In that report, the U.S. reiterated its support to Kyiv saying, “The United States, our allies and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014.”
But as Ukraine’s counteroffensive slowly pushes forward, sobering assessments indicate that the war is inching toward a frozen conflict where neither side is capable of military moves significant enough to end it. Former Russian president and Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev says if Ukraine’s counteroffensive is successful, Russia will use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in defending his country, has sought more advanced weapons systems from Western allies since the war began. He knows, perhaps more than anyone, that this has never been a fair fight. And time is not on his side.
Meanwhile, there have been reports of secret talks aimed at trying to forge a diplomatic solution, as unrealistic as that might seem right now.
Today's reality is that Moscow maintains significant military capability and still occupies most of the Ukrainian territory that it seized in the full-scale invasion. So, what's next?
The Cipher Brief spoke in this exclusive Subscriber+Member interview, with General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, to help put it all in perspective.
THE CONTEXT
- Since Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive began, it’s military has retaken territory from Russia, but progress has been slow and Kyiv has so far failed to realize strategic achievements on the battlefield while taking significant casualties.
- Ukrainian asymmetric, intelligence and special operations activities are continuing with drone incursions targeting Moscow, maritime drone operations targeting Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, and recent reports of small unit raids across the Dnipro River.
- To date, the United States has provided more than $44 billion in security assistance for Ukraine since the full-scale Russian invasion that began in February 2022.
- The US and its European allies have levied unprecedented sanctions on Russia, including an oil export price cap imposed by G7 nations, in an attempt to pressure Russia by reining in Moscow’s ability to fund its military operation in Ukraine.
- Despite this, financial analysts are reporting that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 4.9%, in the second quarter of 2023, beating most predictions.
- Russia has forged closer ties with China, North Korea and Iran in an effort to maintain its military readiness and keep its economy functioning in the face of increased sanctions.
- Since the war began, the US has often initially said ‘no’ to specific requests for military equipment by Ukraine, but as the war has dragged on, has changed its mind on those requests. The most recent example was the approval by the Biden administration to send controversial cluster munitions to Ukraine.
EXPERT INTERVIEW
General Philip M. Breedlove (Ret.) , Former Supreme Allied Commander, NATO
Gen. Philip M. Breedlove (Ret.) retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He served in several senior staff positions to include; Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff. He also served as an F-16 pilot in the Air Force.
The Cipher Brief: Let’s start with your assessment of the war in Ukraine today, particularly in the East and South and other areas where fighting remains heavy?
Gen. Breedlove: Overall, it's going the way that I, and a few other military friends, expected and it's been slower than what the world wanted. I think the world had a view that this was going to be rapiers in the sky and battle flags. It's never going to be like that, especially when Russia had months to prepare and put together a very old-style defensive belt system with dense minefields, extensive trenches, and tank traps. That has been tough for Ukraine to break through, yet they have moved steadily. They were making very slow progress and I think, due to some pressure from the West that the counteroffensive should be showing more results, have worked to speed up their counteroffensive. They have committed another big chunk of their force that they had – until now - kept in reserve, and the pace has picked up recently.
There appears to be at least one vector in the South that looks like it might present an opportunity for a breakthrough. Troops are completely through the first belt and most of the way through the second belt. That would be key, because that is a vector that would potentially allow Ukrainian troops to cut the land bridge to Crimea. What we’re seeing now is slow and steady progress. It’s not the big dramatic breakthrough people wanted, but it is very much what we would expect.
The Cipher Brief: The last time we spoke, we talked about the difference between arming Ukraine to allow them ‘not’ to lose, versus arming Ukraine to win.
Gen. Breedlove: I’ve heard talk recently suggesting that the Ukrainian military has abandoned what it has been taught by the West, and that makes me angry because what we taught them is how to fight like we fight. And the West never, never... I'm going to say it one more time, the West never goes to war without at least battlefield air superiority and we have not given Ukraine the ability to establish battlefield air superiority.
The West never goes to war without long range artillery. We have not given Ukraine long range precise artillery to be able to strike at the supply lines, the concentration areas and so forth. So, we are criticizing them for not fighting like we do, but we have not given them the tools that we take to the battlefield every single time. So, I expect measured success. I expect they've saved a significant percentage of their force as a reserve and will commit them once they get the right breakthrough opportunity. I think we need to be patient.
The Cipher Brief: Are you seeing any signals that indicate Russia's military has improved their performance on the battlefield?
Gen. Breedlove: Russia has gotten better in some areas. For example, they're getting very good at making things hard for Ukraine using electronic warfare. The jamming of Ukrainian GPS has caused some issues. So, Russia has improved in some areas but remember the phrase, “the primacy of the defense”. Russia is now on the defense and enjoys all the factors that a defensive posture gives, especially when they had months to prepare.
The Cipher Brief: Germany recently said no, again, to providing Ukraine with longer range artillery and weapons systems. What do you think the US needs to provide right now short of F-16s, that might offer the Ukrainians a more significant advantage?
Gen. Breedlove: Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). That is number one on the list because the F-16s - and we'll talk about this in a minute - have now been delayed and I think they have been purposely delayed. The Ukrainians are already using the HIMARS system, the long-range, multiple rocket launchers and the guided missiles, (GMLRS) which are shorter range missiles from that same system.
The ATACMS already fit in that launcher, and they could be firing ATACMS within days of receiving them. There's not a big learning curve in terms of training and the ATACMS would bring an immediate response to the battlefield.
I believe the US has been intentionally reticent to give Ukraine the ability to strike deep into Crimea. And some of us believe that Ukraine is going to have to ultimately occupy Crimea. I think short of that, if the Ukrainians can just hold Crimea - at its full length and breadth - completely at risk with weapons like ATACMS, along with the other longer-range systems from our allies, then Russia will find it untenable and would leave. So again, our army would never go to a battle without its long-range precise artillery, but we are expecting the Ukrainians to do it, and that's not appropriate.
The Cipher Brief: Former Russian president and Deputy Chair of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said recently that if Ukraine’s counteroffensive is successful, Russia will use nuclear weapons in this war.
The battles along the front lines are also playing out against a backdrop of constant missile attacks on Kyiv and frequent Ukrainian drone incursions into Russia targeting Moscow. Is the U.S. reticence to arm Ukraine, giving it the ability to strike Crimea, rooted in the fear that Russia might follow through on its nuclear threats?
Gen. Breedlove: Yes, we are afraid of that. Russia’s military by and large is failing Russia on the ground. They're having some successes here and there and they're making it really tough on Ukraine, but the tide is turning and will continue to turn. And in general, if you remember what Mr. Putin's aims were in the beginning, they have already failed in reaching those objectives. So, Russia's military is failing on the ground but Russia's war of intimidation - or in military terms, of ‘deterrence’ - is succeeding wildly because we in the West are deterred. That's why we're making decisions about not giving them the ability to strike deeply into Crimea or to strike targets of military significance inside of Russia.
That's why we're slowing down the deliveries of the F-16s. That's why they still don't have any M1A3 tanks on the ground. All of these weapon systems that we’ve promised, and we publicly celebrated giving them, they still don't have. So, we have grossly over-promised and under-delivered on multiple things. And all of that, I believe, is because we are deterred, we are fearful, we have taken counsel of our fears, and we are afraid that if Ukraine succeeds, especially if they succeed in a demonstrative way, that Russia will resort to more drastic methods.
Now, we must be intellectually honest. It's a possibility. We've faced similar possibilities before. We faced this during the Cuban Missile crisis and we worked our way through it. But in this instance, we are deterred, and we are withholding things that would demonstratively change the situation on the battlefield. ATACMS would be the first of those things.
The Cipher Brief: President Zelenskyy has recently reiterated calls for increased air defense capability in Ukraine. But he also said that he has “no doubt” that F-16s will eventually be used by Ukraine. His comments, made during one of his nightly addresses to the nation, didn’t provide specifics or a timeline, but those were confident words from the president. What can you tell us about the progress with the training of Ukrainian pilots on the F-16s and then in particular, your assessment of if/when they will arrive, what impact that may have for Ukraine’s military?
Gen. Breedlove: The issue of Ukrainian pilot training for the F-16 is an extremely hard one to nail down. Having talked to senior officials in our government, they have one set of answers. They say the Europeans are not ready. The U.S. hasn’t seen their plans, et cetera. When we talk to the Europeans, and I’m frequently in Europe, they say, "We are ready. We have done this before. We know how to do it, and we have our plan." So, there is a disconnect somewhere and at some point, you wonder, is this just an example of governments not communicating with each other? Or does one question whether there a purposeful slowdown on this issue?
I agree with Zelenskyy. I think that we - in the West - will eventually provide Ukraine with the ability to defend its skies. And more importantly to me, having been an F-16 fighter pilot, we will give them the ability for the F-16 to support their ground forces, which is every bit as important.
I think it will eventually happen, but I also think that there are at least some indications that we are purposely slowing this process down. We don't want too rapid of a success in Ukraine. People are already talking about potential talks in the fall and talks in the fall would mean capitulating to Russia and allowing Russia to hold more land and rewarding bad behavior, which is a worrisome thought.
The Cipher Brief: Let’s turn to the recent talks that were held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Many countries, including China attended, notably Russia did not attend. There hasn't been a lot of press out of those meetings, but some of analysts believe China's involvement was notable and while Beijing’s official position remains “neutral and impartial” on the Ukraine war, there has been some speculation that China's sentiment on Ukraine may be slightly shifting in a way that's not favorable to Moscow. I know you watch China closely. What are your thoughts on the Saudi Arabia talks? And what are your thoughts on China's potential role in a future end to the conflict?
Gen. Breedlove: The talks in Jeddah, as far as I could read, did not yield any tangible results. But the idea that other world powers are starting to get involved, I think in the end, is going to be a good thing because it's important for Russia to realize how small of an island they are sitting on right now.
The idea that China lent good words to finding a way ahead obviously upset Moscow, because since then, Russia and China have talked and China has assured Russia that they remain impartial to the conflict, as you mentioned. So, the idea that Russia needs to understand how badly they are isolated amongst the world's leadership is important. What worries me about all of the talks that are going on currently, including the track 1.5 discussions that have been publicly reported on, is that I think it's dangerous to begin to talk about territorial losses for Ukraine as a matter of solving this problem.
In 2008, we rewarded Russia’s bad behavior by allowing them to hold 20% of a sovereign nation, which they still hold in the regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia. In 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea and then invaded the Donbas, the West's response was inadequate to task. And for a second time, we rewarded Russia's bad behavior by allowing them to hold on to portions of one of its neighbor's sovereign lands. And now here, we are faced again in 2023 with a decision of how we go forward. There are already people out there talking about further concessions to Russia in this war in order to get peace. That would be a third time that the world, especially the Western world, will reward Russia's bad behavior and allow them to keep more sovereign Ukrainian territory.
If you reward bad behavior, you're not going to get good behavior, you're going to get more bad behavior. Mr. Putin absolutely understands what it means to invade a neighbor and then threaten the world with nuclear weapons. He knows how that works. It's worked for him twice. Now we're going to see if it works for him a third time.
I believe that we need to be having talks that discuss what we expect for peace, not what we're willing to concede for peace. I'm going to say it in a very direct way. It appears across our last two interactions with Mr. Putin on these kinds of matters, that we are willing to trade the lands of our Western nations who have been invaded, and we're willing to trade the lives of our Western nations that have been invaded to assure our peace. In other words, it appears we're willing to give up Ukrainian land and we're willing to give up Ukrainian lives to assure us, in the West, of our peace. I'm not sure that's what our values are all about.
Cipher Brief COO and Senior Editor Brad Christian contributed to this report
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