Democracy in Europe is in a parlous state at the moment. The British vote for exit (Brexit) from the European Union (EU) has highlighted deep-seated problems with democracy at both the EU and national levels. But it would be a mistake to think that this means the EU is undemocratic, or that Brexit spells the break-up of the EU. Rather, it shows that in the EU, even more so than in the U.S., politics has become increasingly volatile as citizens punish political elites for gridlocked governing processes and policies that don’t work.
The Brexit referendum was dominated by a populist campaign focused on immigration in order to “take back control” from the EU, which was depicted as an over-regulated, undemocratic superstate.
The same kinds of complaints voiced about the EU in the Brexit campaign are mirrored in most European countries, by the likes of, for example, Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, who have also called for referenda on the EU. Euro-skepticism has been increasing more generally across Europe, along with disenchantment with national political elites. This is evidenced by the loss of trust in mainstream parties, the steady rise of populist parties on both the extreme-left and the extreme-right, and the rapid turnover of incumbent governments. The EU’s other crises have also played their part, including the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and the security crisis. The EU’s poor management of all of these crises has been another reason why dissatisfied citizens across Europe, not just the British, may be asking why they should belong to such a Union.
Does all of this sound familiar? Populist campaigns have also taken hold in the U.S. On the right, presidential candidate Donald Trump has blasted away at immigration and political elites. On the left, Bernie Sanders focused his presidential campaign on the plight of the working classes and the poor. Both have attacked globalization and the deleterious effects of free trade, albeit from different angles.
Popular disenchantment with the central governing authority is similar, whether focused on Washington or Brussels. Gridlock is the operative word for both the U.S. and the EU.
But this is where the comparison ends. The U.S. has a president and a federal government elected by its citizens that has the capacity and the legitimacy to act for the public good even when Congress is gridlocked. Political debate and deliberation, however polarized, is at the very basis of the polity.
In contrast, the EU has a governance system in which democracy is fragmented between the national level, characterized by increasing polarization, and the supranational level, crippled by gridlock. Electoral politics and political debate remain primarily national but are increasingly emptied of substance as more and more policies are decided at the EU level, generally in an apolitical or technocratic manner. Such national “politics without policy” helps explain citizens’ frustration, in particular because the EU’s “policy without politics” makes it difficult to have left-right debates on the merits of such policies. National governments, moreover, find themselves caught between being responsive to citizen expectations and being responsible for carrying out their obligations to implement EU decisions. But at least national executives have a seat at the EU table, as opposed to national parliaments, which on the whole have little influence over EU policymaking.
Equally problematic is an EU governance which has been characterized by institutional gridlock compounded by a failure of innovative leadership to solve the EU’s multiple crises. The crises of the euro, refugees, and security all demand a concerted EU response, meaning some form of greater coordination and, subsequently, deeper EU integration. But only in one case, the Eurozone crisis, has deeper integration been pursued so far, and it has not been a great success. Just contrast the EU’s austerity-focused “governing by rules and ruling by numbers” with America’s more pragmatic approach to the 2008 financial crisis, and one will see that the U.S. approach ensured a much more robust economic recovery than the EU one, leaving a Eurozone which continues to struggle with low growth and the risk of deflation.
But for all this, one need not relinquish all hope for the EU. It remains the best way for the countries of Europe to address the problems that they cannot resolve on their own in an increasingly globalized and dangerous world. However, for EU citizens to continue to recognize this, the EU needs to become both more effective with regards to policy and more legitimate politically.
The EU itself recognizes this, as is evident from its recent attempts to piece together agreements on refugee policy and to build a security policy, while incrementally changing the rules of the euro to make them work better. Institutionally, EU actors have been engaging in a new dynamic of interaction, with the member-states more active in exercising leadership; the supranational actors, in using their discretion to improve policy implementation; and the parliamentary actors, in exercising oversight over the other EU actors.
Whether in the U.S. or the EU, the main problem confronting political leaders is the same: how can everything work better, to the advantage and satisfaction of citizens? The challenge remains how to defang the populist demagogues who scapegoat immigrants and excoriate the political elites without offering any workable solutions of their own.
