The world is watching Hanoi this week as President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un hold their second summit meeting in less than a year. Critics worry that any declaration of 'success' out of the Hanoi meeting will fall short of full denuclearization, something western leaders say is vital and North Korean leaders have been resisting.
Former Senior British Diplomat and Cipher Brief Expert Tim Willasey-Willsey, offers a non-U.S. expert perspective on the likely costs of success in Hanoi.
Shortly after I joined the British Foreign Service in 1981, I came across a draft press release celebrating the success of a summit meeting which had not yet taken place. Baffled by this document I asked my boss who patiently explained that both sides needed a success; so a success it would be, almost irrespective of what happened around the negotiating table.
Initial signs suggest the Hanoi, Vietnam summit between President Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will produce a “success” of this sort. Both leaders need a positive outcome. Trump has enough domestic trouble on his plate already with his struggle against the Democrats to build a wall along the Mexican border. And Kim wants relief from sanctions, economic development and freedom from the suffocating embrace of China.
Expectations are already being managed downwards. President Trump is saying publicly that he is in “no rush” to see North Korea give up its nuclear weapons program. Instead, he wants to ensure that there is no more missile or nuclear testing. U.S. envoy Stephen Biegun remarked that; “before the process of denuclearization can be final, we must have a complete understanding of the full extent of the North Korean WMD and missile programs through a comprehensive declaration.” This is a softer formulation than previous maximalist demands for the full and immediate dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.
Speaking at Stanford on 31st January, Biegun also hinted at some economic concessions; “We did not say we will not do anything until you do everything,” he said. Additionally, he implied that a peace declaration was under active discussion. It seems, at this stage, that the harder-line John Bolton is taking a back-seat as his various red-lines are gradually being eroded by Biegun.
Meanwhile, South Korea continues to play its skilful hand as facilitator whilst chipping away at U.S. obduracy. Seoul wants improved relations with North Korea and China. It too, wishes to see a reduction in sanctions, closer economic ties with the North, and transport links through North Korea to the wider world. Seoul doesn’t worry as much about North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as it does about a United States attack on the North.
However, there have also been indications of significant North Korean concessions. The first was that Pyongyang could be willing to end the production of all fissile material. This would be an important achievement but not nearly enough to declare success. After all, Trump has ridiculed President Obama’s Iranian nuclear deal, which also curtailed fissile production. North Korea already has enough material for between 35 and 60 warheads; it hardly requires more.
Secondly, there have been the largely-overlooked comments by South Korea’s former Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Sung-han that North Korea might agree to dismantle the ICBMs capable of reaching the mainland United States. This would allow Trump to tell the American people that they are free from the nuclear threat of North Korea (although U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan would still be in range of medium range missiles). He could also draw a distinction with the Iran agreement, which did not restrict Iran’s Ballistic Missile capability.
One thing is for sure; the verification of any agreement would have to be far superior to the farcical destruction in May last year, of some test site tunnels at Punggye-ri, in the absence of official observers. However, the outlines of a deal seem sufficiently muscular for Bolton to have re-engaged with the process.
An agreement along these lines; visible removal of capabilities in return for economic concessions, would be a long way from Bolton’s previous comparisons with the disarmament of Libya. However, there are those who would applaud such an approach. The British mediation specialist, Jonathan Powell, has compared negotiation to riding a bicycle. So long as you move forward you can stay upright; and if you keep upright, you move forward. The key thing is never to stop. If both sides honour the process, then the chances of conflict are markedly reduced. One might add that North Korea never had any intention of giving up its entire arsenal. After the examples of Iraq, Libya and Ukraine why would it?
The counter-argument is that the United States had North Korea over a barrel before the Singapore summit. The failure to document, and then follow-through on the commitments allegedly made by Kim, loosened the grip of sanctions and allowed North Korea more room to obfuscate. Now total denuclearisation seems far-off and the world may have to live with a nuclear North Korea for the foreseeable future.
A final question is whether Trump will offer to draw down some (or even all) U.S. troops from South Korea. It has been clear, during the renegotiation of the “Special Measures Agreement” by which South Korea hosts U.S. troops on its soil, that Trump feels Seoul is still not paying its fair share. Such a withdrawal is what Beijing wants more than anything; as the move would have considerable regional implications. Japan, Taiwan and others will await the Hanoi outcome with real anxiety.
Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Cipher Brief Expert and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at King’s College, London and a former senior British diplomat.
Read more from Tim in The Cipher Brief
