Tsai Ing-wen’s inaugural address and Beijing’s reaction to it have done nothing more than confirm the fact that has been evident for the past few months: cross-strait relations are entering a period of stalemate.
The mainland’s position was reaffirmed in the post-inaugural statement of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office. The statement said that Tsai had failed to “explicitly recognize” the 1992 consensus and its “core meaning” that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. According to Beijing, this understanding had been the foundation for peaceful development in the past. This omission was said to represent an “incomplete examination paper” (meiyou wancheng dajuan).
It has been clear for some time that Tsai was likely to fail the mainland’s test. The political realities in Taiwan, primarily those within the Democratic Progressive Party as well as the broader base of public opinion, made it unlikely that these conditions would be met. Given these political constraints, her pre-inauguration statements simply recognized that the 1992 meetings had been made possible by an agreement to set aside differences and seek common ground while pledging to maintain a peaceful status quo. She did little more in her inaugural address to meet mainland demands.
Now that the stalemate has been confirmed by Tsai’s speech, the next move is Beijing’s. It must demonstrate its dissatisfaction with Tsai’s position, but how will it do so?
In its pre-inaugural statements, Beijing threatened a number of sanctions that would result from Tsai’s failure meet its conditions. These ranged from specifics such as limiting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, to suspending the cross-strait meetings of the past, to more general warnings that it would oppose Taiwan pursuing independence in “any form.”
In the early days of the Chen Shui-bian administration, the mainland spoke of listening to his words and watching his actions. However, in the view of many observers, Beijing had already made up its mind and very quickly abandoned any trust in Chen.
Tsai Ing-wen is deeply distrusted by mainland commentators on Taiwan – even more than Chen, according to some. Will China behave similarly in the early days of the Tsai administration or will it be restrained and look for possible avenues of constructive discussion? Beijing is not averse to pursuing ambiguous formulations when it is seen as in their interest. The 1992 consensus is a telling example. This could be an element in its response to Tsai’s administration.
There are clearly incentives for both sides to seek some basis for modus vivendi and to avoid a crisis. Good relations with the mainland are important to Taiwan. They are essential for Taiwan’s overall security; for the development of its economy; its future in the emerging economic architecture in Asia; and its relationship with the United States.
Beijing also has an interest in acting with restraint. Taiwan investment is still an important element in its economy. There still appears to be hope that the mainland can win the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan. Finally, China’s leadership must consider the impact on already complicated Sino-American relations.
Still, the political constraints on either side’s changing positions are considerable. Reunification with Taiwan is a key element in Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” What kind of “national rejuvenation” can be accomplished if Taiwan drifts away? The last three years of the Ma Ying-jeou administration revealed a Taiwan public that deeply distrusted his rapprochement with the mainland. Although Tsai seems to enjoy greater public trust in negotiating with the mainland, that deep distrust remains.
So, in the months ahead, both sides of the Taiwan Strait must act with restraint in a continuingly fragile situation. Too sharp a reaction to a seemingly inevitable downturn in relations from either side could be met with a provocative response that would lead to a quickly escalating crisis situation in an already tense East Asia.
Steven M. Goldstein recently joined the John Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University as an associate after teaching at Smith College. At the Fairbank Center he is director of the Taiwan Studies Workshop. His most recent book China and Taiwan was published by Polity Press.
