU, the leader of Italy’s far-right political party Northern League, Matteo Salvini, has expressed appreciation for many Russian activities.
And for a long time, Putin has had a more than amicable personal (but political as well) relationship with Silvio Berlusconi when he was the Italian Prime Minister (2001-2006; 2006-2011). Though largely deprived of domestic political power, Berlusconi wants to be and remains Russia’s and, above all, Putin’s best friend in Italy. However, the Russian leader is shrewd enough to know that he cannot just play the “Berlusconi card” in order to put pressure on Italian politicians and governmental office holders. Some propaganda helps, but what counts more for the Italians is trade.
It is possible to maintain and to enlarge all economic relations with the Russian government and its industrial and financial operators. But one should by no means come to the unwarranted conclusion that Italy is a sort of soft belly in Southern European countries, available to any kind of Russian penetration, including military penetration. No Italian government will ever renounce or even reduce its role and participation in the two pillars of Italian military security and economic prosperity: NATO and the European Union.
