The Cipher Brief spoke with Congressman Will Hurd of Texas about the increasing security challenges in Afghanistan. According to Hurd, U.S. objectives in Afghanistan have remained the same since 2001. Those objectives include creating “a stable and effective government and security apparatus” and preventing “terrorist groups, like al Qaeda from plotting against us again.” However, the current environment in Afghanistan “demonstrates that we are far from achieving these strategic objectives,” says Hurd.
The Cipher Brief: What do you make of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan?
Congressman Will Hurd: For me it’s heartbreaking. I spent nine and a half years as an undercover officer in the CIA. The day I left Texas to go to Washington, DC to start training was the day of the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. I was in the CIA when 9/11 happened and I ended my career as the head of undercover operations in Afghanistan. So Afghanistan has played a major part in most of my adult life.
To think about the amount of blood, sweat, tears, treasure, and lost lives that have gone into that country and to be in this situation is unfortunate.
But the important thing that we have to do is bring the discussion on Afghanistan back to the original reason about why we became involved in the first place: The country was under Taliban control, and it was providing sanctuary to al Qaeda, where they were training and plotting attacks against the West.
The objectives in Afghanistan back then and now should be the same – to create a stable and effective central government and a security apparatus that can protect the country from outside invaders and from internal insurgent forces, and also to prevent terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, from plotting against us again.
The current security situation in Afghanistan demonstrates that we are far from achieving these strategic objectives.
TCB: What are some of the factors that have contributed to this difficult security situation?
WH: There are a handful of broad factors at play here. You have an Afghan government that cannot be described as wholly successful. The Taliban has not ceased waging an insurgency against the Afghan government since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan. An ISIS affiliate is operating primarily in Nangahar province that has the capabilities to launch spectacular attacks. And then you have Pakistan, where groups who are competing for power within Afghanistan, have the support from outside actors.
So the Pakistani government, plus the Taliban, plus outside support for the Taliban equals continued unrest and instability in Afghanistan. It’s that simple.
TCB: The U.S. recently withheld $300 million in military aid from Pakistan. Could instability in Afghanistan be one of the main reasons for this decision?
WH: It’s all connected. The U.S. is showing what we think needs to be done. The fact we conducted a drone attack inside Balochistan and the Pakistani government was unaware of that shows the level of frustration we have with Pakistan, and it shows increasing resolve by the U.S. government to take action. The reality is that Pakistan needs to realize it is not in their strategic best interest to continue supporting the Taliban.
TCB: President Obama recently announced that he intends to keep 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan through the end of his Presidency. Is that a sufficient level for ensuring stability in Afghanistan?
WH: That level is not sufficient. We have seen that when there is a reduction in troop levels, instability increases. This track record demonstrates that U.S. troop presence correlates with success against the Taliban and other insurgent forces. These perpetual drawdowns give the Taliban the impression the U.S. is going to eventually leave and that all they have to do is wait us out. That also demotivates them from coming to a negotiating table with the Afghan government. They say, “Let’s continue to pursue this insurgency because over time we can win.” That’s their strategic calculation.
We also have to continue to train Afghan forces. The Taliban took over some areas last year, and the Afghan military was able to go back and retake them. We have seen some successes by the Afghan military, but we need to have a stable U.S. presence to ensure their continued success.
TCB: The U.S. has recently begun to use air power to push back Taliban offensives. Will this help in the ongoing battle against the Taliban? Is this a course of action that should have been taken a long time ago?
WH: We should absolutely be using all of the tools at our disposal, including force projection thorough airpower. When you look at how we took over Afghanistan after 9/11, we did it with only 400 American troops on the ground - 300 Special Forces, 100 CIA, and the best Air Force the world had ever seen. And we were partnering with local groups, and those local groups were the ones that had to get into the game, because they had more people on the ground. But it was the overwhelming airpower that was the key and it is something we have to continue. Our airpower is what is going to make the Taliban, as well as any other groups, like ISIS or al Qaeda, that are trying to plan operations, think twice.
TCB: What are your recommendations to the next Administration – regardless of party – on the best next steps for the United States in Afghanistan?
WH: One, keep the pressure on Pakistan to get the Taliban to participate in real negotiations. Two, keep troop levels consistent – no more of these scale backs until the Afghan security forces demonstrate they can hold their own against all of the internal and external threats they face. We also need to ensure our military assistance efforts in Afghanistan have a component that is focused on local police. The rule of law issue is often addressed at the local level, and we need to ensure that local police, local judges, and local jails are working in Afghanistan.
We also have to stay intimately engaged with the political environment inside Afghanistan. Doing that will help us fight corruption and will help us create better ties with the political establishments in those local areas. Those fiefdoms have long histories, and we need to stay engaged there. We need to focus a little bit more on that political structure.
