As we approach early May, when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is expected to hold the first Party Congress in more than three decades, Kim is determined to demonstrate to the world that his nation is strong and has achieved the status of a nuclear military power and that there can be no rollback to this capability. Yesterday, Pyongyang announced that the North had successful test-fire a submarine-launched ballistic missile that, according to a quote from Kim Jong-un would give North Korea the ability to “push an annihilate-the-enemy knife nto the back of the heads of the South Korean puppets and the US imperialists any time it pleases.” This follows an unsuccessful first test launch on April 17th of what is believed to be the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile, a system designed to target US and allied forces that would come to the aid of South Korea in a conflict. In addition, South Korean President Park Geun-hye told the international media last week that the North is preparing for its fifth North Korean nuclear test.
Many observers, including some North Korean defectors, cite Kim’s owns statements to support the “truism”’ that he will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that Kim wants to convince the United States and its allies that North Korea cannot be deterred from achieving nuclear status on par with the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. He believes that the survival of his regime rest in large part on his ability to demonstrate the power to threaten the nuclear devastation of his potential adversaries as shown by a recent North Korean video that shows the White House in flames after a North Korean missile strike.
Kim’s ultimate goal, however, is the survival of himself and the Kim family regime. There is an opportunity at this moment, therefore, to alter his calculations by disrupting his elite support. The UN sanctions passed last month are the toughest ever placed on North Korea. If fully implemented, particularly by China, they will have a profound impact on an already weak North Korean economy. The North Korean regime is showing signs of nervousness about the effect of these new sanctions. An article in the ruling party’s newspaper in late March warned the populace that the country may be facing another “Arduous March” of tough economic times and exhorted them not to waver in their support for Kim.
The United States and its allies should seize this opportunity to convince Beijing and Moscow that, if sanctions are fully implemented, we may be able to turn elite opinion in North Korea against the nuclear strategy. Another commonly accepted “truism” that needs reassessing is that the North Korean elites will not turn against Kim because their fate is bound with his. However, Kim is a young, third-generation despot and has acted with unprecedented cruelty and viciousness—not demonstrated by either his father or grandfather—in purging potential rivals within the elite to his power. Elite support for him cannot be as strong as the support for his father and grandfather because, given the deteriorating economy, Kim cannot deliver the same level of financial rewards to the elites.
South Korea’s unification ministry reports that defections by North Koreans increased significantly in the first three months of this year. This may be a leading indicator that Kim’s hold on power is weakening and, if sanctions take hold, discontent among the intelligentsia is likely to rise. This, in conjunction with unilateral US sanctions against North Korean elites residing abroad, stands a good chance of increasing the pressure on Kim to chart a course toward meaningful negotiations in order avoid his demise at the hands of his own subordinates.
When Kim successfully launches a Musudan missile as the first step toward developing an ICBM designed to threaten the continental United States or conducts another nuclear test, some will argue that it’s time to reconsider US policy because it has failed to deter the North. I believe that would be a mistaken conclusion based on faulty truisms. Kim is pursuing nuclear weapons out of regime weakness not strength. The correct course would be to redouble our efforts to press China, Russia, Europe and others to impose tough economic sanctions on the North to convince Kim and his elites that regime survival is only possible if he negotiates away his nuclear ambitions.
