The Cipher Brief: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have the technical ability to pursue nuclear weapons, but all three have refrained. What conditions would have to exist for these countries to consider nuclear programs?
Tom Cynkin: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have each considered the circumstances under which they would pursue active nuclear weapons programs. While all three adhere to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they each have the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons. Japan could probably develop and deploy a nuclear weapon within a year; South Korea and Taiwan would take a bit longer, given the state of their fissile technology.
Japan since 1967 has adhered to its three Non-Nuclear Principles: no possession, production, or introduction of nuclear weapons. However, Japan’s Constitution does not prohibit Japan’s use of nuclear weapons, the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Japan’s constitutional watchdog, confirmed recently.
Japan has taken great pains and expense to maintain a full nuclear fuel cycle in order to keep its nuclear options open. Japan reportedly has nine tons of plutonium stockpiled in Japan, and 35 tons stored in Britain and France, technically sufficient to produce 5,000 nuclear weapons, by one estimate. While the Japanese Government has established for itself the most rigorous monitoring system for its nuclear facilities – exceeding even NPT Additional Protocol standards – this would not pose an impediment if Tokyo made the political decision to produce nuclear weapons overtly. South Korea and Taiwan are not as advanced in this field but are clearly capable.
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan refrain from producing and deploying nuclear weapons for political, not technical reasons. As long as the U.S. commitment to their security remains firm, they have no incentive to go nuclear. By the same token, were the U.S. to retreat from Asia or retract its commitments to their security, the option of their producing and deploying nuclear weapons would be on the table. That does not mean nuclear proliferation would become inevitable, given the major downside of provoking regional neighbors, particularly China. However, it would become a much more serious subject of debate.
TCB: What warning signs should U.S. policymakers look for that would preclude nuclear proliferation in these countries?
TC: It would be useful to monitor the political debate over the reliability of the U.S. and of course the domestic nuclear option. Monitoring scientific developments would be important as well.
TCB: Denuclearization negotiations with North Korea have been unfruitful for many years, and the Obama administration is unlikely to make progress in its remaining timeframe. What can the next administration do from the start to make progress on denuclearization negotiations with North Korea?
TC: The next administration should not be, or appear to be, eager to negotiate with North Korea. This would only encourage the North Korean leadership to think that the U.S. is the supplicant and to adopt a more aggressive negotiating position. Rather, the new administration should appear open to discussion with North Korea, while pursuing more fruitful foreign and security policy initiatives elsewhere.
Meanwhile, the new administration should conduct a comprehensive policy review vis-à-vis China. Within that context, it should consider how best to exert leverage on China to change its approach toward North Korea.
TCB: In lieu of successful negotiations with North Korea, what else can U.S. policymakers do to maintain stability and uphold the U.S.’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation?
TC: The U.S. should reassure its friends and allies in the region that we’ve got their back, and the U.S. is in Asia to stay. We should continue our dialogue with Japan and South Korea on how extended deterrence would actually work, in order to build confidence. We should also intensify consultations with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan on missile defense cooperation – including, in the longer term, prospects for regional missile defense cooperation. While this approach will no doubt be of concern to China, it may provide an incentive to China to be more proactive in reining in its recalcitrant North Korean ally and finding common solutions.
