Once defined by the catchphrase “Zero Problems with Neighbors,” the foreign policy of current Turkish President—and former Prime Minister—Recep Tayipp Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) used to be a model for measured neutrality in regional affairs. But that model began to crack in the lead up to the “Arab Spring,” especially after Syria’s descent into civil war. Since then, by misstep, malice, or fate, Ankara gradually poisoned relations with nearly every close neighbor except the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq.
However, the last few months have seen a rush to patch these ties. Today, as Turkey receives a new Ambassador from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after three years without one, normalizes relations with Israel, and even apologizes – or at least expresses “regrets” – for shooting down a Russian bomber last November, it appears that Erdogan is ready to leave isolation behind. Could this be a return to the era of Turkey’s “Zero Problems?”
To understand this about face, it is helpful to examine the source of Ankara’s departure from the “Zero Problems” policy and its current isolation. Perhaps the first real break came in 2009, when then Prime Minister Erdogan confronted Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum over Israel’s blockade of Gaza. This incident, and the freeze in relations, which came after nine Turkish activists were killed trying to break the Gaza blockade aboard the Mavi Marmara, helped provide Erdogan a massive surge in popularity across the Arab World.
As the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011 swept across the region, that popularity, and Turkey’s position as a functioning democracy, offered Ankara the opportunity to play a far more active leadership role in the Arab World. This was especially true in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, where the Muslim Brotherhood – with whom the Islamist AKP had good relations – quickly rose to political prominence.
However, this proactive role placed Ankara in direct opposition to Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – except Qatar – who feared the threat that political Islam might pose at home. Similarly, Erdogan’s condemnation of Egyptian General Abdullah Fattah al Sisi’s 2013 military coup against Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi deeply soured relations with the current Sisi government.
Yet by far the clearest turning point for Turkish foreign policy has been the war in Syria. Despite historically fraught relations, marred by Syrian support for the militant Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey, Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al Assad enjoyed notably close ties prior to 2011. However, Assad’s unrelenting violence against his majority Sunni citizens, combined with the widespread perception by late 2012 that his regime’s fall was inevitable, convinced Erdogan to call for Assad’s removal.
Assad did not fall. Instead, Turkey has found itself mired in a conflict with direct repercussions on domestic stability, powerful new enemies, and allies who have been either untrustworthy, suspicious, or downright hostile.
Increasingly frustrated by the Obama administration’s refusal to take a more active role in the fight against Assad, Ankara began to loosen controls at the border, which allowed foreign fighters to enter Syria. Many of those fighters joined Jihadist groups like ISIS, and some have returned to attack Turkey. While nearly three million Syrian refugees overwhelm the country’s capacity to care for them.
The Erdogan government’s fight against Assad has also placed it in direct confrontation with Russia and Iran, both of whom are significant trade partners as well as geopolitical rivals. Russian sanctions following the downing of its warplane last November have hit Turkey particularly hard, curtailing Russian tourism to the country. On the flip side of that coin, relations with potential allies against Assad, such as Saudi Arabia, were already strained entering the war and have been slow to rebuild.
Finally, the war in Syria has strengthened the position of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is closely tied to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD’s effectiveness against ISIS won the group military support from the United States, which has helped secure significant territorial gains. However, the possibility that the PYD might establish an independent Kurdish state in Syria is unacceptable to the Erdogan government. This tension has only intensified since peace negotiations with the PKK fell to pieces in July 2015, reigniting the violence, which has claimed at least 40,000 lives since 1978.
Interwoven through all of this is President Erdogan’s consolidation of his own political power. Under Turkey’s current constitution, the office of Prime Minister, not the Presidency, is the seat of power. That is something Erdogan intends to change. According to Soner Cagaptay, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Cipher Brief expert, “Erdogan wants to win a popular referendum or have his AKP cross the 50 percent threshold in snap elections…in order to become an executive-style and partisan president.” However, the AKP is just shy of that 50 percent threshold. Erdogan will need a tangible accomplishment – say, victory against the PKK – in order to sway those voters.
Cagaptay argues that it is this short-term political motivation that prompted Erdogan’s pseudo-apology to Russia, since “Erdogan knows that in order to defeat the PKK, he has to delink Russia and the PKK/PYD.” Ankara’s rush to rebuild burnt bridges, perhaps even to Syria’s Assad, may well represent a return to the old days of “Zero Problems.” However, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former Turkish parliamentarian, Aykan Erdemir, argues that “a better analysis would place Erdogan’s foreign policy vacillations as… a mere outgrowth of domestic calculations.” Regardless, whether driven by reactive political calculus or diplomatic grand strategy, it would seem that President Erdogan is tired of enemies and ready to make a few friends.
Fritz Lodge is an international producer at The Cipher Brief.
