SUBSCRIBER+ EXCLUSIVE ANALYSIS — It’s a tantalizing dream for diplomats and longtime observers of the Middle East: A grand bargain that would normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, pause or end the war in Gaza, and deliver at least a roadmap to a Palestinian state. It’s also widely seen as a non-starter for the current Israeli government – and with that in mind, the U.S. is now pursuing a major strategic arrangement of its own with Saudi Arabia.
The two countries are reportedly close to finalizing a deal that would include U.S. security commitments to Saudi Arabia, a deepening U.S. military presence in the region and the cementing of a relationship that could serve as a bulwark against Iran as well as growing Chinese and Russian influence in the region. There are also economic benefits to be had for both nations – including civilian nuclear assistance for Saudi Arabia – as well as the prospect of pursuing that broader arrangement with Israel once this deal is done.
Saudi Arabia’s leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, met with White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in Dhahran last month to discuss what the Saudi state news agency called a “semi-final” draft of a deal between the two countries.
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a decades-long relationship that dates to the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, and has taken dramatic turns in recent years. Following the 2018 murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi – a killing which the U.S. intelligence community determined had been ordered by Mohammad bin Salman – then-candidate Joe Biden vowed to make bin Salman a “pariah”; but as president, Biden has resumed a close relationship with the Saudi leader. The proposed deal would conclude a remarkable return for bin Salman to the good graces of the White House.
Hurdles remain – not only in the particulars of the arrangement, but also the political reaction, particularly in Washington.
The Cipher Brief spoke about the possible deal with Gary Grappo, a former U.S. Ambassador to Oman and Deputy Chief of Mission in Saudi Arabia, and Norman Roule, a Cipher Brief expert who served as National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Both are Cipher Brief experts, and in conversations with Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski, both said a U.S.-Saudi deal was well worth pursuing.
“It's exactly what we should do to build for the next century,” Roule said, given the economic benefits and the regional threat from Iran and its proxies. Ambassador Grappo called the deal “a win-win for the US and Saudi Arabia,” and a “win-win-win” should Israel ultimately be brought in to a broader agreement.
THE CONTEXT
- The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have reached a "near final set of arrangements" for a potential defense deal that includes security guarantees and cooperation on a civilian nuclear program, officials say.
- President Joe Biden's national security advisor Jake Sullivan met with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in mid-May to discuss the "semi-final" version of the U.S.-Saudi deal. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with the de facto Saudi leader about the deal in late April.
- The pact aims to ultimately include Saudi-Israeli normalization, but Riyadh says this is dependent on a ceasefire in Gaza and the establishment of a path to a Palestinian state. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said such a move "would be the greatest reward for the terrorists."
THE INTERVIEWS
The Cipher Brief: Given the already robust relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, why pursue this deal now?
Roule: In the many decades since President Roosevelt and (Saudi) King Abdul Aziz bonded together during their meetings on the USS Quincy on the Great Bitter Lake along the Suez Canal in February 1945, the relationship has endured multiple and dramatically different tectonic tests.
The difficulty is that much of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been conducted in quiet, but highly consequential, diplomatic and economic discussions involving the seniormost policymakers on each side.
American policymakers have repeatedly told the Saudis that we would remember their diplomatic and economic contributions to U.S. national security. We would stand with them in their time of need. The perception (in Saudi Arabia) is that over the last decade, we have failed to live up to these promises. So the strategic agreement between Washington and Riyadh is a new foundation for an old relationship, in which each side can gain predictability in an increasingly unpredictable world.
Grappo: It was interesting that Biden picked this up given the comments he had made about Mohammed bin Salman during his campaign, the claim of his being a “pariah” and so forth. But Biden realistically understood the critical importance of the Saudi relationship to the United States and vice versa, and swallowed the bitter pill and went to Saudi Arabia and patched over – or at least was able to restart – that relationship between the two heads of state, which is what Saudi Kings and U.S. presidents have enjoyed going back to the time of Roosevelt.
The Biden administration saw an opportunity to build on the Abraham Accords that had been begun by the Trump administration, now with the granddaddy of them all, which is Saudi Arabia. And what this agreement was supposed to imply, but would be difficult to state, is that the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be extended to Saudi Arabia. We officially have never even done that for a country like Japan or South Korea – two stalwart democracies and extremely close allies with whom we have formal security agreements.
So this would've been something quite different than anything we've done in the past. And that probably caused some heartburn among some members of Congress in both parties. But at that time, the desire, the ambition was the three-part deal (between the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Israel).
And then of course this whole effort ran into very stiff winds with the eruption of the war in Gaza. These negotiations, and the fact that these three countries were close to achieving this, was without question a factor in the timing for the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7th. Hamas saw the Palestinian issue slipping away in terms of being an issue of importance and relevance to other Arab leaders of the Middle East, most important being Saudi Arabia.
So now, looking at what has occurred since then, the question has arisen: Well, could this deal happen without the Israeli normalization component?
The Cipher Brief: What’s in it for the U.S.?
Grappo: We are now in an era of great power competition, and the Middle East is very much in play without any doubt. The United States no longer has — I hesitate to use this word because I don't think it ever existed, but many others use it — the kind of hegemonic control, or influence, that we once had.
And that's not necessarily because of a waning of the power of the United States, but the rise in power and influence of so many other players. China especially. To a certain extent, Russia, and then the regional players, to include the UAE, Turkey and of course Iran. And for that reason, I think the Biden administration did a pragmatic and realistic assessment of U.S. interests in the Middle East in this new era and basically reaffirmed the necessity of a strong US-Saudi relationship.
It would mean commitments that would be difficult for any administration to make, because if you're talking about a security guarantee in the literal sense, of the sort that we have with our NATO partners, that has to go before Congress. And Congress would certainly bolt at providing a security guarantee for a country which shares very few values of the United States. We share lots of interests of course – but values? They're few and far between. That's a real obstacle for members of Congress, and even some within the administration. Saudi Arabia is not a democracy and shows no signs of becoming one in the near- to medium-term future. On the other hand, they have been liberalizing, and it's kind of impressive to see what they have done.
There are genuine interests that will be served for the United States, mostly in the area of securing a relationship with one of the strongest and most influential countries in the Middle East.
Iran has formed this axis with China, Russia, and to a certain extent North Korea, that poses real dangers to not only Saudi Arabia, but to the United States. So securing a strong security relationship with Saudi Arabia has now become a priority for this administration. And I think it's a prudent one.
Roule: The kingdom has stated publicly, along with other regional leaders, that in recent years, there's a sense that Washington approaches them with some pretty heavy requests, and explains why this is in the interest of Washington but doesn't do much to explain why this is in the interest of the region.
A good example would be that the U.S. pressed the region to reduce its trade cooperation with Iran, and they did so, and the U.S. then behind the region's back negotiated the JCPOA (the Iran nuclear deal), and offered to meet then-President Rouhani (of Iran) at the UN.
We now ask them to reduce their relationship with Russia. And there are many in the region who say, Look, how do we know that the moment we cut our trade by 90%, which was the case with one important partner, that we're not going to find out the next week that someone in Washington has hit the reset button and we've taken this enormous economic hit and you haven't?
So you need to develop this relationship if we're going to ask people to carry the water for us to do heavy-lift projects. And now there's a sense that an agreement would allow each side the confidence that the other is going to be there in time of need.
The Cipher Brief: What does Saudi Arabia stand to gain?
Roule: Stability, predictability, a sense of strategic proportionality in the relationship. The kingdom, like most of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), particularly the United Arab Emirates, places their investments in the United States. The kingdom sends their students to study in the United States. They're looking to maintain a tight relationship with Washington. But they're trying to make sure the relationship is sustained and won't fall victim to every fresh administration and every fresh political trend in the United States.
It's no secret that at the beginning of the Biden administration, the Biden team had a very public and very negative view of Saudi Arabia, and not just Saudi leadership. Now you see the administration with a very positive view of Saudi Arabia and its leadership and asking the leadership to undertake actions regarding Israel, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Africa, China technology.
The idea that you go from one extreme to the other within one administration is extraordinarily frustrating. And for foreign policymakers, in this case Saudi Arabia, an agreement would allow them to get past much of that, although there will certainly be disagreements in the future. Each country will make mistakes that will need to be addressed, but the strategic foundation of the relationship won't be threatened.
The Cipher Brief: How would this deal expand on existing defense ties between the two countries?
Roule: The language for this agreement is probably going to be similar to language the United States has with other partners, namely Japan, South Korea or the Organization of American States, that does not commit each country to go to war in case of a security threat. That's really important to understand.
I have not seen the agreement, but it's unlikely to say that if an Iranian missile attacks (Saudi Arabia), then we're at war the next day with Iran – if only because our constitution places that authority in the hands of Congress. The administration cannot commit to that. That's a congressional decision. But we would foster defensive assistance, and it would be an environment where we would have more difficulty cutting off defensive weapons in time of conflict simply because one political party or another in the United States feels that that may suit their narrative.
Grappo: It has been an unwritten understanding that if Saudi Arabia is threatened by an outside power, the United States would take action on behalf of Saudi Arabia. And we saw that in the case of the first Gulf War. I went to Saudi Arabia shortly after that and it was impressive to note the impression that left on the Saudi people, the fact that we responded, engaged, and when we were done, job complete, Saddam (Hussein) had been expelled from Kuwait, we picked up our troops and went home, which is exactly what they wanted. And they were impressed by that. We didn't hang around to kind of exert any undue influence because of a U.S. military presence.
We have a longstanding military training agreement with the Saudis. What would be different? Basing, for example – I don't think the Saudis would be interested in that on a permanent basis, but on an emergency basis, such as what we did during the first Gulf War, it’s likely that we reach some understandings there. Warehousing facilities for U.S. equipment, enhanced training and exercise schedules – all those things are potentially on the table. There's a lot that the United States could do and a lot that the Saudis would be interested in having.
The Cipher Brief: What about the nuclear aspect of this deal?
Roule: The kingdom has the same interest in alternative green energy sources as any other country, and that means they have an interest in nuclear power. Next, the kingdom has stated – like every other country – they won't accept any constraints on the nuclear program that are unreasonable. And they define that as, if you've given Iran — a country that has killed and continues to kill Americans — the right to do something, we want the same thing.
The kingdom sees itself as an exporter of energy, not oil, and inherently that will include nuclear fuel. Multiple countries have offered to sell the kingdom nuclear power infrastructure to include enrichment with fewer or no strings – Russia and China have offered the kingdom nuclear power and they have said, We will have few strings on how you use this.
The kingdom has stated that it has no interest in nuclear weapons, but if Iran builds a nuclear weapons program, it's going to consider doing the same thing.
Our interest is the danger of proliferation, and that means the constraint or management of the enrichment process. The good news is the kingdom seeks U.S. partnership and U.S. technology, and the kingdom’s leadership has stated to the U.S. government that they're willing to structure that program to satisfy our concerns. I feel confident that an arrangement will be worked out that will meet our respective objectives, but there will be those in Washington who – not unreasonably – oppose an expansion of enrichment processes and continue to believe this agreement is a bad idea.
Grappo: The sharing of nuclear technology is likely to be a sticking point with Congress. It can be overcome, but we would require the Saudis to submit to the same sort of constraints that we ask of other countries with which we share nuclear technology. That is a rigorous inspection regime, likely to be enforced and administered by the IAEA. But it does gain them access to quite a bit of non-weapons-related nuclear technology that could potentially be weaponized under the wrong circumstances.
It’s a potential point of contention, but one that is more easily overcome in my view than the nuclear umbrella, if that were to be in the offering.
The Cipher Brief: How much of an impact does China’s influence in the Middle East have on this deal?
Grappo: We're certainly not going to be able to put any constraints on [Saudi Arabia’s] economic relations with China, nor should we even try to do that. China relies heavily on Saudi Arabia for its natural resources and will continue to do so, although it has a similar dependency on Iran and a growing one with Russia.
But there is something of a natural economic relationship to be had on the part of both countries, and we should not attempt to put constraints on that, with the exception probably of some technology exchange.
But the main concern is on the security side – that Saudi Arabia is not going to turn to China sometime in the future, to play the role the United States has historically played in terms of security, not only in Saudi Arabia but in the Middle East.
Roule: China is essentially a geoeconomic or geocommercial partner. The United States is in essence a geosecurity or geostrategic partner. We therefore respond very differently to events. China has been the Gulf's primary trade partner since about 2014. The U.S. isn't going to stop that. This agreement isn't going to change that. And the U.S. has never said we want the Gulf to stop selling oil to China.
So the idea with China is mainly a technological hedge, and it's getting ahead of certain issues where the import of Chinese information technology compromises some of our national security issues.
The Cipher Brief: Ultimately, is this a good deal? Would you recommend leaders in Washington and Riyadh go for it?
Grappo: In principle I would say most definitely. This is in the interest of all countries, including Israel. If that piece of it could be worked going forward, it's definitely for all three countries a win-win-win. And if we can't do the Israeli component now, it's still a win-win for the US and Saudi Arabia.
Roule: It's exactly what we should do to build for the next century. It will allow us to shape the current environment. In a multipolar world where we have Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East and Russian proxies throughout Africa and China, putting islands of aggression throughout the Pacific, you need to create almost counter islands of stability and economic growth. The Gulf has got that capital and western technology, and they're a natural partner and they have a natural interest to do that, and we have a natural reason to cooperate with them. But you need this foundation, the strategic foundation to enable that to take place in a way that involves trust and reliability.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.
