The recent tensions between India and China have entered their sixth week. What began as a dispute over the location of a Chinese road building project along a contested border in Bhutan has drawn Asia’s two strongest powers deeper into a decades-long issue over sovereign territory and regional influence. China has called for India to remove the troops it has deployed to the border, though India shows no signs of complying. Neither side is spoiling for conflict, nor do they appear ready to compromise, making the proposition of a quick and easy agreement more remote. The Cipher Brief spoke to Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director of the Wilson Center’s Asia program, to learn more about the origins of the ongoing tensions and prospects for de-escalation.
The Cipher Brief: What are the origins of this border conflict and what has precipitated the recent uptick in tensions?
Michael Kugelman: The current standoff should be seen in the broader context of many years of territorial disputes between two countries that share a 2,520-mile-long border. These include, above all, an India-China war in 1962 over Arunachal Pradesh – a region whose status remains disputed today. It is an Indian state, situated to the east of the current dispute, that China claims as its own. There are also longstanding disagreements about an area of Kashmir called Aksai Chin, which New Delhi accuses Beijing of occupying. Further afield lies Gilgit Baltistan, a region of Kashmir administered by Pakistan but claimed by India – and a growing source of India-China tension, given that China’s Belt and Road initiative envisions extensive development projects there.
In effect, the current dispute marks just the latest flare-up in a decades-long story of standoffs. The crisis of the hour centers around a narrow plateau known in India as Doklam and in China as Donglang. What makes it complex is that a third country, Bhutan, is involved. In fact, India and Bhutan recognize the disputed plateau as Bhutanese territory. China claims it as its own. Back in 1967, a skirmish over this area led to a brief period of deadly conflict between Indian and Chinese forces. This is the most serious crisis to occur here since then, and fortunately so far, it has been violence-free.
It’s unclear exactly what precipitated the current tensions, and often when it comes to these remote border disputes, truth is a casualty. What we do know is that Chinese troops arrived at the plateau to do construction to extend a border road. India, with support from Bhutan – a close Indian ally that has no formal relations with Beijing – then entered in an effort to resist the construction.
Three factors may explain China’s provocative move and India’s bold response. One is the timing. India-China relations are in a particularly bad place right now, thanks to a variety of factors ranging from New Delhi’s opposition to Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative to recent Chinese efforts to prevent India from joining prestigious global clubs like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. With relations so toxic, they were ripe for a provocation and a tough response.
Second, this plateau is no ordinary plateau. It leads to a narrow swath of real estate, known formally as the Siliguri Corridor and popularly as the Chicken’s Neck, that links India’s northeastern states to the rest of India. By staking a claim to it, China knows that it can make India feel strategically vulnerable.
Third, China likely wants to drive a wedge between India and Bhutan at a time when India has struggled to maintain strong ties with its smaller South Asian neighbors. India and Nepal experienced a diplomatic crisis in 2015 over allegations that New Delhi was contributing to a blockade of goods into Nepal.
TCB: What has been the track record for attempting to resolve this dispute, and what does that say about the urgency of the new situation?
Kugelman: If there’s a silver lining here, it’s that China and India have not fought another war since the 1962 conflict. Over the years, the channels of communication have been sufficiently strong on each side to ensure that periodic border standoffs don’t spiral out of control. They flare up, but eventually subside. Still, what makes the current situation so urgent is that you do have a very troubled bilateral relationship at the moment. Neither side will be inclined to back down anytime soon. Another factor is the high strategic stakes: The contested plateau is a very strategic patch of real estate. Geopolitical factors also loom large: India is very keen on ensuring good relations with its South Asian neighbors, setting aside the complicated issue of Pakistan, and it doesn’t want to risk undercutting its relations with Bhutan after New Delhi’s ties with Nepal took a tumble several years ago.
Also, in a way, Bhutan serves as a bellwether of New Delhi’s clout in South Asia – India’s own backyard, but also a region where China is trying to gain a stronger foothold. If India stands firm and finds a way to get the Chinese to end the road project and to remove their troops, then it will have scored a major victory in the face of Chinese attempts to exert its will on what Bhutan and India regard as Bhutanese territory. However, if India backs down and China gets its way, then India could lose a lot of credibility in Bhutan’s eyes. So in effect there’s a lot at stake in this standoff, not as much because of the security risks – escalation into an actual conflict is unlikely – but more so because of the strategic and geopolitical factors at play.
TCB: Reports indicate a buildup of Indian military forces at the border with China. Can you describe the nature of this development? What forces are being moved, and is this a direct response to China’s encroachment or is it part of previously planned movement?
Kugelman: It’s important to be cautious about reports on military buildups. I think the most salient troop movement to be focusing on here is the Indian troops that entered the plateau, reportedly on Bhutan’s request, to stop the Chinese troops from doing their road construction. What’s notable here is that Indian troops did not come in with guns blazing. In fact, according to all reports I’ve seen, no weapons were fired at all. Indian and Chinese soldiers ended up tangling with each other physically – “roughing each other up like schoolboys,” as one account put it. This is telling. Brawling soldiers don’t exactly conjure up images of goodwill, but there’s something to be said for the fact that they were going after each other without weapons. This suggests a willingness to limit the prospects for escalation.
TCB: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi met at the G-20 summit in Hamburg. Did anything emerge from this meeting related to the dispute or bilateral relations more broadly?
Kugelman: This meeting was quite notable simply because it happened. There were indications for quite a few days that there would be no meeting at all, given the deep level of bilateral tensions. Curiously, the Chinese government denied a meeting had taken place, despite photos of the two leaders speaking with each other. The meeting – which was more of an encounter on the sidelines of the summit than a formal discussion – did not touch on the border dispute. It focused on positives such as the constructive role that China and India play in the BRICS arrangement (a group of countries comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and also highlighted their shared interest in combating terrorism.
The fact that this meeting – even if brief and informal, and even if denied by the Chinese government – took place is encouraging, in that it hints at the very real prospects for conciliation between the two countries. It’s true that neither country has an immediate incentive to back down from the border standoff, but beyond the immediate term, there are very compelling reasons for them to find a diplomatic resolution. First, neither side can afford a war. China is already dealing with the North Korean threat, while India faces the Pakistan problem.
Second, there is a very productive economic partnership that benefits each of their growing economies. Not only do they have a robust bilateral trade relationship, but they are also working together increasingly closely in more multilateral settings, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, where India and China are the two biggest stakeholders. They’re also aspiring members in the Regional Partnership for Economic Cooperation, an under-negotiation trade accord. A hot war between India and China could squander all the gains from their extensive economic diplomacy, and that would work against each country’s interests in a big way.
If we want to identify potential markers for progress, we should be looking at a meeting scheduled for July 26 in Beijing that will involve the national security advisers of all the BRICS countries. This event can be an opportunity for Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to take up the issue with his Chinese interlocutors, and to start working toward a solution to avert a war that neither side can afford.
