New audio of the seizure of a British-flagged tanker indicates the vessel was too far away from help to avoid being forced to change course by Iranian Paramilitary forces last week. In audio released on Sunday by a maritime security firm, a British officer unsuccessfully demanded freedom to sail through the Strait of Hormuz.
Ships are getting caught in the middle of the rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran and the latest ongoing incident is casting new and broader perspective on the possibility of a modern-day ‘Tanker War’ in the Gulf.
Cipher Brief expert and former CIA senior Intelligence Officer Steven Ward provides insights and an important historical reminder of what we can likely expect.
With tensions continuing to rise between the United States and Iran, the Trump Administration has dumped a major challenge on U.S. military forces in the region. In the service of the “maximum pressure” campaign, they must deter Iranian and Iranian-directed attacks on regional shipping and other American and allied interests. And, failing that, our military must prevent an escalation in hostilities following punitive U.S. responses to Iranian provocations.
Two months ago, The New York Times reported that the Pentagon briefed President Donald Trump on a plan that, while not calling for a land invasion, envisioned sending as many as 120,000 troops to the region if the crisis escalated after Iran attacked U.S. forces or accelerated work on its nuclear capacity. Recent deployments to the region of U.S. warships, Patriot batteries, and other forces along with the aborted strike on three Iranian sites in June suggest the Pentagon is contemplating a campaign that relies on aircraft and missiles. If true, such a stand-off operation, much like previous American airpower campaigns, would conduct precision strikes to punish Iran, strip it of military weapons systems, and use the threat of greater destruction to compel Tehran to stop its provocative actions. Such operations would carry significant dangers of Iranian retaliation and an escalation to a larger conflict.
Pentagon officials and the press have been citing an earlier limited conflict with Iran—the “Tanker War” of the late 1980s—as a suitable historical analogy for understanding the current situation and its accompanying risks. Using historical events to aid decision making is a time-honored technique, but it is important to choose the right analogy. Given current circumstances, policy makers and war planners should be searching for a more applicable analogy than the events of three decades ago in the Persian Gulf. For an analysis of the pros and cons of stand-off air and missile campaigns, U.S. policy makers and warfighters should take a note from Bombs Without Boots: The Limits of Airpower by Anthony M. Schinella, National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues on the National Intelligence Council
The Tanker War Does Not Work for Today
There are superficial similarities between today’s situation and the U.S.-Iranian Tanker War of July 1987 through July 1988. Then, as now, Iran was unable to export its oil and sought to raise the costs for its opponents by attacking their interests. To support its Gulf Arab allies, Washington sent additional U.S. naval forces to protect oil tankers and other shipping in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters from attacks by Iranian warships, speedboats, mines, and anti-ship missiles. Iranian naval units tried to avoid direct confrontation with militarily superior U.S. forces and initially relied on clandestine and deniable mine attacks against the American-guarded convoys. Despite their impressive capabilities to surveil and defend shipping routes, U.S. forces were unable to prevent attacks along the full length of the Persian Gulf. The Iranians remained undeterred by repeated U.S. punitive attacks through early 1988. Similar to today’s situation, Iran’s persistence demonstrated that the stakes for Iran were much higher than for Washington in the confrontation.
The outcome of the Tanker War is worth recalling. After an Iranian mine nearly sunk an American frigate, the Samuel B. Roberts, in mid-April 1988, the U.S. Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis, sinking several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) speedboats and Iranian Navy warships. The IRGC became more cautious but, still undaunted, continued to attack commercial vessels. Two and a half months later on July 3, during an engagement involving IRGC speedboats, the USS Vincennes mistook a civilian airliner, Iran Air 655, for an Iranian fighter and destroyed the plane in mid-air, killing all 290 passengers and crew. Two weeks after that, Tehran agreed to a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, which ended the ship attacks.
The Tanker War came to an end not because of U.S. air and sea operations, but because it was a sideshow of the larger conflict that ended that summer. As Iran was conducting its final ship attack operations, Tehran was reeling from being struck earlier in the year by roughly 140 Iraqi ballistic missiles, which had caused millions of its citizens to flee the city. Between April and July, Iranian ground forces were dismantled by an Iraqi military flush with arms and supplies furnished by the Soviet Union and the West and paid for with Gulf Arab oil money. Even with these advantages, the Iraqis still resorted to using chemical warfare, hitting the Iranians with nerve agents in nearly every battle. With losses mounting and Iran’s economy and morale collapsing, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini agreed to “drink poison” and accept the cease-fire.
The differences between the situation today and the events of the late 1980s are fairly stark. While Iran is suffering from U.S. sanctions, it is not at war with a powerful regional adversary, does not face major enemy ground forces on its land borders, and its military is intact. U.S. military superiority remains but has been partially diminished by Iran’s possession of more powerful and effective long-range anti-ship missiles and air defense systems. Even Iranian speedboats are equipped with more deadly weapons that make a swarm of attacking watercraft a serious threat to surface vessels. Iran also has partners and proxies positioned around the region that are capable of attacking U.S. allies’ interests. Plus, Iran now has an extensive inventory of ballistic missiles and rockets, which will allow it to strike directly at its enemies, even in the face of regional missile defenses. Iran also has hardened and buried key facilities and prepared to fight conventionally and unconventionally to disrupt U.S. operations.
A Better Analogy: Operation Change of Direction
In Bombs Without Boots, Schinella, widely recognized as one of America’s best military analysts, examines five post-Cold War military operations that relied on coercive airpower. His case studies highlight a number of important factors that, as the title suggests, limit airpower and often result in negative long-term outcomes. Most of his examples focus on air operations in support of indigenous proxy forces, such as in Bosnia in 1995, Afghanistan in 2001, and Libya in 2011. From his study, Schinella concludes that operations relying on airpower “can succeed without committing ground troops—but only under the right circumstances.” Today’s Iran policy makers would do well to read the chapter covering a conflict where proxy forces were not involved: the 34-day conflict between Israel and Hizballah in 2006 known as the Second Lebanon War.
Thirteen years ago, on July 12, 2006, Israel responded to Hizballah’s kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers with a coercive air campaign, dubbed Operation Change of Direction. It was initially intended to last five days. Despite some success in destroying Hizballah’s larger missile systems and other fixed military sites, the Israeli air strikes, supplemented by artillery and naval gunfire, were unable to stop Hizballah rocket attacks on northern Israel. Hizballah also surprised the Israeli navy by unveiling an Iranian anti-ship missile not known to be in its possession in a strike that badly damaged an Israeli warship.
As in other airpower conflicts, the virtually unopposed Israeli aircraft soon ran out of targets. The Israelis had to scramble to identify new ones, which led to a tragic attack at Qana in which 16 children and 12 adult civilians were killed. The Lebanese government, meanwhile, was unable and unwilling to act against Hizballah despite the pressure from Israel’s attacks on the country’s international airport, which crippled the key tourism sector, and from bombing intended to create a massive refugee flow from southern Lebanon. Five days into the campaign Hizballah remained undeterred, and the Israeli government was forced to change its strategy.
The second phase of the conflict began on July 17 and involved small-scale raids by Israeli ground units to clear out Hizballah positions and push their rockets out of range of Israel. Stiff Hizballah resistance, aided by Iranian-supplied anti-tank and other weapons systems, forced Israel to commit larger forces for fierce house-to-house fighting. Spurred by increased international pressure to end the conflict after the Qana tragedy and by a looming United Nations-imposed cease-fire, Israel made a third strategy change. On August 11, it sent roughly 30,000 troops in a full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon. The hastily planned and executed operation did not go well. It cost Israel almost one-third of the total casualties of the conflict and fell short of its territorial objectives. To be sure, Hizballah suffered severe losses during the campaign, but the group was still able to launch 250 rockets into Israel on the last day of fighting on August 14, its highest total for the war.
Differences and Similarities
As an analogy to the current situation in the Persian Gulf, Operation Change of Direction provides some clear warnings in its differences and similarities.
The shorter list of differences starts with the fact that the earlier conflict was limited to just two belligerents, Israel and the non-state actor Hizballah, with Lebanon in the crossfire. At a minimum, the current crisis already involves the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia along with Iranian proxies in Iraq and Yemen. Rather than just one small bystander country, a war could ultimately involve the other Gulf Arab states, Israel, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the forces of U.S. allies in the region. Another important difference is that Hizballah, even relative to Israel, was a tiny military force dependent on outside support from Iran and Syria. The Iranian military is much larger and robust relative to U.S. and allied forces in the region, and it is relatively self-sufficient. Its ability to sustain resistance will be significantly more enduring than Hizballah’s capacity to withstand the 34-day Israeli assault.
Another important difference is that Israeli operations during the Second Lebanon War focused on an area not much larger than New York City (all of Lebanon could fit inside Connecticut). Nonetheless, the Israelis were still unable to stop Hizballah from launching rockets. Iran’s much more numerous fixed and mobile missiles are arrayed in depth in a country more than twice the size of Texas. Iran’s southern coastline runs for nearly 1,100 miles or about the distance from San Diego to Portland, Oregon. On the plus side, U.S. and allied missile and air defenses, persistent surveillance, and anti-ship missile countermeasures are significantly better than Israel’s were in 2006. But they can’t be everywhere and they can’t cover everything if the crisis escalates, so some Iranian and proxy attacks are likely to be successful.
In terms of similarities, beyond the likely role of Iranian missiles and rockets, the most important is that back then, like today, neither side wanted a war. Based on previous hostage taking operations in order to gain prisoner releases from Israel, Hizballah did not expect such a strong Israeli reaction. Its July 12 ambush of an Israeli patrol was more deadly than previous incidents, however, and Israel felt compelled to respond sharply. Another important similarity is that Israel did not have a proxy force on the ground to support its airpower mission. Despite a strong desire to avoid deploying ground forces and escalating the conflict, which might have brought other countries into the fight, Israel consistently was forced by Hizballah’s resistance to push more troops into battle.
This Israel mistake was, in part, a result of failing to recognize the different stakes involved in the conflict. Israel was punishing a provocation and aiming to deter future ones. Hizballah, however, quickly determined that is should seek a victory through its sustained defiance that, despite its losses, would enhance its reputation, popularity, fundraising, and political strength inside Lebanon and around the region.
Today, the United States seems to be making a similar mistake, ignoring that, in Iran’s view, concessions to end its involvement in the region would have perceived negative consequences for its security. Moreover, all signs point to the Iranian regime seeing U.S. pressure as a potentially existential threat. Also, Hizballah and Iran share similar ideological views based on a Shia creed that elevates sacrifice and victory can be found, even in a bloody defeat on the battlefield.
Another noteworthy similarity is that Israel tried to impose pressure on Lebanon’s economy to force a factionalized government in Beirut to help stop Hizballah. The Israeli government hoped that its pressure would turn the Lebanese against Hizballah, but its actions were counterproductive. While Iran’s government is not as fractured as Lebanon’s was in 2006, it is divided. The voices of compromise and caution have been seriously weakened over the past year of U.S. maximum pressure. Meanwhile, an Iranian public that has no love for their theocratic rulers seems poised to rally to the flag and support the Revolutionary Guard, spurred by resentment against an outside power inflicting harm on them.
Finally, Israel tried to avoid collateral damage, but its luck ran out at Qana. International pressure to end the conflict was strong and affected Israeli decision making.
The United States, in an escalating conflict with Iran, can expect similar international pressure, a growing likelihood over time of a tragic and counterproductive incident that kills civilians, and demands from Saudi Arabia and other countries subject to Iranian missile and proxy attacks to end the campaign before all U.S. objectives are achieved.
In the end, Israel’s faulty campaign succeeded in getting a significant expansion of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon to serve as a buffer against Hizballah. And, it is fair to say that for thirteen years Hizballah has been deterred from undertaking major provocations against Israel. But Israel paid a high price for these gains. Meanwhile, although its participation in the Syrian civil war has cost Hizballah much of its standing in the larger Arab world, the group is even more of a force today in Lebanon and is more active throughout the region. In addition, it is well-armed with an even larger missile and rocket inventory and is again poised to resist fiercely should war come again.
Of course, Iran is not Hizballah. It has much more to lose in a war and has no large sponsor to help it recover. Any U.S. air campaign will be severely punishing and will bring substantial pressure on the regime to submit. But it isn’t clear that the circumstances are right for U.S. airpower success. As Schinella reminds his readers, Israel’s Winograd Commission concluded from its examination of the Second Lebanon War that it is wise to be particularly wary of entertaining excessive expectations with respect to stand-off fires in a confrontation with a well-prepared enemy.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.
Read also Iran’s State of Play by the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran in the ODNI, Norm Roule, only in The Cipher Brief
Read more from former CIA Analyst Steven Ward in The Cipher Brief
And then join The Cipher Brief March 22-24, 2020 for in-person briefings with a number of Cipher Brief experts including General Michael Hayden and General Davis Petraeus, on global and national security issues. Request your seat at the table today for The Cipher Brief’s Annual Threat Conference in Sea Island, GA.
