Background: Vladimir Putin was re-elected as President of the Russian Federation less than three months ago. His victory marked his second consecutive election as President and his fourth overall.
Putin’s four terms in office and interim service as Prime Minister, but effective leader of the country, make him the longest serving leader of Russia since Josef Stalin, who served as Premier for nearly thirty years. Stalin’s autocratic and paranoid style of governance never changed in any significant way during his tenure. Can we expect any change in Putin’s approach toward governance in what he has said will be his last term as President?
Putin has said the focus for this term will be on making a marked improvement in Russia’s economic situation, setting a goal of 5% annual GDP growth for a meaningful and sustained period beginning in 2020 and, more ambitiously, for Russia to become one of the top five biggest economies in the world within the next six years.
The Questions:
- What are the trends in geopolitical strategy that can be observed since Putin’s re-election?
- Are there any clues in the appointments in the new government or Putin’s circle of advisors which give any indication that change may be coming?
- Should analysts interpret the fact that Putin agree to a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, as a signal of intent by Putin to change his strategy of confrontation with the West?
Overview: Putin’s prior geopolitical strategy has been clear for at least the last fifteen years of his rule: return Russia to its proper position as a world power. The steps to achieve that goal have included; solidifying political and economic power in Russia to trusted Putin insiders, modernizing and rebuilding Russia’s military power—especially its nuclear arsenal, asserting economic, political and, occasionally, military power in the near abroad to ensure no further encroachment of western values or influence into the new Russian “sphere of influence.” In recent years, this has been demonstrated in the 2008 war with the Republic of Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, support for the insurrection in the Don Basin, and the attempted coup in Montenegro in October 2016.
On a different, and more strategic front, Putin has been tirelessly working to undermine the West, starting with weakening the European Union through support for secessionist movements (e.g., Catalonian and Scottish independence) and the British Brexit referendum, as well as support for anti-Europeanist parties, most recently the Five Star Movement and The Liga in Italy, but also the German Alternative for Deutschland Party. As part of that broader strategy, Putin has worked hard to exacerbate frictions within NATO and in particular, complicate relations between Turkey and its NATO partners, with Putin clearly aspiring to eventually hive off NATO’s eastern flank.
Rob Dannenberg, Former Head of Security, Goldman Sachs
"Putin has been equally energetic in his efforts against his major geopolitical rival, the United States, and make no mistake, despite President Trump’s ‘chummy’ portrayal of relations between the two countries, Putin has always seen the U.S. as a major geopolitical rival."
As the abundant body of evidence attests, Putin has used the formidable cyber capabilities of the Russian intelligence services to skillfully manipulate social media to exacerbate racial and economic tensions in the United States and, perhaps most significantly, undermine the confidence of the average American citizen in the very political institutions that are the foundation of American democracy. IF he can do that while having the U.S. President validate Putin’s place on the world stage, that will be (and is) perceived as a major win in Putin’s overall strategy.
Putin was inaugurated for his current term on 7 May and announced his government in the days thereafter. At the start of his fourth term, there are few indications from Putin of an intent to change course. The violence in eastern Ukraine continues, and by many estimates, has increased significantly since April of this year. The Russian response to the attack on Sergey Skripal in Salisbury, England remains unrepentant; there has been no change in the Russian narrative that the attack was carried out by the UK security services. There has been no effort to cooperate in the analysis of the origins of the nerve agent used, Novichok. Nor has there been any public cooperation over reports of the latest attack, which killed one woman and has significantly sickened her male partner.
On the use of chemical weapons by the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, senior U.S. State Department officials testified before Congress in mid-April that “Russian officials worked with Syrian officials to sanitize the locations of those suspected attacks and to remove incriminating evidence of chemical weapons use.” In Syria, in Iran, in Venezuela, North Korea, and Afghanistan, Russia continues to work against U.S. positions and interests.
Rob Dannenberg, Former Head of Security, Goldman Sachs
"Overall, the Kremlin’s decision-making pattern seems to be continuing along the trends lines of the past several years including its launch of aggressive new cyber attacks on the West, efforts to interfere in elections of note to include the 2018 U.S. mid-term and Mexican presidential elections, and encouraging increased violence in the Ukraine and Syria."
Although Putin and his circle of advisors are firmly in charge, there is some evidence of emerging, but muted criticism of the geopolitical course Putin has set, and its impact on Russia’s economy. In mid-April, a leading foreign policy thinker-strategist of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a sharp criticism of the Kremlin’s geopolitical line, and argued that the Kremlin’s “unchanged fixation” on confrontational geopolitical efforts, deploying only “military-political might” is very popular domestically in Russia, but is very risky and comes with a high price internationally, including economic (e.g., sanctions)
Moreover, as Russia becomes more and more isolated from economic centers of power in the United States and Europe, Russia’s reliance on the military-political tool has proportionately weakened its impact on, and progress in, the economic, social, financial, and technological processes in the world. This can only work to Russia’s long-term disadvantage.
Rob Dannenberg, Former Head of Security, Goldman Sachs
"As with the few early indications of change by Putin in geopolitical approach, a look at the composition of the Russian government for Putin’s last term shows little evidence that change is coming."
This starts with the decision to reappoint Dmitri Medvedev as Prime Minister. The decision was taken, despite the fact that Medvedev had been publicly exposed in embarrassing involvement in corrupt activity, and thus a target of various widespread protests in Russia over the past year. Putin likely decided it was “safest” to continue with Medvedev for at least a few more years, to ensure continuity.
Closer to the anticipated 2024 handover of power, Putin may make another change, as the Prime Minister in 2022-2025, will be the likely successor to take over from Putin as President. The new First Deputy Prime Minister will be Anton Siluanov who will also remain in his previous post as Minister of Finance. Although Siluanov is considered by some to be a protege of Russian liberal politician Alexei Kudrin, he is no “reformer” in the sense that he drives “reform.” He is considered by many to be a highly-capable manager of state finances. But there is no evidence that he has either the ability or desire to effect the type of change required to make Russia a market-driven economy, and it could weaken the trend toward economic consolidation in the hands of a small cadre of Putin insiders.
Other key Deputy Prime Ministers include; Maxim Akimov, who has responsibility for communications and technology, Dmitri Kozak, who has responsibility for oil, gas, energy, and industry, and Tatiana Golikova, who has responsibility for social policy. All of these deputies are younger, but still trusted and reliable figures, not agents of change. Putin’s government has ten new ministers, with six of the ten born in the 1970s and 1980s—clearly an attempt by Putin to bring in trusted members of a younger generation and perhaps with more technocratic skills, to help bring about his advertised economic growth program by the end of his term.
When it comes to Putin’s (mostly) men, two specific ministerial appointments are worthy of note: Dimitri Patrushev, as head of Rosagro Bank, has been named Minister of Agriculture. Dmitri is the son of former FSB head and current head of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev. This marks the third elevation of sons of Putin-related “siloviki” in the last year and half. And Sergey Ivanov, Junior (son of former KGB officer and Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov) was made CEO of Alrosa as Petr Fradkov (son of former SVR head Mikhail Fradkov) was made head of the state-owned Promsvyazbank. Another appointment of note is that of Yevgeniy Zinichev, the deputy head of the FSB, as the new Minister of Emergencies. Zinichev is a former Russian FSO (Presidential Protection Service) bodyguard of Putin. This marks the fourth appointment to a senior position in government to former Putin bodyguards. (Zolotov as head of the Russian National Guard, Alexey Dyumin as Governor of Tula Oblast and Dmitriy Mironov as Governor of Yaroslavl Oblast.)
Another observation on Putin’s new government, is that despite the entry of ten new ministers out of twenty two ministries, when it comes to geopolitically-relevant posts, the architects of Putin’s confrontational geopolitical approach remain in place. Sergey Lavrov remains as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Sergey Shoigu, as Minister of Defense. On the domestic side, Olga Vasilyeva remains the Minister of Education. She is a protege of Putin’s personnel confessor and favorite priest, Tikhon, the Metropolitan of Pskov. Tikhon has for years been cultivating the theory that the siloviki in Russia play a uniquely positive role in Russian history. Another arch-conservative, Vladimir Medinsky remains in his position as Minister of Culture. Both Vasilyeva and Medinsky are two of the main ideologues of the Russian domestic ideological-nationalistic line which Putin has used so effectively to paint the “us-against them” narrative and drive up his popularity.
Looking beyond ministries and into key positions in the Presidential Administration for this term: The key position of handling “cadres” or appointments will be held by Anatoly Servyshev, a KGB-FSB career officer with close ties to Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostech and former Director General of Rosoboronexport—Russia’s arms export firm, and Nikolay Patrushev, Head of the Russian National Security Council and Putin’s successor as Director of the FSB. Patrushev stays on as Secretary of the National Security Council along with all of his deputies, he has held the position since 2008. Moreover, the new head of the Control Department in the Presidential Administration, which has the responsibility for keeping tabs on other officials—and a position Putin himself held when he first came to Moscow from St. Petersburg—will be headed by Dmistriy Shalkov, who most recently was Deputy Director of the FSB. This is a further signal of the intent to continue with the current line in questions of geopolitics.
Lastly, Vladislav Surkov was reappointed as a personal advisor to Putin—a role he has held in one capacity or another since 1999. Surkov is considered by some to play an an ideological role for Putin in the same way that Steve Bannon played that role for President Trump. Surkov is the key figure in advising Putin on strategy in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnistria, and any area of frozen-hot conflicts that Putin seems to favor. Again, the re-appointment of all of the key figures responsible for the confrontational approach to the West that Putin has adopted indicate no intent to change course.
Looking Ahead: the geopolitical trends we have seen in Putin’s nearly 18 years of running Russia are likely to continue, with particular emphasis on the use of cyber tools to manipulate social media and disrupt political harmony in the U.S. and EU. The appointment of some younger “technocrats” to important ministerial positions may indicate some interest by Putin in achieving economic progress in the development of Russia’s economy as a part of his legacy, and to parallel what he likely considers the successes that his geopolitical strategy has achieved in returning Russia to a leadership role roughly equivalent to the position the Soviet Union had vis-a-vis the United States during the Cold War.
The agreement to this Helsinki summit is likely considered by Putin and his inner circle as a significant achievement and confirmation of Russia’s return to superpower status. Putin will likely use the meeting as a platform to deny suggestions of Russian malfeasance in cyber space, as well as denial of Russian involvement in the violence in eastern Ukraine or with incidents such as the Skripal poisoning. What would he give that would follow suit with his strategy? He may well be willing to offer some support in the peaceful resolution of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, or in Syria, to buttress his claim of being an international political figure on par with the President of the United States.
