Despite all the debate on the merits of the Iran nuclear deal, one thing is abundantly clear: the Middle East is changing in ways that could not have been imagined a decade ago. The re-emergence of Iran from a 36-year deep freeze will change the regional balance of power, force new realignments, and create new opportunities for the United States.
This historic change won’t happen overnight, and observers in the U.S. and the region would do well to let reason—not emotion, partisan politics, or religious fanaticism—guide their analysis of the deal. A new Middle East might be emerging, but an apocalypse isn’t around the corner. A Shia Iran won’t sweep across the Sunni region like the Mongols did in the 13th century or the Ottomans did in the 16th century.
Simply put, the Iran deal is designed to avoid war through diplomacy. It’s neither a “leap of faith,” as President Obama has emphasized, nor a “big mistake of historic proportions,” as Prime Minister Netanyahu has claimed. It’s an agreement based on intrusive inspections, verification, pragmatism, and reciprocity of “carrots and sticks” driven by Iran’s post-deal behavior.
Past is Prologue
Before discussing the implications of the deal, it’s worth remembering a couple of things to put the agreement in context: First, critics say the deal will empower Iran at the expense of other countries in the region. But Iran has always been a major player in the region. Its change of government from secular autocracy under the Shah to Islamic theocracy under the Ayatollahs 36 years ago has not altered this fact.
Second, critics also forget that, from 1950s to the 1970s, the U.S. was an ally of Iran and supported Tehran’s role as the guardian of the “Security Belt” in the Persian Gulf. During that time, Washington was able to carefully balance its complicated security relations with Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies adroitly. During a number of regional conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s—such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day war in 1967—Iran remained a responsible actor and dependable ally of the United Stated States. There’s nothing to suggest the U.S. couldn’t do the same today.
Third, Iran’s regional policies both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic have been driven by Iran’s perceptions of its national interest and potential threats—not religion. Despite all the talk about the Sunni-Shia divide, sectarianism has played a relatively small role in Iran’s global contacts and alignments. Its decades-old rivalry with Saudi Arabia above all else has been about the competition for power and influence.
Benefits of a Stronger Iran
You could argue that Iran’s resurgence is a good thing for the United States and the region. Washington and Tehran could work together on a number of issues of mutual concern, including counterterrorism cooperation on ISIS, peace talks with the Taliban, human rights, international commerce, and the environment. Iran could be influential in helping establish a post-Assad regime in Syria, creating an inclusive government in Iraq, and designing a less chaotic political system in Yemen.
The nuclear deal has given Tehran a new sense of confidence, and that’s a good thing. For the first time in over three decades, Iran is no longer concerned about forced regime change from the outside. The sanctions regime that has crippled its economy will be dismantled, and Iran’s international isolation will come to an end. Finally, as a nation proud of its scientific achievement, Iran’s right to enrichment is now recognized internationally.
The logic of the Iran nuclear deal argues that the more confident Iran becomes, the more responsible it will behave, and the less reliant it will be on proxy radical and terrorist groups. If Iran’s behavior moves along this trajectory, it would not be unthinkable for diplomatic engagement between Iran and the United States to increase in a way that mirrors how America’s relations with China, the former Soviet Union, and Cuba steadily improved. America’s Sunni Arab allies—and even Israel—must realize they no longer have a monopoly on Washington’s attention, and by necessity, will have to adjust to this new reality.
Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of "A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World."
