One week after the failed military coup took place in Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has taken significant steps to consolidate his power, firing thousands of government employees from many different sectors. To better understand Erdogan’s actions and how they are viewed by the Turkish public, The Cipher Brief’s Fritz Lodge spoke with Aykan Erdemir, a former member of the Turkish Parliament from 2011-2015.
The Cipher Brief: It’s been about a week since the failed coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erodgan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led government. What is the current state of play?
Aykan Erdemir: This was a major coup attempt carried out by a faction within the Turkish military. The number of officers arrested, the nature of the clashes that took place and their distribution across the country indicate that the coup plotters were not a small group. I, therefore, call this a hybrid coup: multiple cliques joining forces to overthrow the government.
The brutality of the coup attempt and the ensuing loss of life justify the government’s extensive crackdown in the eyes of the public. President Erdogan is using the failed attempt, which he calls “a gift from God,” as an opportunity not to simply go after coup plotters, but also to bolster his one-man rule by carrying out large-scale purges.
As of today, there are over 50,000 people either suspended from their duties or arrested. It is difficult to believe that these lists were compiled after the coup based on concrete evidence resulting from a proper investigation of the conspiracy. This blacklist was most probably already in place, and Erdogan simply used the coup to carry out long awaited purges.
Turkey had a chain of coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007. The best way to stop coups is by strengthening the rule of law and due process, but that doesn’t seem to be what the AKP government is doing now. Ironically, the failed coup nevertheless seems to have succeeded in undermining the rule of law and due process in Turkey. If the coup was successful, it would have led to a military government, and hence no rule of law. The coup failed, but it still pushed the AKP, an elected government, into undermining the rule of law.
TCB: How does the Gulenist movement play into this? Could you explain a little more about Erdogan and the AKP’s relationship with the Gulenist movement and whether there is any validity to the idea that the coup attempt was a Gulenist-led conspiracy?
AE: Right from the start of the coup attempt, President Erdogan and Prime Minister Yildirim were certain that this was a Gulenist plot. They continue to emphasize this point. The more the public learned the details of the coup attempt, however, the clearer it became that the plotters were a larger coalition that simply cannot be reduced to members or sympathizers of the Gulen community. Among the alleged plotters there are officers who come from ultra-secular or nationalist backgrounds. There are also officers who feared the upcoming investigations in July, or early retirement in August. So, some of the plotters might have joined out of a concern for their careers. Overall, strong anti-Erdogan sentiments seem to be the glue that has brought this makeshift alliance together.
I think the government is knowingly obscuring the full scale of the coup plot by simply portraying this as a Gulenist conspiracy. This will give them the justification to carry out an extensive purge, while also salvaging a military that is suffering from a severe legitimacy deficit.
Focusing solely on individual agency and motivations will make us miss the institutional and political factors that have led to almost one coup each decade since 1960. The problem is not about this or that clique in the military. The Turkish military has a structural problem, a culture of impunity, and an accountability deficit. If the AKP just portrays the coup attempt as a Gulenist plot, the government will miss the bigger picture that there is an urgent need to reform civil-military relations in the country. Unless Turkey transforms its military ethos that leads to coups, such atrocities will be repeated.
TCB: Could you give a short summary of who exactly Fethullah Gulen is, who his followers are, and what relationship they have with the government?
AE: Fethullah Gulen is a reclusive Sunni cleric who is in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania. Up until December 2013, he was a close friend and key ally of Erdogan. The two leaders were an effective team: Erdogan is an Islamist-rooted politician who has mass appeal, whereas Gulen is a spiritual figure with an influential network in the media, education, finance, and trades. Gulen also used to wield great influence through his network in the bureaucracy, particularly the judiciary, and the police. From 2002 to 2013, this was a winning alliance: Erdogan’s political mobilization and the Gulen network’s cultural capital and influence in the bureaucracy enabled the AKP to win successive elections.
During the graft probe of December 2013, the two had a falling out and has become arch-enemies. For the last two-and-a-half years, there has been such a bitter fight between the two that they have neglected other adversaries, including the pro-secular groups. I believe that the Gulen network’s alleged involvement in the coup and Erdogan’s subsequent and systematic purge of Gulen sympathizers from the bureaucracy can simply be seen as another chapter in this ongoing fight between two former allies.
TCB: Going back to the military as an institution, what happens to them now? Clearly they’ve lost a huge amount of legitimacy, and as the crackdown extends, maybe even the loss of some real operational effectiveness. Where does the military go from here?
AE: This is not the first trauma of the Turkish military. Since 2008, a large number of military officers were tried and imprisoned with the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. The Turkish military was just recovering from those trials when the coup attempt took place. Right now, more than 6,000 military personnel are under arrest. This will be a very difficult damage to recover from. Turkey has lost a significant number of its generals, majors, and colonels, and more importantly the military has lost a lot of legitimacy, as well as knowhow and morale. This will be detrimental to Turkey’s ongoing fight against the Islamic State, as well as the PKK and its offshoot TAK. Moreover, this has the potential to undermine Turkey’s cooperation with NATO. If we also consider the current strain in Turkish-American relations, all of these factors can come together to result in a substantial security deficit for Turkey. Given that Turkey is in a very difficult and risky geography, it wouldn’t be surprising if some of Turkey’s adversaries take advantage of this crisis.
TCB: On the American relationship specifically, do you see that strain possibly being enough to even close the airbase at Incirlik or have some other real operational impact in the fight against ISIS?
AE: There will be at least two different problems in Turkish-American relations. One will be Turkey’s request for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen from the U.S. If the U.S. chooses not to comply with Turkey’s extradition request, tensions could escalate, and Ankara could take steps to pressure the U.S. into compliance.
The second source of tension is the AKP’s allegations about the U.S. involvement in the coup attempt. Turkish Minister of Labor and Social Security, Suleyman Soylu, announced on TV that the U.S. was behind the coup. He also added that the United States planned and was in part responsible for terrorism in Turkey’s southeast, and the troubles in Syria and Iraq. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry didn’t take long to respond to these accusations. Judging from the recent anti-American rhetoric in Turkey’s pro-government media, we can expect this crisis to worsen in the days to come. When this tension is combined with the crisis of Gulen’s extradition, the Incirlik airbase could turn into a bargaining chip. We could also see a weakening of Ankara’s commitment to join the fight against the Islamic State.
TCB: How about foreign relations with the rest of the region? This comes at a time when President Erdogan seemed to be trying to patch relations with neighbors like Russia and Israel. What do you think will happen to his foreign policy plans now, following the coup attempt?
AE: The more trouble Erdogan has domestically, the more he would like to improve relations with neighboring countries. It wouldn’t be surprising to see Turkey further improve relations with Russia. For example, the pilot who downed the Russian plane last November was also arrested as part of the coup probe. I think Erdogan will use this opportunity to signal to the Russians that the coup plotters were responsible for downing the Russian plane in an attempt to damage Turkish-Russian bilateral ties.
Iran responded immediately in defiance of the coup and in support of the elected government. Despite sectarian differences, Tehran would prefer an Islamist-rooted government to rule Turkey rather than the military which is known for its staunch secularism. Thus, Erdogan could use this opportunity to improve relations with Iran. On the Greek front, there were eight Turkish soldiers who escaped to Greece with a helicopter, and demanded asylum. Greek authorities cooperated immediately with Turkey and returned the helicopter. Although Israel is often the scapegoat of conspiracies in pro-government media, this time the U.S. seems to be receiving the bulk of the attacks. So far, Erdogan has been keen to keep the normalization with Israel on track, and hasn’t made use of his well-known anti-Semitic tirades.
With the exception of the U.S. front, Turkey’s crisis at home has lowered tensions internationally. In the months to come, Erdogan will spend most of his time and effort at home on what he sees as an existential threat to his one-man rule.
