Today, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is holding a historic referendum on Kurdish independence. Kurds are widely expected to overwhelmingly vote Yes, a result that threatens once again to undermine the fragile Iraqi state – split between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish regions – and is causing consternation throughout the region. The Cipher Brief’s Fritz Lodge spoke with Ceng Sagnic, Editor of TurkeyScope at the Moshe Dayan Center for MENA studies, about what the Kurds hope to gain from this vote and how the Iraqi central government, Turkey, and Iran will react to the possibility of an independent Kurdistan.
The Cipher Brief: How exactly is the referendum being held and what do we know from polling so far?
Ceng Sagnic: The independence referendum will be held in the Kurdistan region proper and in KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] controlled disputed territories in Sinjar, Kirkuk, and some parts of Diyala Province.
In Kurdistan Region proper, the referendum is expected to be held everywhere at the same level without any significant issues for the distribution of ballots and results. But in the disputed territories – apart from Kirkuk where the vote will be held in a similar manner to the main Kurdish region – we may witness some difficulties around KRG access, especially in the smaller towns and villages, and areas in Diyala Province where control is contested between the Peshmerga forces and Shiite militias. The Peshmerga forces in these areas – belonging to either the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] or the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] – will be helping the KRG high elections committee to access the neighborhoods and towns in these disputed areas. This indicates a high level of coordination between the security apparatus and the high elections committee, and therefore the KRG’s job will be much easier in administering this vote.
TCB: What are polls telling us as we enter the vote?
Sagnic: We know that the KDP’s base is expected to vote Yes, we know that the PUK’s base is expected to vote Yes, the opposition Gorran Movement hasn’t called for a Yes vote, and therefore, the majority of Gorran voters are likely to either boycott the vote or vote No.
In Kirkuk, many reports indicate that Arabs and Turkmen are likely to boycott, but KDP and PUK supporters in this area are very excited about voting Yes, because independence would likely mean the unilateral annexation of Kirkuk into the KRG.
Based on past election results, where KDP was the first party, Gorran came second, and PUK came third – followed by Islamist parties reaching some 10 percent of votes – a Yes vote victory is likely at over 70 percent of the total population.
TCB: Why now? Why did the KRG’s leaders, specifically President Masoud Barzani, choose to hold the referendum now?
Sagnic: First of all, it’s the end of the war against ISIS. Hawija, which is the last big town to be held by ISIS in Kurdish territory, will be liberated in the coming days or the coming weeks, and the KRG has gained a lot of ground in the disputed territories [disputed by the Iraqi central government] over the course of the war. So the question of annexing these territories, the oil revenue issue with the Iraqi government, the military support from the U.S. received simultaneously by the Peshmerga and the Iraqi military as two separate entities, all of these are reasons for concern in the KRG that after the war against ISIS, a crisis between the KRG and the Iraqi government may include all of these issues at the expense of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Barzani last week in his speech in Dohuk said that the Iraqi central government was preparing to officially demand that the KRG withdraw its forces from the disputed territories and even to withdraw to the pre-2003 borders of the Kurdistan Region after the war against ISIS comes to an end. In fact, many Shiite militia organizations have already made similar announcements, proudly declaring that the next target for the reunification of Iraq will be the Erbil government, and that the Kurds will be forced to withdraw from Kirkuk and all of the disputed territories – from Sinjar on the Syrian border to Mandalay on the Iranian border.
The KRG is very much concerned about these developments, because there is no longer any hope for a healthy cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad following the rise of Shiite-centric Arab nationalism in Iraq. This is in part the reason behind the central government’s continued refusal to transfer the 17 percent of the Iraqi national budget that it is supposed to direct to the KRG.
The war against ISIS and the Kurdish advance into disputed territories abandoned by Iraqi forces in 2014 have increasingly made the KRG a threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq, as much as ISIS in the eyes of Shiite nationalists in the south. So the Kurdish government has no hopes that a new agreement can be achieved with the Iraqi government for sharing oil revenues and delivering the KRG’s budget. This is another reason that the KRG now wants to test its abilities as a sovereign entity, or at least try to enter renewed negotiations in a stronger position as an independent government that has annexed the disputed territories.
It should be noted that room for negotiation still exists. I have always said that the most important outcome of the 2003 war is the culture of negotiation in Iraq. No matter what happens in the political theater, no matter what the political actors continue to accuse each other of, negotiations, talks, and contact continue between the Kurds and different Shiite factions, between the Shiites and the Sunnis, between the Kurds and the Sunnis.
So, in the post-referendum process the KRG is seemingly willing to reengage in talks with the central Iraqi government, which will include a long term future date for secession from Iraq, but will mostly focus on the pending issues of disputed territories, the KRG’s 17 percent share of the national budget, and the military equipment that the Peshmerga forces have been waiting for the past seven years to be distributed from the central government.
TCB: If there is a Yes vote, how does the Iraqi government react to that?
Sagnic: The Iraqi parliament has tasked Prime Minister Haider al Abadi to take every necessary measure to prevent the territorial disintegration of Iraq.
The focus point of all this is not necessarily about the KRG holding the referendum, it’s about the referendum being held in Kirkuk and the disputed territories. There is a growing pressure on Prime Minister Haider al Abadi from other Shiite factions as Iraq prepares for the April 2018 general elections. Using the Kurdish card against Abadi is a useful tool for other Shiite factions to make Abadi appear weak, which in return makes Abadi much tougher on the Kurdistan Region in order to avoid the appearance of weakness. That’s why I’m not really sure if Haider al Abadi will remain silent or limit his reaction to some economic sanctions. He may instead launch a military campaign against the KRG. It’s definitely not going to happen in the immediate aftermath of the independence referendum, but the vote could lead to an uncontrolled conflict between the KRG Peshmerga and Iraqi forces.
There is a high risk that the future of Kirkuk and its current governor, Najmiddin Karim, will constitute the theme of the next conflict in Iraq. We are expecting clashes between Shiite militias and the Peshmerga on the day of the referendum in some parts of the disputed territories, but these clashes are expected to remain limited. Major conflict may take place after the referendum if Baghdad or Shiite militias or a strong faction within the Iraqi parliament decide to resort to use force to remove Najmiddin Karim from his office as governor and to bring Kirkuk back under Iraqi control.
TCB: In your opinion, how would Turkey react to a Yes vote?
Sagnic: The Turkish position is more about domestic politics. Turkey is currently facing a rapid rise of ultranationalist sentiment in the country, which isn’t really favored by [the ruling] AK Party due to its Islamist ideology, but they cannot really do much about it because there is a large voter base that looks to the ultranationalist parties for leadership.
The ultranationalists are pushing the AKP to take a stronger stance against the Kurdistan Region’s referendum. However, military intervention or action against the KRG is totally unlikely at this time, and even unlikely in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence by the KRG for many reasons, but mostly because Turkey is fighting on two fronts in Syria, both against ISIS and the Syrian Kurds. Ankara also has its own Kurdish problem, with daily clashes against the PKK in southeastern Turkey, so it shouldn’t be expected for Turkey to take any military action against the KRG, and KRG leaders know this.
There might be some suspension of trade between the KRG and Turkey imposed by the Turkish parliament or the Turkish government itself in response to the independence referendum, but border closures cannot continue for a long time. The trade between Turkey and the KRG is nearly $8 billion per year, and some 1,300 Turkish companies currently operate in the KRG. It’s very hard to prevent all these economic relations from continuing in the long run. Also, the trade between Turkey and the central government in Iraq runs through the KRG, so it’s very hard to maintain border closures.
The other thing is oil flows from Kirkuk-Erbil to the Turkish port in Ceyhan. Iran has been proposing seriously to the KRG to replace Turkey as the outlet for Kurdish oil to the sea, and this has been a reason for concern in Turkey, which does not want to lose these oil exports to Iran.
We might see oil flows through Turkey halted for a while after the Kurdish referendum, perhaps several weeks. The borders might close for several weeks. Flights from Turkey might be suspended for a time, but the Turkish reaction is mostly about domestic politics, it’s not about Turkey having any kind of strategic interest against the KRG in Iraq.
Turkey knows that if the Kurds lose Kirkuk it will not be the Turks who gain in Kirkuk, it will be the Shiite militias and Iran who gain, so I’m not expecting them to invest many resources in punishing the Kurds. The action they take will be compelled by domestic political reasons, i.e. the new round of ultranationalist competition between the AKP and nationalist parties.
However, in presidential elections planned in 2019, the AKP will need votes from the Kurds, and those who will vote for the AKP are the conservative Kurds in southeastern Turkey who are very close to Barzani and the ruling KDP government in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, so Turkey will have to walk a thin line on the referendum issue.
