Soleimani’s comments were noted, primarily because they came as Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was in the U.S. trying to generate interest in negotiations over a possible Iran-U.S. prisoner swap.
The Cipher Brief recently spoke with expert Norm Roule, who is also the former National Mission Manager for Iran at ODNI, about how both Soleimani and Zarif have become the most visible faces of Iran’s regional activities and about the differences and similarities over their approaches to the U.S.
The Cipher Brief: What do you make of Iran’s talk of negotiations?
Roule: I see no evidence that Iran is interested in negotiations. Iran has yet to suffer the economic pain which would compel it to consider concessions and any one leader who wishes to stay in the good graces of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and replace the ill Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cannot expect to endorse negotiations with the U.S. and survive politically. The offer to negotiate on hostages is especially cruel. Iran’s leaders know the charges against U.S. prisoners are spurious and they also known of their failure to cooperate on the fate of Robert Levinson. However, Zarif’s use of this offer serves to draw attention from Iran’s behavior in the region and fosters another unprofitable debate in the West on how we should engage Iran.
The Cipher Brief: Do you think negotiations over U.S. prisoners in Iran could succeed today?
Roule: I wish I could say otherwise, but I think the answer is no. The engagement during the Obama administration occurred during a period when some believed a working relationship could be nurtured with Iran’s pragmatic conservatives. Iran’s behavior in the region, its missile activities, and its subsequent detention of many Americans and Europeans showed this to be an unfortunately, false hope.
Norm Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
"Neither Zarif nor Rouhani have significant influence over Iran’s hardline judiciary which manages U.S. prisoners. They will inevitably argue that only by stating hardline demands for sanctions relief or the release of many Iranians in Western custody. The idea that the U.S. would provide Iran with financial, political, or other benefits which would strengthen hardliners in the present environment is inconceivable. Iran’s behavior since the last exchange is also important. There is every reason to believe that Iran will simply detain a fresh batch of U.S. citizens in the months following any exchange. Again, I wish I could say otherwise."
U.S. detainees and their families are being very cruelly treated by Iran. I would suggest that the West show Iran that its international stature will be impacted by this policy. Unlike North Korea, Iran does not wish to be a hermit. Iran’s diplomatic presence abroad should be restricted, and Iran’s officials shunned until they change their position on what is essentially hostage taking.
The Cipher Brief: How should we be thinking about the similarities and differences between these two very different leaders?
Roule: Both are well known and at first glance seem to be from very different worlds. However, they share a common perspective which explains Iran’s current behavior and also tells you something about the next generation of Iran's leadership. Each may be described as a child of Iran's revolution, although neither played any role in the pre-1979 revolutionary movement. When the revolution erupted, Zarif was a student in the United States whereas Soleimani was a municipal water worker in southeastern Iran. They each became ardent supporters of the new government but played different roles in the Iran-Iraq War. Their paths didn’t really cross until the years following the 2003 Iraq conflict.
Soleimani’s first role in the war with Iraq was overseeing the delivery of water to Iranian troops. As Iran's generals and leadership were ground away in the conflict, he was made an officer and fought heroically and successfully. He ended the war as a relatively popular mid-level commander and was assigned to lead a unit which dealt with insurgent threats from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Zarif, on the other hand, spent the war in the U.S., except for a brief trip he made to Iran to marry. While thousands of Iranians died fighting Iraq, he moved between a number of U.S. educational institutions, eventually obtaining a Ph.D. It was during this time that a paucity of revolutionary diplomats and Zarif’s interest in political science and English skills resulted in his being drawn into work with the Iranian mission at the United Nations.
Norm Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
"By 2001 they were both modest figures who played modest roles in the architecture of the revolutionary government. The 9/11 attacks and America’s subsequent actions in Afghanistan and Iraq changed destinies. Both men took on roles which involved – in very different ways – engagement with the United States and their work was often complimentary. Zarif – who had some experience with Western diplomats in hostage negotiations – conducted discussions with mid-level U.S. diplomats prior to the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq."
Soleimani, who had been assigned to the Quds Force in 1998, managed Iran’s military response to each conflict, the result of a change in Iran’s military doctrine which emphasized unconventional regional operations to avoid repeating the catastrophic losses Iran experienced in the war with Iraq. A key characteristic in the evolution of each official is that they arrived at these conflicts with modest reputations. What they became is as much a result of how Western policy makers handled Iran as anything else. In any case, they came to represent the “song and dance” of Iran’s approach to the region and the West.
The Cipher Brief: If you consider each of their roles in the coming years, are there issues where they share common thoughts?
Roule: Let me answer this in a few ways.
First, each represents the next generation of Iran's leaders. Pragmatic, ruthless, and deeply committed to the revolution. They have no desire to compromise on their view that Iran should be a, if not the, regional hegemon. They are anti-Israel and they want the U.S. removed from the region. Neither is an actual decisionmaker although their proven loyalty has entitled them to a large degree of freedom in their respective fields.
Second, their success is in part based on their longevity in key positions. Soleimani has led the Qods Force since 1998 while Zarif has been involved in many of Iran’s key negotiations with the West since 2001. Likewise, their power is, in part, a function of their association with a more important Iranian official. For Soleimani, this is the Supreme Leader. Zarif’s potency is derived from his long-standing relations with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. It will be interesting to watch this play out in coming years. When the Supreme Leader dies, Soleimani’s hardline associations likely will sustain his importance to the regime. However, when Rouhani's term ends, it will be difficult for Zarif to stay in his chair.
Finally, each has shown a willingness to engage the United States, albeit in very different ways. Zarif has met with many U.S. diplomats and think tank members over the years. Although Soleimani’s engagement has been more limited, he has authorized some diplomatic engagement with the U.S. and has sent combative back channel messages to U.S. through intermediaries.
The Cipher Brief: How do each of them approach the media and what has driven their individual successes?
Roule: They both exploit the media to bring Iran’s propaganda to Western audiences. Soleimani is sometimes - and wrongly - called the Shadow Commander. This sobriquet may appeal to Western journalists, but it is undeserved. He is one of the most well-known officials in the Middle East and has been for years. Soleimani, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, has allowed his regional activities to be plastered on social media pages. He has also delivered speeches lambasting the United States. Tehran recognizes the domestic value of a saintly war hero and the Iranian media has worked hard to establish a hagiography around Soleimani. At one point, he was so frequently cited in Iran’s media that some wondered if he planned to run for president. Zarif’s press engagement is routine in the West and he uses this to deliver what I describe as an “admit nothing, deny everything, make counteraccusations” narrative.
As to their success, the foundation for this may be found in the absence of a coherent international response to Iran's actions in the region. Soleimani’s militia work is well-known, but it is often overlooked that he has never actually gone toe-to-toe with a Western military or commander. When he has perceived the threat to be significant, he has withdrawn.
Norm Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
"It is likely no coincidence that Soleimani stayed out of Iraq during the period when David Petraeus led U.S. forces in Iraq and during the period when Stan McChrystal’s forces undertook aggressive operations against Iranian operatives in Iraq. His military tools are those of a militia commander leading an insurgency. His deadliest tools have been explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) or Improvised-Rocket-Assisted-Munitions (IRAMs). However, the West has tended to avoid taking Iran on directly in regional conflict, out of a not unreasonable belief that doing so would exacerbate fragile or chaotic situations. We should avoid ascribing to him the reputation of a first world military commander."
Zarif's significant international profile is the result of his involvement in the Iran nuclear deal and subsequent Western attempts to engage Iran on regional issues in an effort to nurture normative diplomatic discussions with Tehran. It took a U.S. decision to bring Zarif into a room with counterparts from China, Russia, and the European heads of state. Had the U.S. chosen to handle Iran differently on regional or nuclear issues, neither would have the stature they enjoy today.
Read more from Norm Roule in The Cipher Brief.
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