The recent infusion of Russian weapons and other military materiel into Syria has gotten the chattering class in Washington in a tizzy. "Inside-the-Beltway" policy experts, as a chorus, are now calling for the U.S. and other Western powers to include Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in any talks about a non-military solution for a post-Assad Syria. Some of the same people only recently had strongly supported Assad’s removal, believing he was part of the problem, not the solution.
Washington’s decision to talk to Assad, if it comes to pass, would be a clear indication of the Obama administration’s failing Syrian policy. The air campaign has not weakened the Islamic State’s (IS) fighting ability, and the U.S.-trained fighters’ performance on the battlefield has been pitiful. They have even surrendered some U.S.-supplied weapons and vehicles to Jabhat al-Nusra, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, according to media reports.
The most glaring evidence of U.S. policy failure is the recent news report that Russia, Syria, and Iran are setting up a regional anti-IS center in Baghdad. Washington’s critical miscalculation, which underpins its policy failure, has been based on the premise that you could fight IS and Assad sequentially rather than concurrently.
Leave Assad Out of It
Including Assad in any discussions of the future of Syria is absurd for many reasons. First, if Assad views regime change as the ultimate outcome of the envisioned talks, he would work to torpedo the talks and cement his rule in areas under his control.
Second, Assad could perceive the talks as a bargaining chip to save him from facing international prosecution for crimes against humanity. If Assad were interested in saving Syria and its people from total destruction, he would have relinquished power over four years ago, much like what Mubarak of Egypt and Bin Ali of Tunisia did in response to their people’s uprisings. Assad should be held accountable for these atrocities.
Third, it’s naïve to think that talking to Assad would reduce the bloody violence and human tragedy in Syria. The IS and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups would continue to fight the regime and wouldn’t accept any transitional deal that would involve Assad or his regime.
Fourth, Russia and those Western countries that are pushing talks with Assad should learn a lesson from the Yemen experience. The agreement for a post-Saleh Yemen—supported by Saudi Arabia, the United States, and others—allowed former President Ali Abdallah Saleh to return to Yemen and escape legal accountability. Once he returned, he used his relatives and other key supporters in the old regime to conspire against the new government.
Fifth, if the United States and other powers are not prepared to send in troops to fight and dismantle Baghdadi’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Raqaa, engaging Assad will not do the trick. Allowing a bloodthirsty fox to decide on the future of the hen house is a travesty of epic proportions.
Multiple Threats
A workable strategy, which aims at removing Assad and combating IS, must consider the multiple long-term threats that underpin the Syrian tragedy and the rise of terrorism in region. Those threats include: radical Sunni ideology emanating from Saudi Arabia; entrenched dictatorships and unresponsive monarchies in Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, which Washington has been supporting; repression and suppression of civil and human rights, including women and religious and ethnic minorities; inadequate education; high unemployment, especially among the 15-29 cohort groups; and severe environmental degradation.
Sectarian factions and terrorist groups find such an environment welcoming. Reaching out to the “butcher of Syria” will not convince him to relinquish power. Nor will it alleviate these threats. On the contrary, it would increase his resolve.
The Way Forward
Any successful policy for Syria must have a well-defined mission of simultaneously getting rid of the Assad regime and containing IS. If the Obama administration remains adamant against putting American boots on the ground, it should take the lead in forming a “boots on the ground” coalition of willing regional states. Such a coalition could involve Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, having led the counter-revolution against the Arab Spring and having thwarted transitions to democracy across the region, should not be invited to join the coalition. Washington would provide logistical support, weapons, training, technical expertise, and intelligence. Although the United States would be leading the effort, regional states would be doing the fighting.
If the foot soldiers, their officers, and the overall command are committed to the twin mission of the war and have sufficient means to do the job, they could prevail, especially if corruption is kept under control. Once the coalition, with Turkey’s support, declares a safety zone and a no-fly zone, Washington should communicate this message to the Russians unambiguously and forcefully in order to avoid potential confrontation or mishaps with Russian forces in Syria.
This plan could yield results, but it’s difficult and costly. Talking to Assad is cheap and easy. But it will not yield tangible benefits for Syria and its people.
A longer version of this piece was originally published on LobeLog.
