Al Qaeda and the Islamic State thrive in lawless and ungoverned spaces where there is no rule of law to keep them in check. Al Qaeda’s home base in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is the epitome of such a place, but the tide there has been turning against them over the last decade, as Pakistan slowly improves its reach into these historically ungoverned lands. Terrorist organizations cannot thrive where there is a functioning government, rule of law, courts, effective policing, etc. Yes, they can exist and function in first world countries, but they really don’t thrive.
On one of my early forays to Pakistan in 2003, we were encouraging the Pakistan military to go into the then notorious Shakai Valley, a remote place in the FATA that had become ground zero for al Qaeda senior leadership and other miscreants. For us in the intelligence community, the Shakai Valley was the root of all evil. After some coaxing, in May 2004, the Pakistan military went into the Shakai Valley for the first time to confront al Qaeda in an attack led from the air, quickly followed by boots on the ground.
The evening of the attack, I was sitting with senior Pakistan military leaders drinking tea and congratulating them on the success of their foray into the FATA. They were glowing over their success, and there was almost a sense of disbelief in the room. Pakistan had taken the offensive, gone into the FATA, removed the terrorist threat, and then held its position overnight (and for a few subsequent days, or weeks). Talking about the day’s events, one Pakistani General, shaking his head in complete disbelief, told me that if I had asked him six months ago when he thought the Pakistan military would go into the FATA and take and hold land, he would have answered, “It won’t happen in my lifetime…”
Since the time of the partition from India in 1947, when Pakistan was created, the FATA had been set up sort of like what we know as an American Indian reservation. The Pakistan state still has little control over, or power in the FATA. But, over the last 15 years, the Pakistan military’s ability to operate in the FATA has improved, and this has kept the world safer by weakening the core of Al Qaeda. Remember, that despite some well-earned complaints about Pakistan, they are still the folks who first arrested and then turned over to the U.S. 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed and then a year and a half later, his replacement, Abu Faraj al Libi, both of whom are now in Guantanamo. That’s the good news on Pakistan. The bad news is that they have not gone nearly as fast, or quite as far, as we would have liked, but at least they’re moving in the right direction—albeit with a long way still to go.
But, if you contrast the above narrative with much of what is going on in Africa, you get another story, and it’s unsettling, as there is a growing sense of uneasiness over Africa in the Intelligence Community. The spread of al Qaeda and Islamic State ideology, and the consequent spread of terrorism in Africa, are getting worse, not better. At its core, the reason for this is the lack of good governance across wide swaths of Africa.
Unfortunately, and despite the international community efforts to make it otherwise, there are large parts of Africa where al Qaeda or Islamic State affiliates, like al Shabab, Boko Haram, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and others, are flourishing. In some places, we see al Qaeda and the Islamic State cooperating and, in others, they appear in competition with one another. Recent terrorist attacks in the heartland of Mali and Burkina Faso mark a disconcerting shift from al Qaeda’s ability to operate deep in the desert, to their conduct of major terrorist attacks in major cities in those countries. The threat posed by al Qaeda in the Sahel is increasing.
In many parts of Africa, it is easy for al Qaeda and the Islamic State to find places that hit their sweet spot of abject poverty coupled with a weak, corrupt, and dysfunctional governments. Unlike in Pakistan, where al Qaeda is foundering because it has been under sustained pressure from both U.S. forces in Afghanistan and from the Pakistan military and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), many terrorist groups in Africa are operating virtually unchecked. The porous borders in much of Africa only exacerbate the problem.
The quickest way to slow the growth of the Al Qaeda or Islamic State affiliates in Africa would be to restore law and order to Somalia and to other failed states via good government coupled with law enforcement capabilities, an intelligence apparatus, and a working military that could challenge the terrorists—easier said than done. This is no easy task, and “fixing” Africa has been something that has bedeviled the international community for generations. The vast, sprawling, poorly governed spaces that stretch across a continent that is as wide as the United States make bringing the rule of law to Africa a special challenge.
People usually don’t turn to radical Muslim extremism as a way of life when things are going well for them. But, an improvement in economic conditions, smart phones, the Internet, and 200+ cable channels are only part of the puzzle. Economic improvement is not the panacea for terrorism that many people think it is. If you look at the 9/11 attackers, for example, all were from pretty well to do families, who lived life styles that were far above middle class. Remember, these were young men whose fathers were professionals, and they were all on visas studying in Europe, or the United States. In some ways, they were probably more economically advantaged than most Americans. We saw the same phenomena with the radicalism in the U.S. in the sixties. It was not the poor kids from Harlem or Compton who were agitating, it was usually the rich kids in schools like Harvard and Berkley, and it wasn’t really about economics, but rather, about a lack of faith in the system and about changing social mores.
People don’t suddenly go berserk and join Al Qaeda because they’re poor or when the opportunity presents itself because of the lack of police presence. No, joining al Qaeda or the Islamic State is more of a last gasp desperation move when the local government is so corrupt and self-serving, steals elections, steals money; there is no justice; the court system doesn’t work; and it seems the future is hopeless. Maybe they’re poor, or maybe they’re rich, but they are clearly exasperated that things are not fair, nothing works like it should, and the future looks bleak.
When their political leaders are unable or unwilling to deliver, they turn to religious leaders who are promising law and order, decency and fairness, courts that actually work to resolve disputes, and protection. Whether they actually get it with groups like al Qaeda, the Islamic State, or the Taliban is another question, but they turn to them because they feel their back is against the wall and they have nothing to lose. This is like the situation in Iraq and Syria with the Islamic State. The absolute worst thing for the Islamic State would be some conclusion to the hostilities and the reestablishment of functioning governments in Baghdad and Damascus. If you want to stem the spread of terrorism in Africa, work to build decent governments in Africa. As a series of CIA Directors commented in the recent Showtime documentary, The Spymasters: we can’t kill our way out of terrorism.
