Since becoming President in June, Rodrigo Duterte has used his forceful personality to take Filipino policy in new directions. For Western allies like the U.S., this has led to confusing public statements that have forced them to question the strength of their partnerships. The Cipher Brief spoke with political scientist Richard Heydarian of LaSalle University to learn more about Duterte’s motivations and future plans for Filipino foreign policy.
The Cipher Brief: What is Duterte’s vision for the Philippines’ regional role? Where does he want to take the country?
Richard Heydarian: Duterte is very much steeped in Cold War-era ideology of “Third Worldism,” which was espoused by the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), such as Sukarno of Indonesia and Nasser of Egypt. He is a self-described “socialist,” who came of age during the Vietnam War era and has over the past few decades, cultivated strong ties with leaders of various leftist-progressive groups, including insurgency movements in Mindanao.
By all means, he seems to not only have cultivated an aversion towards America as the embodiment of Western “imperialism” but seems to be a believer in an emerging post-American world in the 21st century, where Asian giants, such as China, will be playing an increasingly pivotal role. So, quite strangely, he is both a man of the past and the future. His conception of an “independent” foreign policy is a Philippines that is less dependent on America and has more leeway in shaping its foreign policy formulation and conduct. He believes the Philippines has been too intertwined with and subservient to America. So a recalibration in the existing alliance, Duterte reckons, is overdue.
TCB: Recently, President Duterte’s spokesman stated the Philippines wishes to have an “open relationship” with the U.S. and to pursue stronger relations with other countries, particularly China and Russia. What does he mean by this, and how does he see it benefitting the Philippines? What risks is he taking with this approach? Is Duterte’s desire to distance the Philippines from the U.S. a response to the U.S.’s reaction to his war on drugs, is it specific to President Obama’s administration, or does it stem from something else?
RH: Duterte’s dramatic tirades against America and the West in general in the past few weeks are a reflection of three factors. First and foremost, it is his way of signaling a more “independent” Philippine foreign policy, one that is more critical of existing entanglements with the West as well as more explorative and flexible in search of new strategic partnerships. In many ways, his criticism of Western “imperialism” and interference in the affairs of developing countries mirrors his deep-seated personal convictions. But this factor alone doesn’t explain the timing of his recent tirades and how they have reached a fever pitch. If anything, Duterte displayed relative diplomatic finesse towards America and other allies in his first month in office.
Clearly, there is the element of his growing irritation and concerns over American and Western criticism of his human rights record and his “shock and awe” approach to fighting illegal drugs and criminality in the country. He seems to be personally slighted by the Obama administration’s explicit criticism of his signature war on drugs policy. While there is no excuse for his expletive-laced language, there is clearly some sincere mixture of rage and defiance in his tone. After all, down the road, it is possible that Washington and Brussels may even adopt targeted punitive measures against the Philippine government due to human rights concerns. By threatening to downgrade ties with the West, he is also trying to dissuade the West from pursuing a tougher criticism of his war on drugs campaign, if not targeted sanctions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Duterte is also trying to signal to Beijing that he is willing to tinker with the parameters of existing military ties with the West, particularly America, in exchange for Chinese concessions in the South China Sea, from a joint fisheries agreement in the Scarborough Shoal to a mutual non-aggression pact in the areas of overlapping claims. Severing ties with America altogether, however, is a step too far for Duterte, since this could provoke a backlash among the Filipino security establishment that is very favorably predisposed to and dependent on America, which has been an indispensable source of intelligence, funding, logistical support, and training over decades. But the Duterte administration may indeed suspend joint patrols and military exercises with America in the South China Sea as part of a grand bargain with Beijing.
TCB: It appears this growing rift is a problem that will persist into the next U.S. administration. What can the next president do to try and get relations back on the right course with?
RH: Honestly, by and large most policy makers and experts in the region prefer Secretary Hillary Clinton as Obama’s successor. Trump’s extraordinarily low approval ratings, even among Asian-Americans, reflect the broader regional antipathy towards the Republican candidate, who is seen as too mercurial and dangerously unpredictable, not to mention neo-isolationist and nativist in rhetoric, and likely in actual policy, if and when in Oval Office. In contrast, Hillary Clinton is seen as a more predictable, mature, and Asia-focused leader, who will upgrade the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia strategy by adding more flesh and substance to its still-skeletal structure. Entertainment factor aside, many experts believe a Duterte-Trump combination is simply too risky to imagine. It is a potentially explosive combination, notwithstanding their expressed preference, quite paradoxically, for a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire foreign policy strategy.
To begin with, the next American administration has to ensure that its pivot to Asia strategy, particularly its military aspect, isn’t beholden to the vicissitudes of Philippine politics. Diversification is the name of the game, and that is why expanded military cooperation with Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, and other regional states is of utmost importance. Moreover, Obama’s successor will have to be patient and calibrated in its exchanges with the Duterte administration. It has to be tough on human rights and democracy issues, but at the same time not be too publicly confrontational vis-à-vis a strong-willed leader like Duterte, who is easily irritable.
Regardless of the Duterte administration’s diplomatic posture, Washington should constantly emphasize the relevance of the Philippines’ landmark arbitration case against China as a basis to establish a rule-based, just, and peaceful resolution of the South China Sea disputes. It will have to expand Freedom of Navigation operations, along with allies such as Japan and Australia, to counter China’s excessive claims in the area, which was nullified by the arbitral tribunal at The Hague.
Dealing with the Duterte administration is not unlike how Washington has dealt with prickly allies such as Turkey in recent years. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has repeatedly threatened to pivot to Russia and China, there has been some discernible deterioration in diplomatic ties between Ankara and Washington, particularly due to differences on human rights and democracy issues. Yet, both sides have ensured that the fundamentals of their military alliance aren’t disrupted by political differences. We may very well see a similar dynamic between Manila and Washington under the Duterte administration. So the incoming government in Washington should be ready for years of patient and calibrated diplomacy towards a historical alliance, which is not looking as special and sacrosanct as before but is still a fulcrum for regional security.
