SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW – Hostage negotiations are one of the most difficult political issues for a U.S. administration to deal with, particularly in light of a U.S. policy not to negotiate with terrorists or to pay ransom. So, when news broke that the Biden Administration has been quietly talking with Tehran to negotiate the release of five Americans in exchange for five jailed Iranians – and that the deal would include unfreezing funds worth close to $6 billion in Iranian oil revenue, political daggers were drawn.
The release of the hostages would obviously be good news for the hostages and their families, but the deal is drawing political criticism for the multi-billion-dollar financial relief it would bring Tehran, already under blistering U.S. sanctions primarily for its role in the killing of Americans overseas and the development of its nuclear program.
Senior Republicans and non-partisan voices have expressed concern over details of the deal as Secretary of State Antony Blinken commented on August 8 that, “This is just the beginning of a process that I hope and expect will lead to their return home to the United States,” referring to the release of five Iranian-Americans, some of whom have been transferred from Evin Prison, to a hotel in Tehran, where they are being held under house arrest. “There’s more work to be done to actually bring them home.”
This the kind of dilemma that presents a conundrum for any administration, according to Cipher Brief Expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, Norm Roule.
“Any administration has four options,” he told The Cipher Brief in an exclusive Subscriber+ Interview. “First, diplomatic pressure (which is only effective if it is multilateral and long-term); ransom of cash, concessions, or a prisoner exchange; military action; or hope that an adversary’s regime collapses, and a friendlier government frees the hostages.”
QUICK BACKGROUND
- The deal reportedly includes the release of Morad Tahbaz, Siamak Namazi and Emad Sharghi. All three were jailed on charges of spying. The names of two other Americans are being withheld.
- On June 8, 2023, the Middle East Eyepublished a report alleging that Iranian and US officials were nearing a deal that would provide Iran sanctions relief in exchange for reductions in Iran’s uranium enrichment activities.
- That same day, Reuters reported that both the U.S. and Iran denied the Middle East Eye report, with a spokesperson for the White House National Security Council calling it “false and misleading”, adding that “any reports of an interim deal are false”.
- An Iranian official based at the UN told Reuters that, "Our comment is the same as the White House comment."
- Then, on August 10, 2023, The New York Times reported that the U.S. and Iran had in fact reached an agreement that would include a prisoner swap, the release of frozen funds to Tehran and commitments by Iran to reduce uranium enrichment.
- The U.S. and Iran have a long history of negotiations related to prisoner swaps and what some say are clearly ransom payments. Republican and Democratic administrations have both engaged in negotiations with Iran and both administrations have endured political attacks as a result.
- News of the deal between Iran and U.S., which reportedly involved other international partners like Qatar, Oman and Switzerland, has created a fierce backlash in the U.S. among Republicans and Iran hawks who say that it will lead to further hostage taking, and will strengthen the Iranian regime.
- Biden administration officials say the funds released to Tehran will be closely monitored, controlled by Qatar, and will primarily be used for humanitarian purchases of food and medicine.
- Geopolitical shifts in the Middle East have resulted in the restoration of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally.
- Iran has also strengthened its ties with Moscow and is a key enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.
- Iran and Russia have bolstered their military and security partnership, with Tehran aiding Russia in the development of enhanced domestic drone manufacturing capabilities.
What could this reported deal mean politically in the U.S. and more broadly in the face of a complicated Middle East landscape? The Cipher Brief tapped Middle East and Energy Expert Norm Roule, who served as former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for this Exclusive Cipher Brief Subscriber+Interview.
Norman T. Roule, Energy Expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Norman T. Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the ODNI from 2008 until 2017. As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policymakers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.
EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW
The Cipher Brief:How could this reported deal have come together so quietly?
Roule: Hostage negotiations are among the most difficult negotiations conducted by our diplomats. Hostage takers know that we care about our people, and they use extended negotiations and harsh prison conditions for the hostages to extract maximum financial and propaganda concessions. We need to thank those who take on this complicated job and celebrate the release of our citizens. But it is wrong to say that this deal doesn’t have serious negative consequences. Likewise, a deal of this significance certainly merits Congressional oversight.
The talks that led to this reported deal began early in the Biden administration and were mainly conducted indirectly and with the assistance of foreign partners, including Qatar and Oman. As always, Iran prefers lengthy negotiations, believing that such a process allows it to argue that any pressure in response to non-hostage-related aggression will end talks. I understand this deal’s contours were complete by March, but Tehran dragged its feet as the final details were sorted out.
The Cipher Brief: The administration has gone to great lengths to stress that releasing Iran’s frozen funds does not represent a hostage payment. Others disagree. Break this down for us.
Roule: A simple check of any dictionary of the meaning of ransom will produce a clear and crisp definition. A ransom is something given or demanded to obtain the release of someone or something from captivity. Is there any question that Iran would not have released the hostages absent such a payment? The deal involved a ransom payment. That is a policy decision, and we elect our policymakers to make difficult calls. Denying that a ransom is being paid smacks of politics and denies a policy debate on whether such an action – and the precedent it sets and future consequences it invites – is in the national interest.
It's important to note that the Biden administration isn’t the first U.S. administration to pay a ransom. But the current administration and the Obama administrations have used public messages to sharply deny that payments to Iran to release hostages are, in fact, ransom.
President Obama’s officials –who, as current members of the Biden administration, negotiated this latest deal- went out of their way to claim that the $1.7 billion settlement to Iran to resolve a decades-old contract debt was not a ransom but rather a coincidental payment. The Biden administration has sought to divert criticism by claiming that its action is no different than similar decisions made by the Trump administration. These positions may satisfy a partisan base, but it is hard to say it is in the national interest, if only because ransom payments encourage more hostage-taking.
Historically, both Republican and Democratic administrations have used the release of frozen funds to compel Iran to release our citizens. The U.S. provided ransom payments to the Barbary pirates in the late 1780s. The Carter and Reagan administrations ended the 1979 hostage crisis by releasing around 8 billion dollars held abroad. Frozen funds were also released to free hostages in Lebanon. In every case involving Iran, hostage-taking was a combination of a business model by the hostage-takers, a lengthy negotiation process to shield Tehran from other pressure, and an effort to humiliate the U.S.
The debate over the release of frozen funds, masks a more important question. Why have policymakers failed to rally the international community to adopt steps to punish Iran sufficiently to deter it from hostage-taking, as well as piracy in international waters?
Absent such multilateral action, the advantage remains with Iran. We must also ask why we allow American passport and green card holders to travel to Iran. It is true that a ban would bring hardship to some families and that most travelers return unharmed? This is a cruel lottery in which arrest is forever a possibility.
Absent a decision on these questions, more hostages will be taken, families will pressure administrations to act, and ransom and political concessions eventually will be made that will sustain this bloody regime and empower lethal action against other innocents.
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The Cipher Brief: According to reports on this deal, Iran will gain access to more than six billion dollars in funds that are currently frozen in South Korea. Those funds will reportedly be placed in Iranian accounts based in Qatar. How can the U.S. be sure these funds won’t be used for malign purposes?
Roule: There is no reason to believe the unfrozen funds won’t be rigorously monitored to ensure they are only spent on approved humanitarian purchases. The U.S. Treasury will monitor transactions associated with these accounts. Iran’s odious English-speaking propaganda mouthpieces have stated that the regime will have full access to the funds for any purpose it wishes, but this is a lie. Such disinformation is aimed at the domestic Iranian audience and probably also aimed at sparking political divisions in the U.S.
Iran already had funds available for any humanitarian purchases for which these funds will be used, so it will now use these funds for other purposes. Most likely, the bulk of this money will be spent domestically to strengthen the stability of Iran’s economy and to generate support for President Ebrahim Raisi. But it is highly likely, if not certain, that a small but meaningful portion of these funds will be used to resource Iran’s oppressive security forces, missile program, and foreign militia partners.
In short, a deal that brings home our hostages carries lethal consequences for other innocents. Most people won’t know the connection between these resources and the consequences they bring. Partisan hacks and Iran’s shills will deny such consequences even exist. But they do.
The Cipher Brief: How is this reported deal connected to the failed nuclear talks? Is it possible that the hostage deal means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) can be revived?
Roule: JCPOA is dead. Its provisions are dated, and the remaining constraints are insufficient to achieve the goals of its authors. Sterile nuclear talks may be revived. Iran would welcome a return to nuclear talks, but that doesn’t mean it plans any concessions.
The nuclear negotiations have become a mechanism by which Iran normalizes its nuclear program and gains relief from nuclear sanctions. Iran also knows that talks serve as a shield against meaningful pressure in response to Tehran’s malign non-nuclear actions and provide a forum by which it can pressure coalitions.
Reportedly, the U.S. told Iran some months ago, that we would accept 20% and even 60% enriched uranium as long as the amounts of fissile material produced by Iran do not exceed certain levels. This may allow us to say that we have stopped Iran from developing a weapon. It also means that we have allowed Iran to cement the unprecedented expansion that has taken place during the Biden administration.
The Cipher Brief: How would you describe Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Is a nuclear weapon inevitable?
Roule: An Iranian nuclear weapon program is not inevitable. But there is no question that Iran’s current nuclear program looks exactly like what a country would do to build the architecture for such a program should it decide to do so.
Nuclear talks have been aimed at preventing further pressure for these steps and to blunt action by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The international community’s response has been to kick this can down the road. With every kick, the can is heavier, and the road is shorter. Other regional actors are watching and asking why they can’t get similar treatment for their nuclear ambitions. Thus, our approach is eroding the non-proliferation system as we know it.
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The Cipher Brief: What are the most significant benefits of the reported hostage agreement?
Roule: The release of the five hostages is the most important benefit. Families will be delighted, and the administration will achieve a humanitarian victory that plays well in an election year. The deal removes one of the many friction points between Washington and Tehran. Advocates have already suggested that the agreement may create momentum for nuclear talks or discussions on regional issues.
The Cipher Brief: What are the most significant downsides of the agreement?
Roule: This reported deal doesn’t bring home every U.S.-connected hostage in Iran. The last hostage deal was similarly flawed, and one of the hostages released in this deal, Siamak Namazi, was left behind in 2015. The families of two individuals have complained that their loved ones were omitted from the agreement. The first is Shahab Dalili, a U.S. permanent resident and Iranian citizen who emigrated to the U.S. in 2014. The second is Jamshid Sharmahd, a German-Iranian dual citizen who had been living in the United States. Neither are U.S. citizens, but their ties to the U.S. are strong, and the pain felt by their U.S. citizen families is no less real than that felt by the hostages who will return home if the proposed deal is fully executed.
Second, the deal does nothing to deter Iran from taking more hostages, and the sum of money involved in hostage deals now seems to spike with every agreement. That was also a flaw of the 2015 deal. It is foolish to say that Iranian leaders won’t continue to see hostage-taking as a profitable and relatively risk-free policy tool. Other rogue governments will likely take the same lesson from this deal.
Next, the administration’s inability to block Iranian oil sales to China and the unfreezing of Iraqi and South Korean funds will cause other countries to wonder why they must maintain strict sanctions enforcement against Iran.
Likewise, if the U.S. is willing to pay ransom to free its citizens, how can we complain if other countries do the same? The impact of this dynamic on sanctions efforts should be of profound concern. Anything we do that allows Iran to increase its foreign exchange reserves reduces the impact of future sanctions. And when any sanctions are applied, Iran’s ability to draw on reserves, increases the confidence of its leaders that they can outlast the U.S. commitment to any sanctions regime. Absent a sense that sanctions are a useful option, the prospect of military action increases.
Another downside is that this deal reportedly requires the release of five Iranian prisoners in the U.S. The administration has not released the names of these individuals. It is a strange world where our hostages are publicly known, but individuals who committed actual crimes and were convicted in public court proceedings are unnamed. At the very least, the administration should state that we will neither release individuals involved in violent crimes nor those who have attempted to export technology, funds, or materiel that would benefit Iran’s military or security services.
The Cipher Brief: How is partisan bickering on this deal playing into the hands of the Iranians?
Roule: The idea that American policymakers can agree with Tehran easier than with the opposing political party, is a profound statement on how these policymakers see our political system. This misguided approach means that even when policymakers achieve what they believe to be a diplomatic victory, that same diplomatic success increases domestic divisions. This gives Iran the benefits of the deal and an opportunity to turn the U.S. against itself.
The Cipher Brief: How is Iran portraying the hostage agreement?
Roule: Iran’s foreign ministry and some of its propaganda voices describe the deal as a humanitarian decision by each side. When using this theme, Tehran describes its prisoners in the U.S. as hostages. In some instances, the voices using these themes say that perhaps this will lead to progress on other issues and to message foreign audiences that international pressure on Iran is diminishing.
An alternative message is being put out by regime hardliners who brag that Iran “humiliated” the U.S., forcing Washington to release the funds. These hardliners openly tout the value of hostage-taking as a means to acquire funds and to message defiance to the world.
The Cipher Brief: What should we be watching in the coming weeks related to Iran?
Roule: Great question. I can think of several events we should watch. The UN general assembly will gather in a few weeks. This event could provide a forum for talks between Iran and various countries, although I doubt much will be achieved that is substantive. The administration issued Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi a visa to attend last year and will likely do the same this year.
Raisi’s presence brought controversy on several fronts. First, the Secret Service that protected Raisi during his trip also protected several U.S. persons from the threat of Iranian terrorism in the U.S. Homeland.
Second, Raisi held up a photo of Qassem Soleimani during his UN speech. Delegates from the U.S. – and other countries whose citizens died at Soleimani’s hands – failed to walk out.
Last, his appearance on the world stage occurred while Iran’s security forces were brutally repressing peaceful protestors.
The first anniversary of the death of Mahsa Amini at the hands of Iran’s corruption police and the eruption of unrest that resulted in Iran is also coming up in mid-September. The regime is no doubt already taking steps to prevent further protests. Washington verbally supported the protestors and applied modest sanctions, but many argued for more pressure.
The U.S. recently augmented its military deterrence against Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea. The prospect of Iranian-sponsored or direct violence against U.S. and partner forces in the region always remains.
Syria has been relatively quiet since March, likely because Tehran restrained its militias to avoid raising regional tensions while establishing a détente with Saudi Arabia.
Iran may undertake violence against international shipping, but it will want to be careful how it does so to avoid igniting a conflict with the U.S. or upsetting Arab neighbors.
Last, we have an upcoming meeting of the International Atomic Energy Board of Directors (BOG) from 12-16 September. I expect that the U.S. and others remain unwilling to condemn Iran to the point where they will refer Tehran’s actions to the United Nations Security Council. However, the U.S. and its closest allies will issue statements critical of Iran’s nuclear expansion. Russia and China will likely support Iran or offer only muted criticism.
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