Victory against ISIS requires not simply more military muscle but diplomacy. On the Iraq front that means complementing more effective military and political action in Sunni areas with diplomacy involving Iran, Turkey, the Arab states and Baghdad.
The Obama Administration’s policy to defeat ISIS is the right mission, but defeating it requires three elements: offensive combat; a “day after’” plan for immediate relief, security, and governance in areas liberated, and longer term political solutions in Syria and Iraq that will defuse internal conflicts involving Sunni Arabs and Kurds; and diplomatic arrangements to facilitate the first two components.
A solution involving more American forces, including ground troops, is a necessary component for offensive combat. The international community has much experience carrying out the difficult missions of a “day after” plan. That leaves diplomacy as the key “enabler.”
The coalition conducts two campaigns in Iraq—the northern one against ISIS anchored in Ninewah province and its capital Mosul, and the Southern one, anchored in Anbar province, primarily in Ramadi and Fallujah.
Ninewah is where ISIS is most dug in, given the difficulties of urban combat in Mosul, where ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced his caliphate. Also, there are only a few trained Sunni Arabs to fight ISIS in Mosul. But U.S advantages in Ninewah include: its Kurdish ally, although limited mainly to traditionally Kurdish-populated areas; more flexibility deploying U.S. assets, given the good relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG); and the relative lack of Iraqi Shia militia and Iranian interest.
In Anbar, U.S. advantages include: considerable Sunni Arab forces fighting ISIS; more coalition freedom of movement around the “islands” of ISIS control; and proximity to Baghdad and thus logistics. However, Shia militias supported by Iran and not under central government control are present, generally anti-American, and a problem for the Sunni population.
The U.S. should proceed differently in the two campaigns. It is easier to deploy U.S. power in the north. But the correlation of ground forces is more favorable for the coalition in the south. However political and diplomatic obstacles impede U.S.-led action.
Aside from the Kurds, some Sunnis, and the U.S. government, none of the actors—the Iraqi central government, the Iranians, the Turks, the Arab states—necessarily see ISIS as their number one objective. They welcome ISIS’ defeat, but prioritize exerting their own power and weakening their foes: for the Turks and Arab states that means Iran; for Iran and many in Baghdad, it’s the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Turkey, the Arab states, and at least for Iran, the U.S.
This situation, while complicated by Russia’s intervention in Syria, resembles the Balkans in the 1990s. Only when the U.S. took the lead dramatically could it conduct effective diplomacy. So if the U.S. acted equally dramatically against ISIS, what would the diplomacy look like?
With Iran: The U.S. must talk to the Iranians calling the shots in Iraq—the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under Maj. Gen. Qasim Soleimani. While not likely now, it may be possible in early 2016, once sanctions are eased as part of the Iranian nuclear deal. The U.S. must convince the Iranians that defeating ISIS is a priority for the U.S. If possible, the U.S., in coordination with the Iranians, will need to acknowledge Iranian interests in Iraq—preservation of a unified state, their own influence, destruction of ISIS, and no large enduring American military presence. The goal with such “coordination” is a longer temporary U.S. force presence to destroy ISIS and Baghdad’s accommodation of Sunni interests such as a Sunni national guard, services in Sunni areas, and more Sunni autonomy. Otherwise, the U.S. will need to make clear to Iran that with or without its endorsement, the U.S. will prioritize the north, deploying forces there without Baghdad’s permission; arm Sunnis; and let the Iranians worry about Iraqi unity.
With Turkey: Coordination with Turkey on Iraq will be influenced by Washington-Ankara relations on Syria. If the U.S. can deal with Iran, it needs Turkey to forego “go it alone” actions with the Kurds and Sunni Arabs that agitate Baghdad and Teheran. If there is no deal with Iran, Turkey’s cooperation will be necessary for any “Kurd-centric” campaign. In either case, Turkey would get the destruction of ISIS, continued close relations with the Kurds and their energy production, and good relations with Washington.
With the Arab States: If there is a deal with Iran, the U.S. must convince them it is only “transactional” and will not portend a larger U.S. shift to a “pro-Iran” policy, particularly acquiescing to President Assad remaining the leader in Syria. The U.S. must also convince these states that their relationship with the U.S. depends on common efforts against ISIS. In return, the Arab states get ISIS’ destruction and American containment of Iran.
With Baghdad. While Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi generally sees the ISIS struggle in the same manner as the U.S., many in the Shia parties do not. This hobbles the Iraqi government’s cooperation with the U.S. and blocks its outreach to Sunni Arabs and Kurds. The U.S. must press points similar to those suggested for the Iranians. All Iraqis must know that the defeat of ISIS and Iraq’s continued unity depends on more flexibility in Baghdad just as much as more U.S. action.
